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CHAPTER 1
Chapter 1 - Setting the stage – Theoretical and Thematic 
Context
Burma is one of the poorest countries in the world1, ,and it has been in a state of civil war more 
or less continuously since independence from Great Britain in 1948. People from the ethnic 
minority group of  Karen in  Eastern Burma are  being systematically abused by the ruling 
military junta in a manner that has led several NGOs and human rights groups to claim that it 
can be defined as crimes against humanity (see for instance Amnesty International (2008); the 
Thai  Burmese Border  Consortium (2008);  and Horton (2005)).  The situation of   refugees 
moving from Eastern Burma to the Thai side of the border is one of the most prolonged in the 
world (UNHCR 2010). That is the gloomy backdrop of this study. 
The title of the thesis is a quote from one of my informants, a student at the school for 
Karen refugees in Thailand where I was a volunteer teacher during most of my time in the 
field. We were talking about her plans, and she was letting me in on her thoughts about the 
future.  For her internship period – the final  stage of her education at  the school she was 
currently  attending,  she  planned  to  work  with  the  Karen  Women's  Organization,  a  well-
organized and powerful  organization in  the Karen refugee community.  After  finishing her 
internship  she  would  go  back  to  the  refugee  camp and  apply  for  resettlement  in  a  third 
country2 because  she  wanted  to  learn  English  and political  science.  However,  on  another 
occasion she told me that after finishing school she would go to work with children inside 
Karen State in Burma, where she originally came from. 
This sort of apparently incoherent statements was a phenomenon I came across several 
times in conversations with students. As a refugee (characterized as "Temporarily Displaced" 
by the Thai government) with close to no rights in the host country; as a member of an ethnic 
group  subject  to  systematic  abuses  by  the  ruling  regime  in  Burma;  and  as  person  with 
marginal economic resources her choices were limited, to say the least. Knowing this, she still 
told me about her plans for the future. The reason why I used her quote as a title is, in addition 
to  the  fact  that  it  was  uttered  during  a  conversation  which  was  deeply  moving  for  me 
personally, that it illustrates, I believe, one of the overarching problems that Karen refugees in 
Thailand face:  The  lack  of  control  of  their  own fates,  the  apparent  hopelessness  of  their 
1 The CIA World Factbook (2010b) ranks Burma number 208 out of 227 countries listed, measuring GDP per 
capita. There are of course a number of other ways of measuring poverty.
2 «Third Country» is the term commonly used for the destination of resettlement through the UN. Implicit, 
then, Burma is the first country and Thailand the second. 
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situation, as it has been, more or less, for 25 years. Simultaneously however, these notions are, 
as in that quote, being clearly articulated. 
In this thesis, driving forces behind a spirit that can be described as  "we shall never 
give up" are explored (Chapter 2), and changing gender relations, presenting new possibilities 
and constraints, are pinpointed (Chapter 3 and 4). The apparent  incongruity between the plans 
presented by many of my informants and the "real" and actual possibilities they had is also a 
central issue forming a key in my  discussions of subjectivity formation among  young Karen 
refugees (Chapter 4).
1.1. Problem statement and aim of thesis
I entered the field with the intention of investigating gender relations among Karen refugees in 
Thailand.  As  field  work progressed I  realized  the  perhaps  obvious  point  that  ideas  about 
gender and gender relations are closely intertwined with other elements of identification. In 
the case of Karen, ethnicity stood out especially as a central factor of identification. Also, the 
relation to their homeland, Karen State, was a prominent element in people's consciousness, 
something much referred to and, apparently, thought about. When dealing with the question of 
how identity and gender relations are constructed and changed in a refugee situation therefore, 
I see this in relation to ethnicity, nationalism and the imagination of Karen State. I will also be 
focusing on young people, since the majority of my informants were in their early twenties.
Another  prevalent  issue  that  was  discussed  a  lot  amongst  my  informants  during 
fieldwork was what and how they thought about and hoped for their future. I came to see this 
too as strongly related to feelings about Karen State,  and notions of ethnicity in terms of 
belonging to one common territory. My problem statement can thus be read as follows: 
How is the state of refugee leading to changes in identity construction and gender  
relations  among  young  Karens  on  the  Thai-Burmese  border?  How  do  they  
conceptualize their own existence as a refugee, and how do they deal with it? What  
does  their  perception  of  their  own situation  imply  in  terms of  the  relationship  
between people and place  - of how they think about their homeland? And, as a  
prolongation - what is the role of notions of ethnicity and sentiments of nationalism  
in the subjectivity formation of Karen refugees? How does changing circumstances 
in the transition between Karen State and the refugee camp affect the ways young 
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Karen refugees think about themselves in the world? (How) does it affect what they 
think about their possibilities for the future –  (how) does it affect how (or whether) 
they go about making meaning of their lives? 
1.2. Background and brief history
1.2.1. The Union of Burma: ethnicity as a political instrument
Once called "the rice basket of Asia", Burma is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia, 
rich in natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas, hydropower, timber, precious stones 
and minerals. 70% of the total population is primarily occupied with agriculture, while 23% 
are service providers (CIA 2010b). 
 The relationship with neighboring countries is shifting in accordance with shifting 
political climates. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hesitant to 
condemn Burma's military government since their inclusion in 1997. This is due to a number 
of reasons. Tense political histories in the other member countries make them hesitate to point 
out weaknesses in the government of the other countries of the Association. Moreover, an 
alleged approach of "constructive engagement" rather than fierce confrontation and criticism 
is generally applied (Amer 1999). The vast natural resources in Burma make the country an 
attractive trading partner. Thailand and China are the two major partners - Thailand buys 52% 
of Burma's export, while China contributes to 31% of the total imports to the country (CIA 
2010b).
Internationally,  Burma enjoys  the  more  or  less  stable  support  of  both  Russia  and 
China. Thus, attempts of raising the issue of Burma in the UN Security Council have been 
blocked at an early stage (American Society of International Law 2007). 
Burma  is  culturally  very  diverse,  with  eight  major  ethnic  groups  and  an  official 
estimate of 135 subgroups (Gravers 2007)3. The largest ethnic group is the Burman (68%), 
then follows Shan 9%, and Karen 7% ((Smith (2007) in Berg (2009:8)).  Ethnologue (2009) 
lists 111 different languages spoken, the number of minority language speakers ranging from 
around a hundred  (Khmu) to 3,2 million (Shan). S'gaw Karen, the Karen language with the 
most  speakers,  counts to  1,280,000.  The total  population in  Burma is  estimated variously 
3 This categorization is questioned by Gravers however, both in terms of the categories applied for "qualifying" 
as an ethnic group, and in terms of the reliability of the counting done by the Burmese regime.
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between 48 millions (Gravers 2007) and 52 millions (Taylor 2005 in Berg 2009). 
Ethnic relations in pre-colonial Burmese kingdoms is hard to reconstruct. However, 
according to Gravers (2007:13) ethnicity was  not "a part of the power model as a decisive 
mechanism of difference and as an instrument of vertical or horizontal inclusion/exclusion". 
Ethnicity was one of several concepts distinguishing people and shaping the sociopolitical 
landscape, but most of all it played a part on the individual level, and was thus important for 
personal relations (Gravers 2007:10). Conglomerates of alliances organized horizontally were 
intertwined with vertical class identifications, and hillside-lowland as well as urban-rural were 
distinctions  which  affected  relations  of  power  as  much  as  ethnicity  (Gravers  2007:9-13). 
Forested, non-Burman areas were often areas of rebellion against the shifting central powers, 
even though conflict was not first and foremost ethnically based (Gravers 2007:12). 
The British took 62 years to colonize Burma through a series of three Anglo-Burmese 
wars between 1824 and 1886. Burma was then a part of the British Empire for another 62 
years, between 1886 and 1948, up until 1937 as a part of British India (CIA 2010b). Ethnic 
differences became territorialized in an absolute sense when the British began mapping Burma 
in 1826. They split the country's population into "civilized" and "primitive", "tribal societies" 
excluded as subjects of the empire. They defined frontier areas where they argued that the 
Burmese kingdom had never de facto extended its authority, and these areas were not included 
in  Burma Proper  (or Ministerial  Burma).  This definition was later  central  to  many ethnic 
groups', among them Karens' claim for autonomy. Ethnicity became the central definition of 
difference in  colonial  Burma,  actively advocated by the British administration,  and ethnic 
identity became "reified  and bounded,  based  on absolute  differences  in  race,  religion  and 
mentality" (Gravers 2007:14). 
From the early 20th century a nationalist movement emerged, which came to be led by 
general Aung San. During the World War II, his group of Thirty Comrades, played a strategic 
game of shifting allies from the Japanese to the British to gain Burmese independence (Berg 
2007:5-6).  After  the  war  Aung  San  emerged  as  the  leading  figure  in  the  independence 
movement. He was in a unique political position because he nurtured close ties to leaders of 
the two largest, and fiercely competing, political parties in Burma at the time, the Communist 
Party of Burma (CPB) and the Socialists, who, despite their name, were politically quite right-
wing. In his strife for national unity he also attempted political agreements with the ethnic 
minorities, and launched the Panglong Conference in February 1947, where leaders of the 
4
CHAPTER 1
Shan, Kachin and Chin groups all signed such agreements. The scheme of the conference was 
to include all  former frontier  areas into a Union of Burma. Aung San guaranteed cultural 
autonomy, and the agreement included a right to secession from the Union after ten years. 
However, the exclusion from the British Empire on the grounds of alleged historical autonomy 
was used by some ethnic groups (among them the Karen) to refuse the agreement. The Karens 
expected  the  British  to  secure  an  independent  Karen  State  as  part  of  the  independence 
negotiations (Gravers 2007). 
Through the assassination of Aung San in July 1947 six months before independence, 
Burma lost  a charismatic leader,  a neutralizing factor on the central  political  arena,  and a 
reconciliatory force  towards  the  ethnic  minorities  which  constituted  almost  a  third  of  the 
population  (Lintner  1994:xv).  Within  six  months  after  independence,  the  communists  and 
several ethnic minority groups, including the Karen National Union (KNU), had turned their 
guns against the government in Rangoon, demanding political power or autonomy for their 
region (Lintner 1994:xv). In spite of several attempts at cease-fire agreements, the state of war 
between the KNU and the Burman government army has lasted until today.
In 1962 General Ne Win and his State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
took power in a military coup. The ideology guiding his leadership was termed the "Burmese 
way  to  socialism",  "a  hodgepodge  of  Marxism,  Buddhist  thinking  and  humanism which 
reflected  an  attempt  by  the  military  regime  to  be  seen  as  belonging  to  Burma's  specific 
political  traditions" (Lintner  1994:171).  People's  freedom  was  severely  restricted,  and 
isolationist  economic  policies  soon  lead  the  country  into  poverty.  Students  demonstrated 
against  the  military take-over  early  on,  and  were  met  with  disproportionate  violence.  An 
underground resistance movement developed in response to the developing totalitarianism of 
the authorities. Following an apparently uncalled for devaluation of the Burmese currency in 
1987, the well-known 08-08-88 uprisings in Rangoon and other major towns and villages led 
to an unknown number of thousands of demonstrators being killed by the junta. Following the 
uprisings,  General  Ne  Win  stood  down,  but  he  remained  an  important  figure  behind  the 
scenes, the military remained in power and even though the one-party system was formally 
abolished, the politics stayed the same (Lintner 1994). 
The arrival of Aung San Suu Kyi  -  Aung San's  daughter -  in 1988 gave Burmese 
people  a  new unifying  icon.  Suu  Kyi  with  her  opposition  party  the  National  League  for 
Democracy (NLD) traveled to all corners of the country giving speeches on democracy and 
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non-violent resistance. Her house-arrest in 1989, which has continued on-and-off until today, 
did not diminish her status. When the NLD won a landslide victory in the general elections in 
1990, SLORC refused to hand over power. Many party representatives who had been elected 
members  of  parliament  were  arrested,  while  others  managed  to  flee  the  country. 
Simultaneously, warfare against ethnic insurgency groups continued (Lintner 1994). 
In 1997 SLORC changed their  name to the State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC). They still hold power under senior general Than Shwe. National elections have been 
announced in 2010, and though opinions differ among oppositional groups on the potential for 
improvement following the election, many observers agree that there is no intention on the 
government side of making serious efforts to facilitate a transition to democracy (Irrawaddy 
2009; 2010). Several offensives against ethnic insurgency groups have been launched, and 
following  student  and  monk  demonstrations  in  Rangoon in  2007,  raids  against  suspected 
protesters  have  increased.  According  to  Human  Rights  Watch  there  are  more  than  2100 
political prisoners in government prisons, and "the Burmese military continues to perpetrate 
violations  against  civilians  in  ethnic  conflict  areas,  including  extrajudicial  killings,  forced 
labor, and sexual violence" (Human Rights Watch 2010). 
Ethnicity has been an important political instrument in Burma ever since they started 
operating as a national entity. Competing definitions and characterizations of ethnic groups 
signify battles over the definition of reality, and struggles for political influence. For instance, 
the government's insistence on focusing on the 135 "national races" instead of the eight "big 
races", can be seen as an attempt at weakening the foundation of struggles for autonomy based 
on  for instance one pan-Karen ethnic identity. In the words of Gravers (2007: 8-9): "Ethnicity 
in  Burma has  become  part  of  a  political  strategy of  ethnic  differences  developed  during 
colonial era and further escalated in the turbulent post-colonial time."
1.2.2. Karens and Karen State
Karen State is situated in the mountainous eastern border area of Burma towards Thailand (see 
appendix 2).  It  covers  an area of a little  over  30,000 km² (roughly the size of  Belgium). 
Administratively, Burma is divided into seven states and seven divisions. States and divisions 
are units at the same administrative level, the difference being that states are associated with a 
corresponding ethnic minority group (Shan, Karen, Karenni etc.) while all the divisions are 
considered Burman areas. Karen State is one of the seven states. Each state is further divided 
into administrative units called townships, followed by divisions, and then the lowest level 
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unit, the village. 
 A number of rivers run through Karen State,  constituting important  transportation 
routes and the foundation for livelihood for the people who live there. Most of Karen State is 
covered with sub-tropical rainforest. Physical infrastructure is limited.
Estimated numbers of Karens in Burma and the border area vary quite widely, due to 
both  practical  estimation  difficulties  and  relative  to  who  is  doing  the  counting.  Ethnic 
Conflicts in Southeast Asia (Snitwongse and Thompson 2005:67) note that the Government of 
Burma estimates the number to around 6,2 million, while the KNU states that the number is 
around 7 million (KNU n/a), and other sources as high as 10 million (Mahn Aung Lwin in 
Engelbert and Kubitscheck 2004:89). The Karen occupy the eastern border area of Burma, 
towards Thailand. In addition it is estimated that around 300 000 Karens not originating from 
Burma live in Thailand,  where they constitute the largest  of the so-called hilltribes.  Their 
subsistence  is  mainly  based  on  agriculture,  fishing  and  forestry,  with  local  variations. 
According to Thawnghmung (2008:3) 15-20 percent are Christian, 5-10 percent are animist 
whereas the majority of Karens are Buddhist.
The Karen "comprises of conglomerates of diverse ethnic groups" (Gravers 2007:228). 
Though Delang (2003) holds that  ethnic  identification among Karens is  mainly linguistic, 
Ethnologue (2009) listed 10 different Karen languages, S’gaw Karen and Pwo Karen being the 
two largest ones. The two languages are related dialects of Karen, though too far apart for 
them to  understand  each  other  (South  2007b:2).  The  diversity  of  the  different  subgroups 
makes  the  existence of  the  concept  of  one  Karen  ethnicity  questionable  from a  "cultural 
content" point  of  view.  Why  are  they  considered,  by  the  Burmese  government,  and  by 
themselves, as one ethnic group at all? However, in accordance with a transversive view of 
ethnicity following the lines laid out by Barth (1969) and paying attention to the history that 
has shaped both ascription and self-ascription of ethnic identity as much as being shaped by it, 
I will leave the debate about whether Karens are a  "real" ethnic group or not. What matters 
here is the fact that perceptions of ethnicity and thus claims to political rights and autonomy 
related  to  these  perceptions,  are  central  in  the  case  of  Karen.  Therefore,  I  will  settle  for 
describing  them as  one  ethnic  group.  I  will  however,  later  on  be  giving  attention  to  the 
contestedness surrounding their self-proclaimed unity and homogeneity, since such attention is 
vital  to  understanding  the  rationale  behind  the  Karen  struggle,  as  well  as  individual  and 
collective identity construction.
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A number of reported hardships face people in Karen State. I will briefly account for 
the ones commonly considered the most influential ones affecting the quality of life. 
Conditions in Karen State 
It is estimated that a total of at least 451,000 people are internally displaced inside Burma 
(UNHCR 2010), many of them in the eastern parts. Altsean (2010) reports that 75,000 were 
displaced between July 2008 and December 2009 alone. Military offensives against Karen 
areas by the SPDC have been reported frequently the past year, forcing hundreds or thousands 
at the time to flee to Thailand. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) warned in 
November  2009  once  more  about  increasing  security  threats  (DVB  2009;  DVB  2010a). 
Forced relocation4 and the destruction of more than 3500 villages since 1996 is according to 
the TBBC recognized as the major single indicator of crimes against  humanity in eastern 
Burma (TBBC 2007b). 
Landmines is a major concern, and reports of civilians stepping on landmines being 
mutilated or killed are relatively frequent. The number of landmines in Karen State is not 
known, but the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2008) reports that it is a registered 
problem in all of the townships in Karen State. Interestingly, the ICBL reports that both SPDC 
and a number of ethnic insurgency groups, including the Karen National Union (KNU), use 
landmines in their warfare. 
Forced labor for the government army – the Tatmadaw - is another issue facing many 
civilians, especially in areas under stable SPDC control. Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) 
reported in March 2010 that forced labor was increasingly affecting the lives of people in 
Toungoo district, whether they are subject to it or live in hiding to escape it. Movement and 
trade  restrictions,  arbitrary  taxation,  forced  labor  in  food  production,  construction,  porter 
service for the army or even forced conscription or using civilians as  "mine-sweepers" are 
amongst the tactics employed (KHRG 2010). A  number of national development projects 
have  been  attempted in  Karen State,  including a  number  of  planned dam projects  on the 
Salween river in cooperation with Thai and Chinese authorities. This has lead to an increase of 
forced labor and forced relocation on proposed dam sites (TBBC 2007b). 
The KWO reports rape and sexual abuse of women by the Burmese army as "widely 
4 Note that relocation and resettlement does here not refer to the same. Whereas resettlement denotes an 
organized moving to a third country through the overall administration of the UNHCR, relocation denotes the 
act of forcing people to leave their homes inside Karen State. Either alternative villages is pointed out, or 
they flee «into the jungle». 
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committed in Karen, Karenni and Shan states" (KWO 2004:10). In their report,  the KWO 
were able to document 125 cases of rape in Karen areas, but estimates that the real number is 
much  higher.  Similar  reports  have  been  published  by  the  Shan  Women  Action  Network 
(SWAN 2002). 
General humanitarian situation
Burma in general ranks low on international standards of human development. The UNDP 
Human Development Index ranked Burma 130 out of 177 countries, and the WHO ranked the 
health sector 190 out of 191. Average income for the majority of Burmese is less than $200 
per year, a good deal lower than the UN limit denoting "extreme poverty". Eastern Burma 
generally ranks lower than the average. Infant and child mortality and malnutrition in children 
are  high,  and  malaria,  HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis,  are  considered  epidemics  in  the  area. 
Sanitation and hygiene facilities remain arbitrary and this causes diseases such cholera and 
diarrhea to be widespread (Mae Tao Clinic n/a). 
In the field of education, a lack of school buildings, material and teachers compromise 
the accessibility of schooling for children of all  ages, even though completion of primary 
school is compulsory. Only SPDC controlled areas are allowed to offer 4th to 10th standard 
education, and these levels are generally not found in rural areas (Mae Tao Clinic n/a). 
White, black and brown areas 
The Burmese regime use a three-part territorial categorization of Karen State; white, black and 
brown areas. Areas where the threat of insurgency has been removed and where the SPDC 
hold control are labeled "white" areas, while "black" areas are controlled by the KNU. Areas 
of fluctuating control are called  "brown" areas. People living in black areas are subject to a 
more aggressive treatment from SPDC officials, as they are seen as potential insurgents. "The 
use of terror against the population is more intense here" and they "can be shot by government 
troops on sight" (Lang 2002 in Berg 2009:14). The political attitudes of people in white and 
brown  areas  concerning  Karen  nationalism  is  less  known  than  the  dominant  black  area 
discourse that seems to prevail in the camps. According to Thawnghmung (2008) many Karen 
in white areas are sympathetic to the nationalist cause even though they have no possibility of 
joining the insurgency. People in brown areas generally have to be cautious about actively 
taking sides, since they risk sanctions from both SPDC and Karen soldiers. However, Smith 
(2007)  points  out  that  "little  is  known  of  what  goes  on  in  the  minds  of  many  Karens 
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concerning their loyalties to Karen nationalism, since the great majority are poor rice farmers 
occupied with survival" (in Berg 2009:14). 
1.2.3. The Thailand-Burma border situation
The Karen National Union (KNU) have been rebelling since 1949 and have increasingly been 
pushed back towards the Thai border since the mid 1970's. However, up until the mid 1980's 
the Burmese Army had only managed dry season offensives in Karen State, pulling back in the 
rainy season. The first wave of refugees from Burma to Thailand came in 1984 when the 
Burmese Army for the first time launched a major offensive after which they managed to hold 
their grip on captured areas. Around 10,000 refugees fled over to the Thai side and settled in 
temporary camps, mainly in Tak Province. During the following 10 years the Burmese army 
strengthened their grip on the area, capturing new areas every dry season. Between 1984 and 
1994 the number of refugees increased to around 80,000 (TBBC 2007a). 
In 1988 and 1990 the student uprisings and the general election won by the NLD and 
Aung San Suu Kyi  led to another wave of around 10,000 people crossing the border. Many 
went back in the following years, leaving the number of longer-term refugees stemming from 
that flight at around 3000. 
The effective control of the border areas by the Burmese army has increased, and the 
KNU have weakened correspondingly. Following the fall of the Karen administrative capital 
of Manerplaw in 1995, the junta struck cease-fire agreements with a number of other ethnic 
minority insurgency groups, and in 1997 they launched another massive dry season attack on 
Karen areas. The number of Burmese refugees in Thailand now amounted to around/about 
115,000 (TBBC 2007a). 
Since  gaining  control  in  a  significant  part  of  the  territories  along  the  border,  the 
Burmese  army  has  initiated  severe  village  relocation  programs  in  order  to  uproot  any 
continued insurgency. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC 2007a) estimates that 
more  than  3500  villages  have  been  destroyed  since  1996,  affecting  more  than  1  million 
people.  In  January 2010,  136,519 people  were on  the  rations  list  of  the  Thailand Burma 
Border Consortium (TBBC 2010), while 106,613 people were registered by the UNHCR5. 
61% of these have registered their origins from Karen State. The UNCHR estimates that out of 
the total, around 3000 people were new arrivals (after June 2009). In addition, an estimated 
5 The TBBC figures include all persons living in camps and eligible for rations, while the UNHCR figures 
includes those with a refugee or PAB status (or pending one of these) and some students, but excludes new 
arrivals. 
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minimum of 451,000 people are internally displaced inside Burma (UNHCR 2009). 
1.2.4. Thai authorities' policies and treatment of refugees
Thailand has not ratified the Geneva Convention concerning the status of refugees, and as 
such  do  not  apply  the  legal  term  "refugee" to  people  crossing  the  border  from  Burma 
unofficially. However, they have served as hosts to Burmese people crossing the border for 
different reasons for nearly  25 years, using the term temporarily displaced persons fleeing 
fighting, which does not imply any legal commitments. They do allow the UNCHR to operate 
in the camps from offices in Thailand. Refugees and asylum seekers not living in camps are 
considered  illegal  immigrants  and  are  subject  to  arrest  and  deportation.  Media  have  also 
reported that camp dwellers have been pressured into going back  "of their own free will" 
(DVB 2010b), and that intolerable material conditions in some camps have forced people to 
leave (DVB 2010c).
1.3. The Refugee Camps
There are  nine refugee  camps (officially called  "temporary shelters"  by  Thai  authorities) 
along the border (see appendix 3). Seven of them have predominantly Karen populations and 
are commonly referred to as "Karen camps". In this section I will give a brief account of the 
formal organization and workings of the Karen camps. 
1.3.1. Formal organization of the camps6
All  the  camps  along  the  border  are  under  the  ultimate  jurisdiction  of  the  Royal  Thai 
Government (RTG), through the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The camp leadership is topped by 
a MOI local district officer, which is assigned Camp Commander.  The gates are guarded by 
Paramilitary Rangers from the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and the Border Patrol Police, who also 
"assist in implementing policy and providing security". 
Each of the ethnic groups of which there are people living in camps along the border, 
have their own Refugee Committee (Karen Refugee Committee, Shan Refugee Committee 
etc.). They coordinate assistance from NGOs, and communicate with the UNHCR, RTG and 
security personnel. The Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) oversees activities in all the Karen 
camps through Camp Committees which form the main administrative bodies of each camp. 
6 Unless otherwise specified, the source of reference for this and the following sections is The TBBC website 
(TBBC 2007d)
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The Camp Committees  coordinate  the day-to-day running of  the camps.  Below the camp 
committee level is section level committees (usually just consisting of a section leader and a 
secretary), and, in a minority of the camps, household leaders serving as bonds between the 
section  leadership  and  individual  households,  organized  in  groups  of  ten  households  per 
household leader. The camp committee members are elected, usually for two years at the time. 
The  suffrage  is  20  years,  and  everyone  can  in  principle  nominate  candidates,  including 
themselves. Three persons per hundred in each section are elected. 
In addition to this  linear organizational  hierarchy there are  the Community Elders' 
Advisory Boards (CEABs). The CEABs serve to "provide guidance" to the KRC and camp 
committees, overseeing elections in these bodies, and assisting in conflict solving  They are 
made up of elders appointed by “senior elders”, and their term of office is seldom fixed. The 
degree of influence they exert on the Camp Committees is hard to assess. 
Also accountable to the Camp Committee are the Women's and Youth Organizations, 
KWO and KYO, designed to "represent the needs, views and aspirations of the women and 
youth sections of the populations, through organizing various activities to raise awareness and 
promote  issues  relevant  to  their  respective  target  groups.  These  include  trainings  and 
workshops, social services, research and documentation, advocacy, publications, competitions 
and celebrations". 
Although  not  formally  holding  positions  in  the  camp  leaderships  or  refugee 
committees  as  such,  it  is  held  that  leaders  or  former  leaders  of  the  KNU seem to  gain 
influential seats in important organizations in the border area (Berg 2009:21). 
1.3.2. Organizational environment in the camps and surrounding areas
There are a number of organizations present in the camps and the border area which provide 
different sorts of humanitarian aid and other services to refugees in camp, illegal immigrants 
in  Thailand  and  Internally  Displaced  People  (IDPs)  inside  Burma.  There  is  a  thriving 
environment for volunteer activity both with a local and less local base, funding and staff. I'll 
illustratively count that in Mae La Oon, in addition to the Camp Committee, section leaders 
and CEAB which are administrative bodies, and the KWO and KYO which are interest group 
organizations  with close ties  to  the camp leadership,  there  is  the Thailand Burma Border 
Consortium (TBBC) which provide food, shelter and non food items; Malteser International 
(MI) providing health and sanitation services; Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand 
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(PPAT) organizing activities related to reproductive health; ZOA Refugee Care responsible for 
primary and Secondary Education, the World Education (WE) providing special education; 
Handicap  International  (HI)  dealing  with  mine  risk  education  and rehabilitation;  Catholic 
Office  for  Emergency Relief  and  Refugees  (COERR) and Taipei  Overseas  Peace  Service 
(TOPS) delivering social services; Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA) in charge of libraries; 
and last but not least,  the UNHCR responsible for overall protection (TBBC 2007e). Also 
worth noting, the Karen Education Committee (KED), which is the educational wing of the 
KNU, are responsible for the curriculum in Karen schools both inside Karen State and in the 
camps. They conduct standardization and approve of curriculum and exams. 
All of these are members of the coordinating organization Committee for Coordination 
of  Services  to  Displaced  Persons  in  Thailand  (CCSDPT),  which  work  together  with  the 
UNHCR and create five-year plans that serve as platforms for the specialized organizations 
mentioned above (UNHCR 2010).  In general, the humanitarian conditions in the camps are 
not acute in terms of pure survival. Food rations is provided, and so is building materials, 
charcoal  for cooking,  school  materials,  medicines  and other  health  equipment,  though the 
provisions are not abundant. 
The above serves to illustrate the range of actors present on the border that the Karen 
people meet when they enter the refugee camps although the immediacy of this organizational 
presence  in  the  everyday  lives  of  dwellers  in  the  camp  cannot  be  taken  for  granted. 
Nevertheless, without assuming that everyone in Karen State are completely cut off from their 
surroundings, the logistical reality renders many parts of Karen State very hard to access from 
the outside. It is a fact that for the most part, non-governmental organizations and international 
organizations present in the camps do not enter Karen State, and it is fair to assume that the 
complexity  of  the  organizational  environment  on  the  border  compared  to  Karen  State 
potentially represents new impulses and opportunities to people arriving in the camps. My 
own fieldwork supports this, as I will illustrate below. 
Notably, this version seems to contrast with Berg’s (2009) argument that the refugee 
camps  serve  to  consolidate  sentiments  of  Karen  nationalism.  I  will  leave  this  apparent 
contradiction for now, and discuss it  more thoroughly in  Chapter 2.  It  is  one of my core 
arguments  that  the camp represents  both opportunities and constraints  compared to  Karen 
State. In Chapter 3 I will explore how some of these contrasting developments turn out in 
terms of gender relations. In Chapter 4 I will take a look at how it affects the ways young 
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Karen think about their future. 
1.3.3. Resettlement
In 2005 the Thai Government allowed third countries to receive people from the camps who 
were legally registered as refugees by the UNHCR. Since then, more than 50,000 Burmese 
have resettled, more than 30,000 of them to the USA (Berg 2009:23). 15,000 more departures 
are expected in 2010 (UNHCR 2010). Only people legally registered as refugees are eligible 
for  resettlement.  People  with  special  needs  such  as  security  concerns,  medical  or 
psychological problems and refugees who seek family reunification are given first priority. 
"Other individuals will be handled on a ‘first-in-first-out’ basis", meaning that the first ones to 
arrive in Thailand get resettled first (Berg 2009:24). During my fieldwork this implied that 
only people who got their refugee status before 2006 got resettled during the ongoing round. 
1.4. Theoretical perspectives
In this section I will give a brief outline of the more overarching theoretical perspectives and 
concepts that forms the basis for my analysis throughout the thesis. Specific concepts related 
to issues covered chapter by chapter, will be introduced as I go along. 
1.4.1. Structure and agency
Through  my exploration  of  Karen  people’s  negotiation  of  identity  in  different  roles  and 
subject  positions,  the  relation  between  structure  and  agency  emerges  as  an  overarching 
analytical dimension informing my project.
Structure,  according  to  Bourdieu  & Wacquant  (1993:26)  denotes  the  material  and 
mental,  social  and  individual  conditions  and  dispositions  that  guide  human  actions  and 
choices. Mental and objective structures are mutually constitutive. Bourdieu, aiming to erase 
the  perceived  split  between  subjective  and  objective,  combines  phenomenological  and 
structural views on structure in his model. While structuralism tends to reify action, seeing 
action as a pure enactment of structure, social phenomenology, seeing society as  product of 
choices by conscious individuals, fails to explain the reproduction of structures. While society 
does have a real structure,  it  is equally and at  the same time created by the agents. Even 
though social agents construct the social reality both individually and collectively, they didn't 
construct the categories they use for this construction (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1993:28).
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With Bourdieu, they key to social reproduction lies in his concept of habitus which is 
explained as a set of historical relations embodied in the individuals themselves in the form of 
mental  and  bodily  schemes,  perceptions,  evaluation  and  action  (Bourdieu  &  Wacquant 
1993:34). It is a structuring mechanism that works in the agents, […]  "the principle which 
breeds  strategies  making  the  agents  able  to  meet  very  different  situations" (Bourdieu  & 
Wacquant 1993:35). 
 Underlying habitus is doxa, or "that which is taken for granted" (Bourdieu 1977:166). 
Doxa is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, which presents and 
imposes itself as a universal point of view - the point of view of those who dominate by 
dominating the state and who have constituted point of view as universal by constituting 
the state (Bourdieu 1998:57).
Even though the Karen elite does not constitute a state as such I believe this perspective can 
be applied.  As I will  show later,  Karen National Union (KNU) is applying a nationalistic 
ideology by the book, so to speak, and I believe concepts of power applied in relation to the 
state are applicable to a large extent. Moreover, as I will also discuss throughout the thesis, 
there is scope for talking about those who dominate and those who are being dominated when 
talking about the KNU. 
Doxa is reproduced most of all through the "dialectic of the objective chances and the 
agents' aspirations, out of which arises the sense of limits [...]" (Bourdieu 1977:164). Through 
doxa the symbolic order is maintained, unconsciously, because it is essential – it "goes without  
saying because it  comes without saying" (Bourdieu 1977:167).  In relation to my case,  the 
range of  imagined and imaginable Karen identities can be considered doxic. The dialectic of 
possibilities and aspirations which creates a sense of limits to what is possible, is relevant 
when discussing  negotiations of identity both in terms of ethnicity and gender. 
Doxa is distinct from  heterodoxy, that  which can be discussed,  a concept implying 
"awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs" (Bourdieu 
1977:164). In heterodoxy lies the potential for social change. Opinions differ on the scope for 
action, or creativity, the ability to produce change, in Bourdieu's theories. In sum, it can be 
said that he first  and foremost  explains social  reproduction,  although some see habitus as 
possibility for creativity (Parker 2005:8).   
Drawing  on  Parker  (2005)  I  use  the  term  agency to  denote  "the  socio-culturally 
mediated  capacity  to  act" (Ahearn  2001:112  in  Parker  2005:3).  The  concept  is  seen  as 
"concerned with the mediation between conscious intention and embodied habituses" (Parker 
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2005:8 cf. Bourdieu 1977). It has commonly been posed as an opposition to structure, as "the 
individual  who  seeks  to  escape  the  constraints  of  society" (Parker  2005:4).  However, 
following the logic of both Parker and Bourdieu, it is important not to fall into the trap of 
employing a simplistic opposition between structure (or victimhood) and agency, but rather 
see how the two exist as functions of one another. 
Even though Bourdieu does stress that  the actor is always interpreting through her 
actions (Moore 1994:77), Bourdieu as well as Foucault (1980) can perhaps be said to have 
more explanatory power when it comes to dominance, hegemony and reproduction than social 
change.  In  the  Foucaultian  view,  where  there  is  power  there  is  resistance.  Resistance  is, 
however, never  "free" from power (Foucault 1978:95 in Parker 2005:6). This is where the 
concept  of  agency  can  be  useful  -  not  as  an  opposition  to  structure  or  unconscious 
reproduction of the order of things, but as a sort of interface between subject and structure, 
individual and society, not as opposites but as mutually constitutive (Parker 2005:8). 
There is no possibility of pure agency for an individual. Nor is the "measuring of the 
degree of agency" a  meaningful  task (Parker  2005:9).  Moreover,  "[…] under  some social 
arrangements  and in  moments  of  crisis  and  trauma,  the  exercise  of  agency is  simply not 
possible" (Parker 2005:13). The concept is nevertheless central to any discussion of identity. 
The focus on the relation, between structure and agency is useful for the rest of the thesis, 
when discussing representations of Karen State and the camp; the state of refugee; ethnicity 
and nationalism (Chapter 2); changing gender relations (Chapter 3) and thoughts about and 
desires for the future (Chapter 4). 
1.4.2. Discourse, Power and Subject Positions
The concept of discourse is central in discussions of subjectivity and identity construction. A 
discourse can be understood as a set of salient notions about the world. These notions are 
framing what kinds of knowledge are considered possible, acceptable and true within a social 
field7. It is closely linked to power, which in the Foucaultian sense defines knowledge and is 
defined by knowledge (Foucault 1980). Power, moreover, is relational in Foucault's terms. It 
does not rest with individual actors but is enacted in relations between different actors. And 
the other way around, a relation can not be free of power (cf. Foucault 1980). Even though I 
identify certain powerful actors in the social field of the refugee community, I wish to stress 
7 A social field is defined as "a set of objective historical relations between positions anchored in certain forms 
of power" (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1993:34)
16
CHAPTER 1
that  I  see power as  manifest  in  relations  between actors,  and between actors  and various 
institutions or systems, not as resting with certain individuals or groups as such. Power will 
always be "over", not merely "to". The exercise of the Karen National Union of power over 
"regular" refugees in the border community is such a relation. 
Discourses, moreover, are structured through difference, along axes such as race, class, 
ethnicity,  sexuality,  religion  and  gender.  These  differences  intersect  with  each  other  and 
proffer various subject positions which individuals can take up or reject (Moore 1994).
Several competing, and possibly contrasting, discourses can play in a social field, and 
a discourse offers several alternative and contrasting subject positions. For example, notions 
of femininity and masculinity within a discourse shape what kind of behavior is acceptable for 
women/girls and men/boys in a social field. Such notions are rarely clear, unambiguous or 
free of contestation. Different expectations – or subject positions – occur in different settings 
and according to different people, and various social signifiers intersect with each other. This 
approach to subjectivity is a part of post-structuralist theory, and it incorporates notions of 
both structure and agency, of reproduction and resistance (cf. Moore 1994:4). I will return to 
the latter shortly.
Some discourses are more powerful than others in providing available and desirable 
subject positions within a social field. In other words, dominant discourses define reality, and 
the  individual  is  positioned  within  structures  of  power  and  domination.  Resistance and 
complicity are acts of agency within these dominant structures. But what is it  exactly that 
dominant  discourses  determine?  (cf.  Moore  1994).  How,  where  and  amongst  whom  do 
"acceptable" subject positions in the Karen refugee community evolve, and how do relations 
of power shape available subject positions for individuals there? Drawing on Berg (2009) I 
find that one powerful producer of a dominant discourse in the Karen refugee context is the 
Karen  National  Union  (KNU)  which  plays  a  significant  part  in  shaping  and reproducing 
notions of ethnicity and nationalism. Notions of ethnicity interplay with notions of gender, 
thus also affecting what a "proper" Karen man or woman has come to denote within this 
dominant discourse. 
Henrietta  Moore  poses  the  question:  "Can  people  actively  recognize  and  choose 
subject positions they take up, and to what degree are they able to resist the terms of dominant 
discourses?" (Moore 1994:4) This question is a central one, and although I do not propose to 
answer it in a concluding manner, this too is worth keeping in mind throughout the thesis. 
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1.4.3. The Social Construction of Gender
Although human societies all around the world recognize biological differences between 
women and  men,  what  they make of  those  differences is  extraordinarily  variable.  We 
cannot  deal,  therefore,  with  the  observable  variability  in  the  cultural  constructions  of 
gender across the world or through historical time simply by appealing to the indisputable 
fact of sexual difference” (Moore 1994:71). 
In spite of biological differences between the sexes I hold, in line with Moore (1994), that the 
particularities  of  gender  differences  are  socially  constructed.  Moore  presents  gender  as  a 
central axis for the discursive definition of  difference, which pervades all spheres of human 
lives and interplays with other significant structures of difference, such as race, caste, class, 
religion and sexuality. Difference, as opposed to sameness, is central for the construction and 
maintenance of boundaries between groups, the formation of us and them. Gender is thus, in 
the words of Fagertun (2009) "constitutive of any social process" and can be "conceived in 
terms of a  'total  social  fact',  i.e.,  something which is  involved in all  human activities and 
which shapes, and is shaped by, social practice" (Fagertun 2009:6). Discourses about gender 
are powerful because they render women and men as primary and inescapably defined by 
difference (Moore 1994). 
Discourses  on  gender  thus  provide  different,  and  possibly  contrasting,  subject 
positions which one can take up or reject. Furthermore, gender identification is a social and 
relational  process,  meaning  that  people  position  themselves  in  relation  to  others  and  to 
different systems and discourses. Gendered positioning is processual and not fixed, and can be 
said to form a constant negotiation within and between the available options. 
Structures of gender inhabit a significant power dimension. The categories "woman" 
and "man" and the specific discourses which employ those categories,  are involved in the 
production  and reproduction  of  identity  and agency.  There  is  thus  a  link  between gender 
differences and types of agency, implying that gender difference can be constitutive of patterns 
of inclusion and exclusion (Fagertun 2009). Therein lies a potential for domination of one 
group,  or  one  type  of  agency,  over  others.  In  Chapter  3  I  will  discuss  changing  gender 
relations among the refugees in Mae La Oon camp, and these perspectives will be particularly 
relevant there. 
1.4.4. Thematic context: Conceptualizing refugeeness
An overarching question in this thesis is how to conceptualize the state of "refugee". Liisa 
Malkki  provides  important  reflections  on  this  issue  in  her  book  Purity  and Exile  (1995). 
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Through exploring processes of identification among Hutu refugees in Tanzania, she questions 
dominant notions and perceptions of refugeeness and the link between place and identity, and 
problematizes the very categorical order of things that create and shape these notions. Within 
the framework of a global system of nation-states, a framework which pervades through all 
layers of contemporary social science, as well as "commonsensical" conceptualizations of the 
world,  refugees as a category are rendered "matter  out  of place".  Within the order of the 
"nation  form"  –  characterized  by  Malkki  (1995:5)  as  a  hegemonic  generative  order  of 
knowledge – refugees occupy a problematic, liminal position (Malkki 1995:1). Liminality, as 
framed by Turner (1974 cf. Malkki 1995)  is a sort of transitional state where individuals find 
themselves  "betwixt  and  between  all  fixed  points  of  classification;  he  passes  through  a 
symbolic domain that has few or none of the attributes of his past or coming state" (1974:232 
in Malkki 1995:7). Refugees are externalized; they are unclassified and unclassifiable, and this 
makes  them particularity  polluting.  They  represent  an  attack  on  the  categorical  order  of 
nations (Malkki 1995:8). 
According  to  Malkki  (1995),  the  internationally  standardized  way  of  discussing 
displaced people, is by viewing them as in a limbo, as outside the world. Because culture is 
territorialized  in  the  categorical  order  of  nations,  refugees  are,  through  their 
deterritorialization,  rendered  outside  of  history,  and  outside  of  culture,.  This  common 
conceptualization of refugees  - both in academia and in the domain of policy application and 
administration of programs directed towards refugee situations - leads to a pathologization of 
the people that are refugees. Malkki, drawing on Hannah Arendt (1973), argues that they are 
rendered naked, bare humans - and, importantly, pure victims. 
Such a perspective is evident in Tangseefa's doctoral dissertation Imperceptible, Naked 
Lives  (2003).  According  to  Tangseefa,  the  Karen  as  a  group  are  not  regarded  as  proper 
political subjects by neither Burmese nor Thai authorities. Within a state-centered paradigm 
they are completely robbed of any institutional voice, and thus, also robbed of their humanity 
(Tangseefa  2003).  Furthermore,  we,  subjects  that  are  safely  positioned  within  the  statist 
discourse and have adequate juridical protection, cannot hear the cries of the Karens because 
they are not qualified subjects within that discourse - a fact rendering the lives of the Karens 
imperceptible (Tangseefa 2003). However, it is arguably this same state-centered discourse the 
Karens "use" in their attempt at empowering themselves by demanding their own nation-state. 
Nevertheless,  they  are  living  in  a  state  of  utter  juridical  marginalization and  existential 
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exception, carrying a dream of being a part of "the general" (cf. Tangseefa 2003). In the words 
of Berg (2009): 
[…] refugees do not have any  control over their future. This unpredictability caused by 
structural factors influenced the opportunity to lead a fulfilling life on the individual level, 
and thus the sense of being a true human (Berg 2009:78).
Malkki (1995) problematizes this view. In her account of identification processes among Hutu 
refugees in Tanzania, she argues that deterritorialization and displacement always presents at 
least two logical possibilities :
The first is that a liminal collectivity tries to make itself "fit" into the overarching national 
order, to become a "nation" like others. [...] The second possibility entails an insistence on, 
and a creative  exploitation of,  another  order  of  liminality.  This  constitutes a  sweeping 
refusal  to  be  categorized,  a  refusal  to  be  fixed  within  one  and  only  one  national  or 
categorical identity, and one and only one historical trajectory (Malkki 1995:4). 
Malkki's analysis (1995) shows that a refugee situation can have different outcomes in terms 
of  individual  and  collective  identity,  attachment  to  the  "homeland"  and  perceptions  of 
nationality and identity. The particularities of the exile situation shape how people negotiate 
their existence as refugees, whether they operate within the framework of a system of nation 
states, or oppose it and refuse to be categorized in terms of it. 
This  perspective  also  touches  upon  questions  of  agency.  Seeing  refugees  as  pure 
victims, "understanding displacement as a human tragedy and looking no further can mean 
that one gains no insight at all into the lived meanings that displacement and exile can have 
for specific people [...]" (Malkki 1995:16). 
Lubkeman  makes  a  similar  argument  to  Malkki  (1995)  in  Culture  in  Chaos.  An 
Anthropology of the Social Condition in War (2008), in which he seeks to re-theorize the 
conceptualization of war and migrants of war. Supported by his ethnographic study of social 
survival and change in Mozambique, a country which experienced successive wars between 
1964 and 1992, he argues that: 
For  the  inhabitants  of  such  places  war  has  has  not  been  an  “event”  that  suspends 
“normal”  social  processes,  but  has  instead  become  the  normal  –  in  the  sense  of 
“expected” - context for the unfolding of social life. [...] anthropologists should study the 
realization and transformation of social relations and cultural practices throughout conflict, 
investigating war as a transformative social condition and not simply as a political struggle 
conducted through organized violence (Lubkeman 2008:1).
Furthermore, "[…] Refugee migration is often seen as largely devoid of strategic calculation, 
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indeed as virtually a 'non-decision'  driven by a reflexive instinct for survival" (Lubkeman 
2008:5),  and in line with Malkki's  argument,  "War-time conditions are  assumed to reduce 
individuals to acting on the basis of what are often described as 'more fundamental' and, by 
implication socially and culturally undifferentiated needs" (Lubkeman 2008:5).
While  Malkki's  perspective  is  firmly tied to  the  act  of  crossing a  national  border, 
Lubkeman pays less attention to the link between place and identity so central in Malkki's line 
of reasoning.  Thus, his  perspective is  also very relevant for IDPs and people who live in 
conditions of war without fleeing. 
I find these conceptualizations useful because indeed (as is also one of Lubkeman's 
points) the boundaries between conventional "refugees" and other war-time migrants  is often 
blurry. The prevalence of the category of  "students" in Mae La Oon refugee camp (see sub-
chapter 1.5.1. about legal categories), illustrates this point. Moreover, people who now happen 
to have a refugee status in the eyes of the UN, may have had various experiences and different 
"statuses" prior to that. Also, the fact that only people with legal status as refugee were eligible 
for  resettlement,  may in  fact  have  led  to  an  unbalanced  representation  of  people's  actual 
motives  and  reasons  for  going  to  the  camps  (Berg  2009:65),  in  favor  of  the  "I  fled  at 
gunpoint"-story. The category of  "refugee", then, is far from clear-cut when looking at the 
reality of migration from Eastern Burma to Thailand. However, it important not to "overdo" 
this argument, and in the eager to identify agency commit the crime of forgetting the utterly 
marginalized position these people find themselves in, after all. 
In my exploration of refugeeness, Karen nationalism, and imaginations of their own 
place in this world (Chapter 2) and possibilities of creating a "better future" (Chapter 4) I 
return to these perspectives. In what sense do Karen refugees themselves have the feeling of 
being in between statuses, not belonging anywhere; or in a state of exception or emergency; 
and what kind of choices to they perceive to have in the refugee camp? In Chapter 3 especially 
I link these questions to a discussion of agency and subject positions in terms of gender. What 
gendered subject positions are available for Karen refugees on the Thai-Burmese border? How 
are the range of available subject positions changing with shifting circumstances and possible 
rethinking of dominant discourses on gender and ethnicity? 
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1.5. Methodological reflections
Methodology is  not  just  about  what  to  do and how to do it  in the field.  It  is  also about 
discussing  concepts  of  social  scientific  knowledge,  and the  epistemological  boundaries  of 
research. Following the postmodernist turn, anthropology is commonly seen as an interpretive 
rather than a "disclosing" discipline (Keesing 1987). This is not to say that what to do and how 
is  unimportant,  but  rather  that  a  discussion  of  methods  should  be  based  on  a  principal 
epistemological discussion if it is to assist in asserting the validity of any claims that are made 
on the basis of fieldwork.
In this section I start by giving a brief account of the legal "categories" of people that 
live in the camps, since it is important to understand that they are in fact not all in the same 
boat. Then I will introduce the geographical and social area that constituted  "the field", and 
reflections upon methods I applied during fieldwork. I will make a note of the concept of "ah 
na  deh",  borrowed  from  Berg  (2009),  which  can  serve  to  give  an  insight  into  some 
communicational obstacles a Westerner might meet when carrying out field work in Southeast 
Asia. 
1.5.1. Legal categories: Refugees, IDPs and stateless people
People  residing  in  the  refugee  camps  can  mainly  be  divided  into  three  different  legal 
categories: Refugees, PABs and students. New arrivals not registered will usually be pending 
one of these statuses. Refugees are registered and recognized by the UNHCR according to the 
Geneva  Convention  of  2006.  They  are  eligible  for  resettlement  through  the  UNCHR 
resettlement  program.  PAB is  short  for  Provision  Admission  Board  which  is  an  ad  hoc 
administrative unit registering new arrivals in the camps. It basically means that they  are 
recognized as rightful dwellers in the camp, but they do not have refugee status. They are not 
eligible for resettlement. People registered as  students have temporary permission to stay in 
the camps for educational purposes. They are expected to go back when their education is 
finished (Berg 2009). In line with Berg (2009) I use the term "refugee" to denote people who 
reside in the refugee camps along the border,  regardless of whether they are registered as 
refugee, PAB or student, or pending one of these. 
In addition to what I (in spite of the lack of legal recognition from Thai authorities) 
will refer to as refugees in this thesis, there are two other categories of Karens which are 
explicitly not included in this term – IDPs and stateless people. IDPs – Internally Displaced 
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People – are people displaced inside Burma, they have not crossed the border to Thailand and 
do not live in the camps8. Though the distinction is blurry in reality – firstly people do go back 
and forth a bit provided they believe it to be fairly safe at the time, and provided they have the 
resources to organize the trip; and secondly there are a few so-called IDP camps inside Burma, 
and people currently living in camps in Thailand might have arrived from those camps and 
may still have family there – I will keep this distinction simply because I never visited Burma 
during my fieldwork and cannot speak for the people  "inside". I will however refer to both 
IDPs and refugees as Burmese Karen wherever there is a need to make a distinction towards 
Karens not originating from Burma. The distinction is needed because of the second category 
not  included  in  the  term  "refugees",  namely  Karens  from inside  Thailand.  There  are  an 
estimated 3,5 million stateless people in Thailand (excluding people living in refugee camps) 
which are born in Thailand, might have lived there for generations but are not granted Thai 
citizenship. Most all of them come from the so-called hilltribes in the north of the country, and 
the majority are Karen. They will be referred to as Thai Karen, but they are not subjects of this 
thesis.
This  is  not  an  exhaustive  list  of  possible  locations  where  Karen  people  live.  For 
instance, there are not insignificant populations of Karen in the Thai cities of Bangkok and 
Chiang Mai not accounted for here.  
1.5.2. The Field
My fieldwork was for the most part carried out in and around a three-year post-ten school for 
Karen refugees where I served as a volunteer teacher. The school had two branches, one of 
which was located in the small town of Mae Sariang in Mae Hong Son Province about 20 km 
from the Burmese border (see appendix 3). The senior students stayed at this branch, hereby 
referred to as "the Center". The first- and second year students' branch (hereby referred to as 
"the  School")  was  located  inside  Mae  La  Oon refugee  camp,  and  this  was  also  the 
constituency of the school, as all students that attended school were residents of the camp9. 
8    The TBBC (2007a) gives a conservative estimate of  the total number of IDPs in Burma to around 500,000 
people.
9 Some students also lived in the neighboring camp of Mae Ra Moo Luang. There is a significant degree of 
organizational communication between the two camps, and also, as I understand it, with other camps along 
the border. 
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The Center
While the two first years at the school were spent at the School in camp, the graduate students 
went to study and stay at the Center, getting access to computers and internet, which is a much 
trickier affair to arrange in the camp due to infrastructure deficits and logistic difficulties. 
Many of the graduates have gone on to become teachers in camp or in Karen State, or to work 
for Community Based Organizations (CBOs) along the border.
At the Center, students stayed in a boarding situation where the school building and 
the sleeping quarters were located in the same house – the offices, classrooms and dining area 
on the ground level and the bedrooms upstairs. The area outside the house consisted of a small 
courtyard  between the Center house and the house of the man who owned the Center house. 
He was a Thai Karen, and his daughter, 14 at the time of my fieldwork, went to school in Mae 
Sariang and spoke both Thai and Karen. Outside there was also a dining shack, an outside 
toilet, a shack for the drying of various foodstuffs such as garlic and chili, and an area serving 
as a volleyball/cane-ball field. The whole area was perhaps 150 square meters altogether. 
The refugees are formally not allowed to leave the premises of the refugee camp, and 
they have no legal rights in Thailand apart from the permission to stay in that camp. Thus, all 
students and most of the staff stayed there illegally. The Center could only exist and function 
at  the  mercy of  a  few well-intentioned (or  well  paid)  Thai  policemen in  Mae Sariang,  a 
position some policemen have happened to take advantage of on more than one occasion10. 
The illegal status the students held in Mae Sariang also meant that the they could hardly go 
out of the school premises at all, and never by themselves or without a phone and the number 
of one of the staff. Trips to the center of Mae Sariang would be organized on special occasions 
such as Buddhist holidays when there were big markets and a lot going on so they wouldn't 
attract attention. The first trips into the town center most of the students seemed quite nervous, 
but there was a marked difference in peoples' attitude towards going into the center from the 
beginning of the school year and towards the end. Most of them grew braver as time went by.  
10 During a stay at the same Center in 2005 I was told that just before my arrival Thai policemen had marched 
in and taken a computer without further explanation. Further, while I stayed there for this fieldwork in the fall 
of 2009, some policemen came to the Center one day demanding ten boys to follow them to the station. No 
explanation was given and when they came back later the same day I asked some of the boys what they had 
done.  They said they had done nothing but give their fingerprint. However, both the boys that went to the 
police station that day and people that stayed behind at the Center were obviously scared. The question of 
what purpose this random visit served, remained unanswered to me.  
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The School in Mae La Oon Refugee Camp 
Mae  La  Oon  refugee  camp  was  established  in  2004  as  a  result  of  successive  camp 
consolidations for a period of six years. People from smaller camps in different locations were 
moved to Mae La Oon. The camp is  located around 2 km from the Burmese border,  and 
walking distance to the neighboring camp Mae Ra Ma Luang. The total camp area is 320,000 
m2 - less than half a square kilometer. The population in 2008 according to feeding figures 
from the Thai-Burmese Border Consortium (TBBC) was 16,223 people, but this number is 
subject to a degree of flux due to changing circumstances in Karen State, ongoing resettlement 
to third countries, and the fact that people to a certain extent move back and forth between 
Karen State and the camp. Between 2006 and 2008, a little over 1700 people resettled to third 
countries from Mae La Oon (TBBC 2008b). The camp is accessible by car most of the year, 
but  in  the  rainy  season  the  normally  three  hour  drive  can  take  up  to  eight  hours,  and 
sometimes the car has to turn and go back due to very muddy paths. (TBBC 2007a) It is also 
possible to reach the camp by boat,  but then only by passing Thai military check points. 
Foreigners are generally not allowed past these checkpoints. 
Mae La Oon is located in a steep hillside down towards the river. There are roads of 
mud  and  rock,  but  they  fall  more  or  less  apart  every  rainy  season  and  require  constant 
maintenance throughout the year. There are cars, mainly belonging to NGOs, going in and out 
on a fairly regular basis. Most of the international NGOs do not let their staff sleep in the 
camps if they can avoid it, and then generally not for more than a couple of nights. Volunteers 
going in on their own accord can usually get to stay up to ten days with a camp pass issued 
from the KRC, even though this is not in accordance with Thai regulations. 
There  are  limitations  to  what  kinds  of  agriculture  are  allowed within  the  camp 
premises.  There are no possibilities for growing rice,  but some varieties of vegetables are 
grown, and there is some household-scale breeding of pigs, chicken, ducks and fish. Though 
commonly bred in Karen State, in the camp there are no cows or buffaloes. Still, the camp 
does have its own economy, people running shops, workshops and small eateries, and there is 
a certain amount of money going around11. The going currency is Thai baht. 
The School campus was significantly larger than the Center.  In addition to several 
classrooms and a computer room; offices and a large meeting room; the dining room and the 
boys' and girls' dormitories, there were a vocational room for handicraft workshops; a library; 
11 Though I regard it as fairly likely, the existence of a black economy based on smuggled goods is not 
something I have investigated in this thesis. 
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a shop and one football  and one volleyball  field  which they shared with the neighboring 
school12. However, the material standard was generally lower than at the Center as all houses 
were made of  bamboo and banana tree  materials  (except  that  a  few houses  had concrete 
floors). The result was rapid material deterioration and high vulnerability to nature's forces 
such as rain, wind13, mudslides and flooding.
Most of the students at the School were residents of the camp, either with a student 
status or more permanently. Some came from Mae Ra Moo Luang and moved to Mae La Oon 
for studying. Most of the people with student status did not have any family in the camp, 
while  the refugees  and PABs mostly did14.  Both  at  the  Center  and the School  the school 
provided  food,  basic  toiletry and lodgings  to  the  students,  for  an annual  fee  of  300 baht 
(around 55 NOK). 
12 At the time of my fieldwork there was a plan to join the two schools together in a coordinating effort 
launched by the KED. The new school was to become part of a post-ten network consisting of schools from 
altogether four camps along the border, each new branch providing a specialization such as engineering; 
economics etc. 
13 One student told me that at the closing ceremony for the academic year of 2008/2009, two large trees fell 
down on the football field due to wind, smashing both the girls' toilet and the boys' shower shed. Luckily, 
everyone was gathered in the great hall for the ceremony so no one got hurt. 
14 The easiest way to know the difference was to look at which students stayed at the school dormitories all the 
time, including holidays, and which students went home during weekends or even every day if they lived 
close by. 
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Illustration 1: Girls' room at the Center
Illustration 2: Relaxing in the common area, Center
Illustration 3: The dining shed at the Center
Illustration 4: Making chili paste at the Center
Illustration 5: Showering and washing clothes, Center
Illustration 6: Mae La Oon refugee camp. View from the road in Section 1
Illustration 7: The School fotball field, Mae La Oon
Illustration 8: Dining at School, Mae La Oon
Illustration 9: Girls' dormitory, hallway, Mae 
La Oon
Illustration 10: Girls room, usually shared by 
two people, Mae La Oon
Illustration 11: Morning assembly at School, Mae La Oon
Illustration 12: Girls in the common area of the dormitory, Mae La Oon
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1.5.3. Narrative Representations
Human experience is both conceptualized and conveyed through narrative. In the words of 
Bruner (1991) "We organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in 
the form of narrative - stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on” 
(Bruner 1991:4). 
In  anthropology,  narrative  is  central  in  two ways:  In  the  representations  we  meet 
during fieldwork through the accounts of our informants;  and the narrative tropes we use 
when  conveying  our  arguments  in  our  texts.  In  the  words  of  Wagner  (1981):  "The 
anthropologist  makes  his  experiences  understandable  (to  himself  as  well  as  others  in  his 
society) by perceiving them and understanding them in terms of his own familiar way of life" 
(Wagner 1981:36). The meaning I make of any information is dependent on my associations, 
and of "all sorts of contexts" (Wagner 1981:37). 
As  I  will  show  throughout  the  thesis,  Karens  conceptualized  and  communicated 
central elements of ethnic identity in the form of narratives, about the origin of Karen people, 
providing  stories  behind  certain  ceremonies  or  prevailing  states  of  affairs  among  Karens 
today,  and  about  the  history of  suffering  at  the  hands  of  the  Burmans.  Narratives  had  a 
normative function, they served to explain, to justify and to judge. But, if my understanding 
of  Karen  narratives  is  ultimately  constituted  through  myself,  my  culture,  my  previous 
experiences, my values etc., how can I assert any validity to my interpretation at all? 
According to Sanjek (1990) there are three ways of asserting ethnographic validity – 
through sound theoretical foundation; through making known our paths to information in the 
field; or through providing fieldnote "evidence" in order for the reader to judge for her- or 
himself (cf. Sanjek 1990). I have attempted to provide field notes illustrations that I hold to be 
fairly representative of my data. They could probably have been handled very differently by 
someone else, and this fact is impossible to escape. Reliability in terms of replicability is not 
the strong point of anthropological accounts (cf. Sanjek 1990). 
One way of resolving, or at least of unmasking, this problem, has been to "bring the 
author back into the text", instead of masking her through a "disembodied narrative voice" 
(Moore  1994:116).  However,  this  entails  its  own  sets  of  problems.  According  to  Moore 
(1994), postmodernists seem to assume that the authorial "I" is unproblematic - to assume the 
isomorphy of the "I" in the text and the "I" that  write the text.  By revealing the "I" it  is 
assumed that strategies,  intentions and meanings of the author are revealed.  However,  the 
relationship between the two will always be imaginary, and therefore there can never be a text 
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that "faithfully represents the fieldwork situation" (Moore 1994:117). 
I  have  nevertheless  tried  to  solve  the  problem  of  narrative  interpretation  and 
representation by being present throughout the text. Even though I can never escape the fact 
that the "I" presented in the text is my own representation of myself, I believe the way out of 
this catch-22 - if there is one - is to embrace the fact that this is my work, my invention. It is 
my understanding. I will provide interpretations. I will suggest relations of causality, and I will 
give a representation of the subjects in the field which to some extent is generalized and stable 
even though this is problematic. I will present my data in ways that attempt at coherence, even 
though things aren't always coherent. I will try to make sense of things even though things 
don't always make sense. The text will contain elements of narrative tropes. It is hard to avoid. 
The fieldwork conveyed itself to me as a story, and any other re-shaping of that experience 
would entail its own epistemological difficulties. The best I can do is to reveal that I am aware 
of this dilemma and that I had to make a choice. 
1.5.4. Field Methods applied
The  methods  I  applied  were  basically  twofold:  Participant  observation  -  variously  tilting 
towards participation and observation - and interviews. In addition to this I got access to a set 
of essays written for an assignment by the students both at the School and the Center. 
Participant observation
Some insights can, arguably, only be gained through participation (see for instance Jenkins 
(1994) on fieldwork as an apprenticeship and Lyng (1998) on "co-presence"). What kind of 
impressions I hold on to from participating in "alien" practices and what I make of them 
through the process of analysis is of course a product of who I am. This issue can be discussed 
at  lengths  in  terms  of  what  kind  of  knowledge  has  actually  been  produced,  and,  in  the 
prolongation of that discussion, a discussion of what "anthropological knowledge" is (Jenkins 
1994:444). One of the weaker points of insights gained through participation, is that they are 
elusive. They are so situationally specific, and so contingent on the fact that we are there to 
participate in them, that they disappear the moment we do. Thus the focus on instance and 
situatedness can render our insights worthless in any and all other situations. It is, however, 
possible  to  turn  the  coin  and  assert  the  value  of  participation  exactly  because  of  its 
situatedness and its attention to context. 
Experiencing the isolation of the refugee camp, although I am sure it came across very 
differently to me than to the refugees, I believe is one such instance where my insight would 
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clearly have suffered had I not gone there. That is also the reason why I moaned when my 
planned  trip  to  the  Karen  State  was  canceled  due  to  “changing  security  circumstances” 
(battles broke out). 
True participant observation instinctively seems a self-contradictory term. On the one 
hand, If you participate fully (if possible) you loose sight of the analysis. "Full participation" 
is  immensely difficult,  inadvisable,  not to  say impossible.  In the words of Lyng: "[…] to 
record  faithfully  the  lived  experience  of  people  who  routinely  manage  their  daily  affairs 
deprived  of  adequate  amounts  of  food  or  sleep  and  stressed  by  interpersonal  crisis,  for 
example,  participant  observers  must  immerse  themselves  in  these  same  conditional 
circumstances" (Lyng 1998:225). On the other hand,  every time you withdraw to observer 
position you risk loosing whichever status you build up as a participant.  
 Admitting that there might not be such a ting as "true participant observation", means 
that one has to find a balance between the two that works in the field, and that gives you fairly 
valid data. For me this meant finding a degree of participation in the student's daily activities – 
from getting up at 4 am. to do the cooking; to eating rice and chilies three times a day; to 
classes; to adapting to unfamiliar hygienic habits – which gave me "insider points" but which 
at the same time could be possible to sustain for the whole period of the field-work. Moreover, 
doing this while at the same time being painstakingly aware that no matter the intensity of my 
efforts I was still, at the end of the day, considered different on a number of levels. 
To exemplify:  Being in the role  of  a  volunteer  teacher  at  the Center  had its  clear 
advantages  and disadvantages.  On the  up-side  I  was  immediately thrown into  a  situation 
where both sides were forced to interact with each other, I  had to learn everyone's names 
quickly, and I early on got an impression of the different personalities in the class. Also, they 
all had to relate to me regardless of whether or not they would have approached me during 
their spare time. Another methodological advantage was that I was allowed to stay in the girls' 
dormitory. This gave me a good opportunity to shift between participation and observation, 
although language was often a constraining factor. English would not be spoken unless I was 
in the conversation, and sometimes not even then. However, the physical closeness of staying 
together six people in a room of 15 m2, did after a while create a certain intimacy which would 
otherwise have been hard to achieve.  Late night conversations had a different atmosphere 
about them, and different topics were discussed. At the request of the school administration I 
was also in charge of organizing evening activities, such as games, quizzes and movie-nights. 
This gave me a natural place also in the out-of-school activities, which I appreciated. 
The down-side to the role of teacher and organizer was perhaps that I came into the 
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setting as a sort of authoritative figure. However, believing that I would not have been viewed 
as set apart from the group "no matter what", would be naive. My white skin, my economic 
status, my role as a researcher, and perhaps most of all,  my status as a free person,  not a 
refugee,  rendered  me  as  an  other to  an  extent  which  I  believe  is  impossible  to  undo. 
Participant observation however, was facilitated greatly by the fact that I was given a clear 
role that enabled me to participate - albeit not as an anonymous part of the group - in various 
activities throughout the day. 
There were however, a number of activities in which I was not included. Daily chores 
such as cooking and cleaning it was, it seemed, more or less assumed that I didn't wish to 
participate in. When attempting to approach such a situation I was always welcomed, although 
with an air of wondering - why does she want to do the dishes when she doesn't have to? In 
spite of my expressed wish to learn how to cook Karen food, this was never followed up 
unless I pursued it vigorously, as if they somehow thought I didn't actually mean it. Many 
expressed a concern that the material conditions I had to live under were very poor, probably 
too  poor  for  a  golawah15 who was used to  much better  standards.  The idea  of  me doing 
"housework" seemed to not find any resonance with them. 
Doing interviews and collecting narratives
My intention  was  to  conduct  interviews  with  as  many people  as  possible.  After  a  while 
however, I came to experience interviews as an artificial situation where the small-talk was 
inhibited and both parties seemed to feel like we needed to be concise and concrete. With the 
people I got to know better, especially the students in the Center and at the School, a less 
staged  setting  was  more  relaxing  and beneficial.  This  experience  can  be  seen  in  light  of 
reflections done by Sanjek (1990) that a dialogic approach to ethnography risks "removing 
speech from action", and is most useful when combined with close observation of the dialogue 
setting (Sanjek 1990:406). Avoiding the interview situation was a turn that most of the time 
brought me closer to the informants, and a lot of  "small" details came through to a greater 
extent in smalltalk and participation than through the staging of questions and answers which 
were to be recorded. This sense of limitations can also be said to be the case with fieldnotes 
however, albeit in different ways. While the interview perhaps shapes the actual formulations 
of narrative by my informants, the narration in fieldnotes is my own. The tapes I got were 
after all a direct pathway back to the field (though re-interpreted my my interpreter in those 
cases where she was present), and as such a valuable tool for recapturing moments. In that 
15 "Golawah" is S'gaw Karen for "white skin", and was used of all Western foreigners. 
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sense fieldnotes and interviews are complementary kinds of data. 
In the end however, I wound up doing interviews only with people I didn't have the 
chance to spend lengths of time with, especially in the camp since both my trips there were 
quite short. My data included two interviews with representatives from the Karen Women's 
Organization;  two interviews with  female members  the  Camp Committee  and one of  the 
Camp Committee staff; and five interviews with students at the School and at the Center. 
Most  of  the  interviews  I  did  were one-on-one.  On one  occasion,  what  was  originally  an 
individual interview after a while turned into a group interview. 
Finding a balance between me giving directions and letting my informants set  the 
agenda was a challenge. I had opted for a semi-structured approach where I asked some broad 
questions, and followed up the answers I got with more detailed questions, asking them to 
elaborate,  give  examples  etc.  My questions  were related  to  gender  relations  in  the camp; 
differences (both in gender relations and other social organizations) between the camp and 
Karen State; and thoughts about the future. This broad approach was deliberate, and I tried to 
let the interviewees direct the conversation as much as possible. The degree to which they did, 
varied. 
Using an interpreter 
Language was an ever-present barrier.  Most people's  English skills  were not sufficient for 
having an unconstrained conversation, and many opted for Karen even though I was present. 
Doing interviews in camp I used an interpreter, since most of the interviewees there had close 
to no knowledge of English. My interpreter was a woman I have known for many years, which 
was both an advantage and a disadvantage. One the one hand, since she knew me well she was 
less hesitant to ask me to clarify, or to correct me if I misunderstood or said something wrong. 
Anticipating the next section on the concept of ah na deh, someone I knew less well would not 
have been likely to exhibit this sort of direct behavior. On the other hand, she might have 
believed that she knew what I wanted to know, and projected this understanding onto the 
interviewees without bothering to clarify with me first. She no doubt served as a gate-keeper 
for me, a fact I will have to take into account when using the data I obtained in the interviews. 
Ethics and anonymity
When I first started teaching at the Center, I organized an orientation meeting with all the 
students  and  staff,  in  order  to  obtain  permission  from potential  informants.  Prior  to  the 
meeting I had discussed my project with my interpreter, explaining what I intended to do and 
31
CHAPTER 1
why, and that if anyone at any point didn't want to participate they were free to refuse it. My 
interpreter  then informed the students and the rest  of the staff,  in Karen,  in  the meeting, 
whereupon  a  written  declaration  of  consent  was  handed  out.  Everyone  who  agreed  to 
participate signed the declaration.  A similar procedure took place in the camp. 
There was however, still the question of whether all of my informants, given their lack 
of exposure to the aims and practices of higher education, understood the full extent of what 
their  consent  actually  entailed.  Moreover,  the  relation  between  them  and  me  could  be 
expected to be of such a nature that I could not be sure that people actually said no even if 
they might have been skeptical.  I  was also aware of a general  tendency for people to be 
unconfrontational. All these elements induced me to be careful when approaching people in 
order to leave the door actually, not just formally, open for people to avoid me or refrain from 
answering certain questions. 
 When quoting informants I have not used their actual names, but replaced them with 
fictional names, some are real and some I have made up but they could have been real. "Naw" 
is a polite or formal prefix used together with girls' and women's names16, and "Saw" is the 
corresponding prefix for boys' and men's names. I have put 'Naw' and 'Saw' before girls' and 
boys' names respectively, as a pointer to the reader. 
1.5.5. Embodied Knowledge - The concept of  Ah na deh
I want to introduce the concept of  ah na deh, a concept that I believe shaped relations and 
communication during my fieldwork. The concept is defined by Fink (2001:x) as "a feeling of 
obligation to others that makes one act in a restrained way". In the words of Berg (2009): "In 
a Burmese cultural context the objective is to maintain smooth relations by refraining from 
acting in a way that makes the other 'lose face'" (Berg 2009:30).  Furthermore, there is a 
strong sense of social cohesiveness, respect for authorities is deeply engrained, and the norm 
is  to avoid disagreements and not  to stir  up negative emotions.  This concept  can also be 
applied in the Karen context, and this has both methodological and analytical implications. Ah 
na  deh  had  effects  on  the  dynamics  of  conversation.  For  instance,  disagreements  in 
conversations were avoided, which meant that I had to be very careful not to imply too much 
lest my informants would "automatically" agree with my "suggestions". Moreover, emotional 
or touchy issues were extremely challenging to approach, since stirring up negative emotions 
can  be  considered  a  break  with  the  norms  of  ah  na  deh.  It  also  constituted  an  everyday 
16 The Karens did not distinguish between first names and surnames. They usually used their full name in most 
situations (or nicknames in close relations), including "Naw"/"Saw" in formal settings. 
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challenge for me as displaying strong emotions was more or less avoided and seen as loosing 
face.
Relevant  for  understanding  the  significance  of  this  concept,  is  Jenkins'  (1994) 
reflections  that  knowledge  is  practical.  In  his  article  "Field  work  and  the  perception  of 
Everyday Life", he asserts the importance, and uniqueness, of fieldwork lies in learning these 
practical knowledges. This illustrates the clear connection between methods and knowledge – 
what we "find out" is dependent on our perceptions in the field, what we see is dependent on 
whether we notice what goes without saying – the 'embodied knowledge' (cf. Jenkins 1994). 
Putting these experiences into writing is also a difficult, if not impossible, task. "What is built 
up is a practical understanding, a form of knowledge that is not necessarily conscious and 
often cannot be brought into language" (Moore and Sanders 2006). Thus, the concept of ah na 
deh can be viewed in light of epistemological discussions concerning practical knowledge. 
Karens have been described as exhibiting "control over sentiments, mind and mood" 
(Berg 2009:96), and I had to strive for the same in order to not expose myself in ways that 
were rendered embarrassing for me - me loosing face - as this would, I reasoned, alienate me 
further  from my informants.  Acquiring  these  "habits  of  action"  (cf.  Jenkins  1994 was  a 
learning  process,  and  though  I  honestly  felt  that  I  wasn't  very  successful  at  this,  it 
nevertheless, as time went by, constituted an awareness of "the things that go without saying" 
(Jenkins 1994:437), of body language, of atmospheres, of "smelling out" when a conversation 
was of such a nature that I should stay away, of realizing (or at least suspecting) when things 
were being left out, glossed over, euphorized. etc. Skills of this kind cannot be learned outside 
of the field, a point which strongly favors participation in ethnographic research.
Analytically the concept is also significant. In this thesis I will several times point to 
contrasts in representations of reality - both regarding Karen State, the refugee camp, Karen 
ethnicity and plans for the future. I believe this can be viewed through the light of the concept 
of ah na deh. For example, suffering in silence, not exposing negative feelings to others is a 
trait that can be related to ah na deh; not hoping because hoping implies a possibility of being 
disappointed, and a display of disappointment breaks with the concept of ah na deh.
1.6. Structure of the thesis
In  Chapter 2 set off with noting an apparent paradox in peoples' representations of both the 
camp and Karen State - on the one hand it is imagined as a Perfect Place and on the other 
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remembered  as  a  place  of  utter  terror  and  suffering.  I  use  perspectives  of  ethnicity  and 
nationalism (cf. Anderson 1991) to gain an understanding of how dominant conceptualizations 
of place become central to Karen peoples' understandings of themselves in the world. I argue 
that the prevalence of certain notions of Karen ethnicity and sentiments of nationalism, are 
produced and sustained by the Karen National  Union (KNU) (cf.  Berg 2009).  I  will  also 
discuss  different  ways  of  conceptualizing  the  state  of  refugeeness  with  regards  to 
marginalization/powerlessness and agency  as somewhat conflicting views (cf. Malkki 1992; 
1995; Camino and Krulfeld 1994; Tangseefa 2003; Parker 2005; Lubkeman 2008).
In  Chapter 3 I discuss how the situation of refugeeness leads to changes in gender 
relations, and especially observed changes in the division of labor in the refugee camp; and in 
how women's leadership, activism and out-of-the-house activities are viewed in the refugee 
community. This will be discussed in light of views on gender relations in Southeast Asia (cf. 
Wikan 1990; Atkinson and Errington 1990; van Esterik 1996; Parker 2005; Fagertun 2009), as 
well  as  more  general  theories  on  gender  (Moore  1994).  I  point  to  the  Karen  Women's 
Organization  as  an  influential  actor  whose  activities  result  in  a  broader  range  of  subject 
positions being available to girls and women, for instance women as leaders, within the wider 
prevailing  discourse  of  Karen-ness.  With  an  aim  of  rendering  "female  modes  of  action" 
equally worth as "male modes of action" – this can adequately be described as resistance 
towards the dominant discourse – I claim that they partially succeed. I do not claim, however, 
that there is a univocal shift in power in favor of women in the refugee camps. 
Lastly, in Chapter 4 I discuss how the state of refugeeness – several aspects of which 
will already have been discussed in chapters 2 and 3 – are related to thoughts about and plans 
for the future, about possibilities and constraints. I have observed a contrast in the way young 
Karen refugees speak about their future, and this point is explored here. I frame this contrast in 
terms of a negotiation between imaginaries and "reality", where acts of dreaming and making 
plans that relate to their actual possibilities, are mixed in an what I argue is an attempt at 
making meaning. Acts of imagining a Perfect Place already discussed in Chapter 2, have also 
been projected towards a "third country", and this turn creates ambiguities, doubts, and guilt 
(cf. Berg 2009). 
A brief examination of practices regarding courtship and romantic relationships among 
young,  unmarried  Karen  refugeeness  serves  the  purpose  of  illustrating  the  paradox  of 
representation  on  the  level  of  individuals.  I  show  how  people  were  hesitant  to  express 
themselves  in  assertive terms about  their  relationships.  This  example illustrates  in  a  very 
direct way some of the effects of the unpredictability of life in the refugee camp, on identity 
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negotiations,  pulling  people  between  different  and  contesting  notions  of  ethnicity, 
refugeeness, gender, and the link between place and identity. 
Many of the general points made in this chapter will already have been presented in 
the previous chapters, which have been discussing paradoxical representations of place (Karen 
State and the refugee camp) and gender roles and relations. Notions of ethnicity, sentiments of 
nationalism, conceptualizations of place and ideas about gender are all elements in the identity 
constructions  for  young  Karen  refugees  on  the  border  between  Thailand  and  Burma.  It 
structures the ways in which they think about their future. In that sense, Chapters 2 and 3, 
while providing important analytical points in their own right, also serve a purpose of leading 
up to Chapter 4. 
35
REFUGEENESS, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM
Chapter 2 - Karen Identity Construction: Refugeeness, 
Ethnicity and Nationalism
The aim of this chapter is to pinpoint important features of identity construction related to 
refugeeness, ethnicity and nationalism. I start the chapter by discussing how my informants' 
representations of Karen State were highly contrasting, and sometimes contradictory, in an 
interesting  way:  Images  were  formed,  where  Karen  State  represented  both  unimaginable 
suffering and hardships at the hands of the ruling Burmans, poverty and lack of development; 
and a Perfect Place that they longed for and maybe the only place where they could be truly 
happy. 
Displacement, or deterritorialization, is central to identity formation. To understand the 
reason for these contrasting representations of Karen State and the refugee camp, I need to 
take a look at how to conceptualize "refugeeness". I will discuss some contrasting, but at the 
same time complementary,  perspectives on subjectivity formation among refugees (Malkki 
1992; 1995; Camino and Krulfeld 1994; Tangseefa 2003; Lubkeman 2008). Questions related 
to marginalization and liminality will serve to highlight how processes of identification might 
happen in the camp and what factors play a part. I argue that exile has become integral to 
perceptions of Karen identity. Being suppressed, involuntarily driven into warfare with the 
Burmans,  being pure victims, are central elements in representations of Karen history and 
ethnicity. The war, opposition, resistance, have become constitutive of what it is to be Karen. 
I then turn to central perspectives on ethnicity and nationalism  (Barth 1969; Anderson 
1991; Eriksen 1993) which are also central elements in identification processes in the refugee 
context. I substantiate this discussion with cases and narratives from informants from Mae La 
Oon refugee camp. The aim is to illuminate the ways notions of ethnicity and nationalism are 
intertwined and constitute a dominant discourse in the refugee camp. I argue that these two 
elements  - refugeeness and nationalism - severely structure people's sense of being in the 
world by representing particular subject positions related to "What is Karen" and "how am I 
Karen".  The  Karen  National  Union (KNU) is  a  strong political  and  military organization 
among the Karen. I argue that this organization is a dominant discourse-producer providing a 
particular imaginary of Karen identity, shaping the reproduction of certain notions of "Karen-
ness" and Karen nationalism. 
Lastly I will return to empirical representations of the refugee camp, to observe how 
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the camp setting can work in  two directions in  terms of identification:  Both as  arenas  of 
consolidated nationalism, and as potential multi-discourse providers. 
The paradoxes of representation that  I  will  discuss are  also manifest  in seemingly 
contradictory ways of thinking of and talking about the future for my informants, an argument 
I will discuss further in chapter 4. 
2.1. Remembering  and  imagining  Karen  State  –  The  paradoxical 
narrations of a "Perfect Place" and a place of suffering and terror
"My village is small but the villagers are united." (Saw K'ulu Wah)
"Karen State is a beautiful state. Even though I have to be away I never forget it. I always 
miss it. It is much better than other countries. All Karen people want to go back to it. It will  
always be in my life." (Saw Michael)
The above quotes are taken from a set of essays written by second year students at the school 
where I  was a teacher.  This particular essay assignment was given to  the students by the 
school principal as a free assignment where the students could choose the topic and title of the 
essay. Out of 27 essays handed in, seven had topics revolving around the country or village 
they had left, and the contents were in some cases remarkably similar, in a few instances even 
to the letter.  This might of course indicate that  the students were saving themselves some 
schoolwork by cooperating rather more closely than what was intended. Nevertheless, the fact 
that  nearly  one  third  of  the  students  who handed  in  an  essay chose  to  write  about  their 
homeland17, illustrates a point that is perhaps not very surprising - that they thought a lot about 
the  place  they  had  left.  The  essays  were  moreover,  strikingly  coherent  in  their  narrative 
content - even when controlling for somewhat leisure-minded students. One of the reoccurring 
imaginaries was the beauty and plentiness of whichever home village was described:
"The river is full of fish" (Saw K'ulu Wah)
"We raise different animals like buffalo, goat, pig, duck and cow" (Saw K'ulu Wah)
"There are many kinds of paddy in the field" (NKJC student 9)
"We also have beautiful flowers in my village, with many kinds of colors. When it's raining 
we plant the mustard and it's very delicious to eat and it gives energy" (NKJC student 9)
17 Notably, another seven students wrote essays named "my future plan" or something equivalent.  I will return 
to these essays in Chapter 4, where I discuss the negotiations between imaginaries and "real" choices in 
relation to agency, identity and being and "becoming" Karen. 
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For me, the Karen State is very small, beautiful, wonderful and important for the Karen  
people. It has enough mineral resources such as gold, silver, copper, jewels and more. It  
is evergreen and so has many animals. We have some high and popular mountains. The 
streams in Karen State always carry fresh water. (Saw Michael)
These statements illustrate, I argue, that Karen State was a focal point for the imagination of a 
Perfect  Place  which  might  not  really  exist,  at  least  not  exactly  as  described,  but  which 
nevertheless - or maybe  because of its imagined nature - had an important function in the 
master  narrative  of  Karen  ethnicity:  This  is  the Place where the  Karen People belong.  A 
similar pattern was observed by Liisa Malkki (1995) in her exploration of identity formations 
among Hutu refugees in a Tanzanian camp. There, the place they had left became an important 
signifier of identity, and was closely intertwined with their identity as refugees. I will return to 
this point. 
At the same time as Karen State was imagined and described as a Perfect Place to 
which much Karen sense of belonging seemed to be attached, it was also frequently narrated 
in terms of terror and suffering. People in Karen State were described as poor, uneducated and 
even unenlightened, having to work hard to survive and as always living in fear of being 
subjected to the cruel actions of the government army – the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) – or alternatively, fleeing to the jungle. 
We Karen people love peace and honesty, a peaceful life and wish to live like this in our  
homeland. But other nationalities use force and try to control our land (Saw Soe Win).
[...] many Karen people become IDPs (internally displaced persons). They do not have 
enough food to eat or enough clothes to wear and they are living without shelter. They 
must run to hide from place to place. Many people get diseases and some of them die. 
They do not have enough medicine to cure people. (Saw Soe Win)
Now, if we look to our brigade many of our people feel the hand of the SPDC soldiers  
(NKJC student 6). 
Nowadays  the  situation  in  Karen  State  is  very  bad  because  the  State  Peace  and  
Development Council (SPDC) enter the villages and destroy them. The people are afraid  
of them and flee to another village to save their lives (Saw Kaw). 
If we look at our own country there are many people living poorly under the oppression of  
an  enemy.  Many  people  have  broken  hand,  blind  eye  and  poor  food  (female  NJKC 
student).
If the first function of narrations of Karen State was to create a romanticized image of it, the 
second function was to enhance a feeling of common suffering: We the Karens are suffering 
because of the demonic Burman soldiers. This line of narrating provides an explanation – this 
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happened because we are Karen – and a morale – the Burmans are bad, we the Karens are 
innocent victims. Burmans were portrayed almost as pure evil, as the opposition of what is 
Karen; as the ultimate Other. This is in line with observations made by Malkki (1995). In her 
case,  narratives about the homeland  were romanticizing and had clear didactic traits,  and 
served a  purpose  of  both educating and moral  preaching  about  the  situation Hutus  found 
themselves in (Malkki 1995:53). The presence of a morale and an assertion of causality in the 
Karen narratives, is strikingly similar. 
Thus,  descriptions  that  might  seem contradictory,  illustrate  how  Karen  State  was 
simultaneously imagined as a Perfect Place and remembered through stories of suffering. The 
latter became vital in justifying a struggle for the first,  sustaining nationalistic sentiments. 
I will now go on to discuss two central factors which I believe can go a long way in 
explaining this paradoxical mode of representation: Perceptions of refugeeness; and notions of 
ethnicity and nationalism. 
2.2. Conceptualizing Refugeeness: Victimhood and resistance
One perspective providing insights into the state of refugeeness is Tangseefa's (2003) doctoral 
dissertation on stateless Karens inside Burma. Tangseefa uses a constellation of a number of 
concepts in order to create a theoretical space for conceptualizing about forcibly displaced 
Karens. Drawing on Agamben (Tangseefa 2003:25), he uses the Greek concepts of naked life 
and form-of-life, where the concept of  zoe refers to the simple fact of living common to all 
living beings.  Bios is  human life,  it  is  possibilities  of life,  it  is  power (or  possibilities  of 
empowerment) and pursuit of happiness. The forcibly displaced Karens, he claims, have been 
"devastatingly  deprived  of  potentialities  for  good  lives  and  possibilities  for  happiness" 
(Tangseefa 2003:33). Tangseefa sees the forcibly displaced Karens as in a position where they 
are robbed of their humanity in the sense of form-of-life. Through the eyes of both the Thai 
and Burmese nation state apparatuses they are not considered proper political subjects. Within 
the  state-centered  paradigm,  he  argues,  there  is  no  space  for  the  subjectivity  of  stateless 
peoples. Institutionally, Karen Internally Displaced People (IDPs) have no voice. 
Even  though  Tangseefa  (2003)  discusses  IDPs  and  not  refugees,  I  find  his 
conceptualizations useful.  Many refugees have been IDPs previous to entering the camps. 
Being an IDP, a PAB, a student, an illegal immigrant, or even none of the above (see Chapter 
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1), must, I believe, be seen as being rendered "outside" to the very extreme. A status as a 
refugee.  marginal  as  it  might  be,  at  least  grants  you certain  formal  rights  within the UN 
framework - at least renders you a "proper victim". The concept of "statuslessness" has been 
applicable  to  many individuals  before entering  the camps,  thus  shaping  their  experiences. 
Even though the people in  the camps  are  slightly more  visible  to  the outside world than 
displaced people inside Burma, I argue that there is an ongoing struggle also among the Karen 
on the border to define themselves as qualified political subjects. Through claiming status as 
refugees and through demanding autonomy for Karen State, they are trying to gain a place for 
themselves within the national order of things. 
Malkki (1992; 1995) provides a very useful discussion of how the "categorical order 
of nations" renders refugees "out of category". Within a framework of nation-states, the state 
of refugee automatically becomes a state of "nothingness", because refugees don't have a place 
within any nation. The rootedness that is inherent, and often unquestioned, in the "scholarly 
common-sense" of place and identity is lacking for refugees. They are uprooted. The state of 
refugee then also automatically is assumed to be a temporary one. Liminality is taken for 
granted, because refugeeness doesn't have a place within the "conceptual practice of spatial 
segmentation" (Malkki 1992:28) – they are automatically "betwixt and between" (cf. Turner 
1974 in Camino and Krulfeld 1994). Malkki's (1992, 1995) argument rests on her exploration 
of identification processes among Hutu refugees in Tanzania. She accounts for two different 
"categories" of refugees, one group dwelling in a refugee camp, and the other consisting of 
people who had resettled in the Tanzanian town of Kigoma. The two "groups" demonstrated 
two very different – simultaneously contrasting and complementary – ways of dealing with 
displacement.  The  people  in  camp  reproduced  strong  notions  of  collective  identity;  of 
themselves as "a people" and as "a nation in exile"; whereas the "town refugees" tended to 
seek assimilation and multiple, shifting identities (Malkki 1995:3). Identification processes 
were influenced by "the local, everyday circumstances of life in exile", and "the camp had 
become the most central place from which to imagine a "pure" Hutu national identity" (Malkki 
1995:3). Displaced people, in this view, might well exhibit the agency to actively contest the 
categorizations that render them marginalized; voiceless; outside of the world. 
Another perspective, which gives attention to the alleged scope for action in a refugee 
situation,  is  provided  by  Camino  and  Krulfeld  (1994).  In  their  view  the  articulation  of 
ethnicity, the construction of identity, and gender relations are all subject to people's creative 
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adaptation in a refugee situation. A state of liminality, which the authors argue is suitable for 
describing existence as a refugee, enhances this scope for action exactly because it is a state 
"in between", leaving room for invention.
2.2.1. Representations of refugeeness
What then, is the most adequate way of conceptualizing refugeeness in the case of Karens? 
Are  they utterly  marginalized  and  "robbed  of  their  humanity" (Tangseefa  2003);  do  they 
actively relate to, and possibly contest, the marginalization allegedly inherent in the refugee 
category (Malkki 1992; 1995); or do they utilize their liminal state to change and adapt in a 
pragmatic way (Camino and Krulfeld 1994)? 
I  believe  all  these  perspectives  have  points  that  claim validity  in  the  Karen  case. 
Representations by my informants of their own situation tends to focus on hopelessness and 
marginalization,  and  so  I  see  this  as  central  elements  of  identification  for  many  Karen 
refugees.
"Every day we wish our village was free." (NKJC student 9)
"Mae La Oon is like a prison, but better than inside Burma." (Saw Lah Minh)
"The first year I cried every day and I dreamed about my mother every night. But Naw 
Liberty comforted me." (Naw Wah)
"Everything is temporary for me." (Saw Lah Minh)
However, I also believe that they, similarly to the Hutu refugees in Malkki's (1992; 1995) 
case, used actively the very categories that render them marginalized within the conventional 
statist framework (Malkki 1995). They were operating firmly within it – as were the camp 
refugees in the Hutu case - by claiming historical rights to be viewed as a nation: 
The camp refugees saw themselves as a nation in exile, and defined exile, in turn, as a 
moral trajectory of trials and tribulations that would ultimately empower them to reclaim 
(or create anew) the "homeland" in Burundi (Malkki 1995:3). 
The  Karen  refugees  simultaneously  resented  and  embraced  the  very  category  of  refugee 
because it was through that category that they could claim martyrdom. One could say that the 
notion not only of  victimhood but also of  resistance, had become  embodied  (cf. Bourdieu 
1993). They were reproduced through means of powerful narrations of the history of Karen 
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suffering, and through this process, the category of refugee became associated with being a 
noble victim. As in Malkki's case, "exile was part and parcel of a more overarching historical 
trajectory of the Hutu as 'a people' [...]" (Malkki 1995:221-222). On the same trail, Karen 
refugees insisted on their own liminality, and on the temporariness of displacement, because it 
was necessary for the maintenance of the Karen struggle, the ultimate goal of which was to 
reclaim Karen State and create the Perfect Place there. In Malkki's case, "Being a refugee 
signaled a tie with the homeland and, hence, the possibility of an eventual return" (Malkki 
1995:230). The refugee category became not a polluted one, but a pure one and, importantly, 
belonging to this category meant that Karens had the right to claim their nation back. 
Thus, victimhood at the hands of the Burmans, and resistance towards the regime that 
forced them out of their country, became central elements in Karen understandings of their 
own ethnic identity. This active articulation and act of claiming a position in this world, I 
believe, can be seen as agency. Here, however, a discussion of discursive power is called for, 
and I will return to that shortly. 
The  experience  of  flight,  of  "becoming  a  refugee",  was recorded  by  one  of  my 
informants to lead to a completely new awareness of the situation for Karens as a group: 
Before I went to the refugee camp I didn't know anything. I thought we were the only  
ones. But in the refugee camp there were so many Karen people, and they told me about  
all the other villages that were destroyed, about the war. Before that I didn't know. (Naw  
April)
This observation corresponds with Berg's (2009:55-56) assertion that the refugee camps serve 
to consolidate notions of ethnicity. It also fits quite neatly into Mortland's (1994) account of 
Cambodian refugees in the United States. Mortland (1994:5) shows how most Cambodians 
were to a very limited extent aware of "having an ethnicity" prior to fleeing Cambodia. For 
many, the experience of flight brought with it a new conception of "being Cambodian in the 
world". In spite of some fundamental differences between Mortland's and my case18, I find it 
useful to compare the two since both deal with changes in identity construction and gender 
relations in a refugee population from mainland Southeast Asia.
As  I  have  now  pointed  to  they  ways  in  which  notions  of  refugeeness,  of 
18 The first substantial difference between these cases is that the people in Mortland's (1994:5-25) study have 
already resettled to a third country whereas the Karens in my study still live as refugees in the "second 
country". Secondly, the Cambodian conflict was in its acute phase for a period of around nine years (1970-
79) when the Khmer Rouge fought for and gained power, in contrast to the conflict between the SPDC and 
the KNU which has lasted for well over half a century.
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marginalization and victimhood became engrained in identification processes for many Karen 
refugees, it is now time to explore the second central element of identification in the refugee 
camps – also closely related to the points made above: Karen ethnicity and nationalism. 
2.3. Ethnicity and nationalism
Expressions of ethnic identity can be regarded both as psychological responses to threats 
from the outside and as symbolic tools in political struggles. The social importance of 
ethnic identities is greatest when both are applied in enacted ethnic ideologies". (Eriksen 
1993:76)
In this section I hope to illustrate how notions of ethnicity in the case of Karen refugees work 
both as an important source of identification for individuals and, through its link with Karen 
nationalism, as an instrument for the political project of fighting for an autonomous Karen 
State. 
I  argue  in  line  with  Eriksen  (1993)  (drawing  heavily  on  Barth  (1969)),  who 
understands ethnicity as relational. Ethnic groups define themselves in terms of that which 
they are not, the others. Eriksen refers to Moerman (1965), who defines ethnicity as an emic 
category  of  ascription  (Moerman  1965  in  Eriksen  1993:12),  focusing  on  people's  own 
experience of belonging to a certain ethnic group. At the same time he stresses that, ethnicity 
being relational,  some sort  of recognition from the  others which groups define their  own 
ethnicity in terms of, is needed for this project to succeed. This can be seen in relation to 
distinctions between  external and  internal identification and, as in Jenkins (2004), between 
ascribed and  acquired identities.  "Ascribed  identification  is  constructed  on  basis  of  the 
contingencies of birth",  while  "acquired identifications are  assumed during the subsequent 
life-course"  (Jenkins  2004:148).  Rather  than  seeing  ascribed  and  acquired  identities  as 
oppositions  they  should  be  seen  as  working  dialectically  in  an  everlasting  process  of 
identification, and the border between the two are blurry in real life. In other words, ascribed 
identities influence the course of acquisition of identities, while acquired identities can be (and 
often are) viewed by actors as ascribed. The process involves negotiation and transaction with 
others, and should thus also be seen as relational (Eriksen 1993:38). 
Furthermore there are some common elements of groups that are described as ethnic 
entities.  One  is  that  they  tend  to  have  notions  of  common  ancestry  and  shared  culture 
justifying their  unity.  However,  Barth (1969) holds that  more important  than the "cultural 
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stuff" within the group, is how the boundary of the group is maintained. Even though the 
cultural content can be perceived as the core of ethnic identity for the people holding it, it is 
not this content as such that creates the group or maintains the boundary of the group. Cultural 
differences  may  well  be  an  effect,  not  a  cause  of  boundaries.  Both  a  relational  and  a 
processual approach is necessary, since the cultural content might (and will) change with time 
and through interacting with other groups, though the boundaries of the group might well be 
upheld.  Moreover,  the  importance of  maintaining boundaries  arguably increases  when  the 
group perceives itself to be under pressure.
Perspectives  on  ethnicity  can  be  categorized  along  two  dimensions: 
Primordialist/instrumentalist and subjectivist/objectivist. While primordialists would hold that 
there is a fundamental cultural core at the base for every ethnic categorization, instrumentalists 
would claim that even though such a core might be felt to exist by the members of the group, 
it is constructed by elites struggling to control the content of the culture for political purposes. 
Eriksen  (1993)  is  perhaps  not  as  inclined  as  Barth  (1969)  to  claim that  ethnicity  can  be 
negotiated and changed. In the Karen context there are features limiting the available subject 
positions for individuals regarding ethnic identity. Whichever approach one wishes to take, it 
is evident that cultural content, either objectively and fundamentally existing or constructed 
for  instrumental  purposes  and subjectively experienced,  potentially carries  a  great  deal  of 
meaning for individuals perceiving themselves as holding an ethnic identity. 
I  hold  that  in  the  case  of  Karen  refugees,  ethnicity  is  both  a  primary  source  of 
identification  and  meaning-making,  and  an  instrument  for  a  political  project,  where  the 
"cultural stuff" to a great extent has been created, and maintained, by the military, mainly 
Christian,  mainly S'gaw Karen elite  of  the  Karen  National  Union.  I  will  substantiate  this 
argument in the following section. 
2.3.1. Nationalism and representations of myth and history
To understand the basis for the origin and continued existence of Karen struggle for autonomy 
Benedict Anderson's (1991) perspective on nationalism is useful. Following Anderson (1991), 
nationalism is an ideology that developed in Western Europe over a period of several hundred 
years,  as  a  result  of  the  constellation  of  a  number  of  specific  historical  events.  The 
technological  development  of  print-languages  is  one  key  event  in  the  development  of 
nationalism. People
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gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands even millions, in their particular 
language-field, and at the same time, that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, 
so  belonged.  [...]  These  fellow-readers  [...]  formed  [...]  the  embryo  of  the  nationally 
imagined community (Anderson 1991:44). 
Secondly,  the  fixating  effect  on  the  language  of  the  printing  technology  gave  room  for 
representing history in a much more thorough and lasting way than before, and also helped 
form an image of historical  continuity central  to the idea of the nation.  Thirdly it  created 
languages  of  power -  the spoken dialects  that  were closest  to  the written language "were 
elevated to  a  new politico-cultural  eminence" (Anderson 1991:45).  In  the next  round, the 
formal  standards  became models  to  be  imposed -  both  exhibiting  and  reproducing  social 
patterns. 
These three ways in which a written language is important for the development of 
nationalism, can all be found in the Karen case. Even though the large majority of Karens 
were illiterate in the 1880's (around the time when a Karen national consciousness developed 
(Rendan 1980 in Rajah 2002:527)) or spoke a dialect so different from the written language of 
S'gaw Karen that it  was unintelligible to them, there was (and is) a significant  attempt to 
define "Karen-ness" by means of a written language. This is salient for instance in written 
representations of Karen history which were dominating in the refugee community, as I will 
illustrate shortly.
The written history of the Karen people is mainly produced by sources related to the 
Karen  National  Union  (KNU).  The  following  quote  is  drawn  from  the  KNU-run  web 
karen.org: 
The Karens are much more than a national minority. We are a nation with a population 
of 7 million, having all the essential qualities of a nation. We have our own history, our 
own language, our own culture, our own land of  settlement and our own economic 
system of life. By nature the Karens are simple, quiet, unassuming and peace loving 
people,  who  uphold  the  high  moral  qualities  of  honesty,  purity,  brotherly  love,  co-
operative living and loyalty, and are devout in their religious beliefs. 
Historically, the Karens descend from the same ancestors as the Mongolian people. 
The earliest Karens (or Yangs as called by the Thais), settled in Htee-Hset Met Ywa 
(Land of Flowing Sands), a land bordering the source of the Yang-tse-Kiang river in the 
Gobi Desert. From there, we migrated southwards and gradually entered the land now 
known as Burma about  739  B.C..  We were,  according to  most  historians,  the  first 
settlers in this new land. The Karens named this land Kaw-Lah, meaning the Green 
Land. We began to peacefully clear and till  our land from all hindrances. Our labors 
were fruitful and we were very happy with our lot. So we changed the name of the land 
to  Kawthoolei,  a  pleasant,  plentiful  and  peaceful  country.  Here  we  lived 
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characteristically simple, uneventful and peaceful lives, until the advent of the Burman. 
We the Karens could not enjoy our peaceful lives for long. The Mons were the next to 
enter this area, followed at their  heels by the Burman. Both the Mons and Burman 
brought with them feudalism, which they practiced to the full. The Burman later won the 
feudal war, and they subdued and subjugated all other nationalities in the land. The 
Karens suffered untold miseries at the hands of their Burman lords. Persecution, torture 
and killings, suppression, oppression and exploitation were the order of the day. To 
mention a few historical facts as evidence, we may refer to the Burman subjugation of 
the Mons and the Arakanese, and especially their past atrocities against the Thais at 
Ayudhaya. These events stand as firm evidence of the Burman feudalism, so severe 
that  those  victimized  peoples  continue  to  harbor  a  deep-seated  resentment  of  the 
Burman today (Karen National Union n/a b).
A notion of a common ethnic destiny – of  suffering because we are Karen –  was evoked, 
giving historical explanations showing how Burmans had terrorized Karens ever since the two 
groups  "met",  and  how the  Karens  were  now forced  to  live  in  exile.  I  argue  that  these 
historical  narratives  were  fundamental  elements  in  embodied  notions  of  victimhood  and 
resistance. Notions of Karen-ness, including quite selective representations of Karen history, 
served to assert their ethnic uniqueness; to explain their current suffering; to mobilize people 
for military conscription; to justify claims for autonomy and claims as "rightful natives"; to 
support flattering descriptions of the "nature of Karens"; to claim historical moral superiority 
to their suppressors, the Burmans; and to stress the unity of Karens in general. This is in line 
with Malkki (1995) who found that Hutu refugees in a camp in Tanzania to a large degree 
resorted to mythical imaginaries of the homeland and Hutu history, and where exile became a 
point of identification (Malkki 1995:3).
The most unusual and prominent social fact about the camp was that its inhabitants were 
continually engaged in an impassioned construction and reconstruction of their history as 
"a people". [...] These narratives, ubiquitous in the camp, formed an overarching historical 
trajectory  that  was  fundamentally  also  a  national  story  about  the  "rightful  natives"  of 
Burundi. (Malkki 1995:3)
The act of turning to myths (mythico-history, in Malkki's (1995) terms) to support and protect 
ethnic identity, was also observed by Mortland (1994) in her study of Cambodian refugees in 
the United States. In coping with staying as a minority group in a dominant society, everyday 
arrangements exerting continued pressure on what was perceived as Cambodian ways of life, 
the  act  of  "defining  a  mythical  Cambodian" became  a  valuable  identity-creating  activity 
(Mortland 1994:16-17). Conceptions of proper Khmer19 men and women and "[...] myths of 
19 The largest ethnic group in Cambodia 
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"before" not only demonstrate Cambodians' losses and struggles, but anchor them as Khmer. 
[… It]  is  the myth  which solidifies  identification and not  the actual  behavior"  (Mortland 
1994:16-17). Following the conceptualization of Pellizi (1988, cf. .Mortland 1994), 
Khmers are developing additional “images of belonging”, and in so doing they are calling 
upon what Pellizi (1988) calls a generic, disembodied memory. They are remembering the 
grandness of  their  past,  identifying themselves as the descendants of  the Angkorean 
Empire. To be Cambodian is to be of Angkor (Mortland 1994:23).
I argue that the mythical representations of Karen history were communicated and reproduced 
in refugee camps all along the border. They were applied both individually and collectively, 
and served both to structure individual  meaning-making and as instruments for the Karen 
nationalist project (cf. Berg 2009). I will discuss these processes in more detail below. For 
now,  let  these  quotes  drawn  from  students'  essays  illustrate  how  KNU-influenced 
representations of history were reproduced among the students:
At first, Karen people called this place Kaw Lah, which means green land. Our land was 
so  beautiful  so  we changed the  name to  Kaw Thoo Lei,  which  means a  pleasant,  
plentiful and peaceful country. (Saw Soe Win)
Burma was Karen country before. The native Karen people came to this country first.  
Pee Pan Say and Pu Hser Kaw buried a fishing rod and then they hung a Karen shirt on  
the fishing rod. (Saw Michael)
These  observations  can  also  be  seen  in  relation  to  the  previous  discussion  about 
remembering  and  imagining  Karen  State,  and  the  embodiment  of  victimhood  and 
resistance  inherent  in  the  conceptualization  of  refugee.  The  line  between  myth  and 
reality was blurred, shaping notions of ethnic identity, and the ways in which identity 
was connected to place. Nationalism was sustained. 
I  now  turn  to  what  I  argue  is  the  dominant  discourse-producer,  the  Karen 
National Union (KNU). Then I explore the workings of this reproduction in more detail, 
as  I  turn  to  the  refugee  camps  asking  whether  they  are  merely  arenas  for  the 
reproduction of nationalism, or if they might also have potential to  be multi-discourse 
sites. 
2.4. The Karen National Union as dominant discourse-producers
Anderson (1991) holds that, "[i]t was generally recognized that the intelligentsias were central 
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to the rise of nationalism in the colonial territories" (Anderson 1991:116). Among the Karens, 
the people who were most extensively in touch with the Baptist missionaries from the 1820's 
onward, and later colonial administrators, were generally S'gaw Karen from the lowlands. In 
the second round, Christian, S'gaw-speaking Karens from the lowlands were the ones who 
traveled to Rangoon or even to Britain, got a western-style education and were influenced by 
Western political  thoughts (cf. Lintner 1994). Policy-levels of official nationalism includes 
"compulsory  state-controlled  primary  education,  state-organized  propaganda,  official 
rewriting of history, militarism and endless affirmations of the identity of dynasty and the 
nation [...]" (Anderson 1991:101). In Karen society, the center of power when it comes to both 
administration,  military and education,  mainly lies  with  Christian,  S'gaw-speaking  Karens 
(Berg 2009:15). I hold that the so-called educator-intellectuals selected a set of myths and 
narratives and constructed an official version of Karen history, with the goal of legitimizing 
the idea of a Karen nation through means of ethno-history (cf. Smith 1991 in Berg 2009:54; 
Rajah  2002  and  South  2007).  This  endeavor,  fundamental  to  the  production  of  Karen 
nationalism, "presupposed a modern education of an elite who was informed about the model 
of modern states as introduced by the British colonialists" (Berg 2009:54). 
The Karen National Union (KNU) is still  the dominant political party and military 
organization representing Karens. It is arguably one of the major forces in the refugee camp 
producing and shaping narratives of the kind presented in the above section. In a prolongation 
of  this  argument,  I  believe  (in  line  with  Berg  2009)  that  they  have  come to  represent  a 
dominant  discourse  on  Karen  ethnicity  and nationalism,  giving  powerful,  even  doxic  (cf. 
Bourdieu  1977)  imperatives  on  what  it  is  to  be  Karen,  which  structure  available  subject 
positions. To substantiate this argument, I will take a look at the history of the organization. I 
then discuss their claim to legitimately represent a unified Karen people. 
2.4.1. The birth of ethnic and national consciousness and claims for autonomy
There is no authoritative written account of Karen history,  but research suggests that  they 
arrived in the area today constituting eastern Burma in the 6th or 7th century A.D. (Lintner 
1994:41-42), though the Karen themselves, relying on myths of origin, date their settlement to 
739 B.C20. (KNU n/a a). Illiterate, and with no significant academic tradition, "the Karens 
20 Whichever is closest to the truth, the fact remains that they were probably already there when Burmans 
entered the area around a thousand years ago (Lintner 1994).
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suffered more at the hands of the aggressive Burman invaders than any other people in the 
region" (Lintner 1994:42). They were treated as inferiors by the Burmans; forced to provide 
labor; subjected to high taxation and their villages were frequently raided. Stories of suffering 
at the hands of the Burmans are prevalent in Karen mythology. When missionaries (mainly 
American Baptists) arrived in the 1820's, a few decades preceding the British colonialists, the 
Karens  proved  receptive  to  the  preachings  of  the  Christian  god.  This  stands  in  peculiar 
contrast  to  neighboring  highland  groups,  for  instance  the  Akha,  which  were  much  more 
reluctant to conversion. Pinpointing the reasons for these variations is not a straight-forward 
exercise,  as both local and wider sociopolitical  variables must be taken into consideration 
(Kammerer 1990). However, I consider such an exercise beyond the scope of this thesis. For 
now I will point to two commonly mentioned factors: The empowerment that came through 
being associated to the white men; and an old Karen myth about a white younger brother who 
was supposed to arrive with a book of true knowledge, made the missionaries job easier than 
expected (Lintner 1994:42). 
The religious conversion from animism and Buddhism to Christianity brought several 
elements that  would prove crucial  to the development of Karen national consciousness.  A 
Karen script was developed in order to be able to print the bible in Karen. The conversion 
"implied a political identification" and gave Karens access to Christian schools and Western 
knowledge (Gravers 2007:234). At one time, Christian Karens numbered 22% of the student 
body at  the University of Rangoon (Lintner 1994:44). Thus, Karen national consciousness 
developed in the 1880's (Rajah 2002). In 1881 the Karen National Association (KNA, later 
Karen National Union (KNU)) was established as the first political organization in British 
India (Lintner 1994:45), leading to a political consolidation of Karen culture21.
The relatively beneficial  relationship  that  Karens  maintained  with the  missionaries 
(compared to the Burman majority which was much less open  to conversion), in addition to a 
historical  mutual  mistrust  between  Burmans  and  Karens22 were  among  the  factors  that 
contributed to the Karens being prone to support the British colonization.
The first claim for a separate Karen State was made in 1928 (Lintner 1994:45). In the 
Second World War many Karen fought on the British side, hoping that their loyalty would pay 
21 This organization was dominated by a small group of S’gaw and Pwo Karens (recapturing chapter 1, these 
were the two largest of the several existing Karen subgroups), for the most part Christians, who had been 
educated in Rangoon or Britain, and this domination has continued ever since (Lintner 1994:45).
22  Karens were generally viewed as primitive, barbaric peoples by the urban majority. The Karen were 
commonly viewed by Burmans as “no better than cattle”  (Tangseefa 2003:77).
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off  in  terms  of  British  support  for  their  claims  to  autonomy after  independence. Initially 
enjoying such support, KNU lost a lot of British political goodwill after continually claiming 
vast  areas  of  the  country,  and  boycotting  the  repeated  attempts  from the  Burman  side  at 
national unity within the confinements of parliamentarism (notably the Panglong Conference 
in  1947) (Lintner  1994).  Content  with nothing less than being granted full  autonomy,  the 
insurgency aimed at  maintaining the administration of Kawthoolei23,  and engaged in open 
warfare from early 1949. 
The following decades the KNU enjoyed de facto control over substantial parts of the 
border  area  towards  Thailand.  Here  they  were  allowed  to  consolidate  their  organization, 
establishing a civilian administration, and coordinated health and education systems  (South 
2007:10), all under the ideological umbrella of the KNU and with Karen independence as the 
ultimate goal. 
From the early 1970s until 1995 the KNU headquarters were situated at the city of 
Manerplaw,  which  served  as  the  center  not  just  for  Karen,  but  altogether  for  Burmese 
opposition at the time (Lintner 1999; Smith 2007 in Berg 2009:8). Smith (2007a) holds that 
KNU, like other armed ethnic groups, were engaged in a lucrative black market trade enabling 
them to build up a well-equipped army. In the early 1980s, KNU had 10.000 soldiers under 
arms. 
Since  the  mid-1970's  however,  the  power,  influence  and  size  of  the  KNU  have 
declined steadily. In 1984 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took control 
of strategic KNU bases, and in 1994, internal opposition in the KNU led to the break-away 
and  establishment  of  the  Democratic  Karen  Buddhist  Army  (DKBA).  Subsequently,  the 
DKBA, now associated with the SPDC, captured Manerplaw,  forcing the KNU to relocate 
their headquarters. This constituted "a major blow for  both the KNU and all the democratic 
and ethnic  alliances"24.  The following years,  SPDC succeeded in claiming the majority of 
formerly Karen-held territory,  and for the first  time in history more or less controlled the 
border  area.  Now  followed  a  massive  village  relocation  program  in  order  to  eliminate 
ethnically based insurgency. It is estimated that between 450,000 (UNHCR 2009) and 500,000 
(TBBC (2007a) people are fleeing internally in the Eastern areas of Burma. The camps along 
the border had a population of more than 130,000 in January 2010 (TBBC 2010), and an 
23 The administrative name of Karen State at the time. Translates to “land of flowers” in S'gaw Karen. 
24 http://www.tbbc.org/camps/history.htm  
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unknown number of illegal immigrants from the eastern parts of Burma reside on the Thai 
side of the border. 
Today the KNU is counting 5-7000 soldiers. Still they are described as the largest, and 
one of the most significant and influential ethnic opposition groups in Burma (South 2007a). 
In line with South (2007a) and Berg (2009) I claim that the KNU remain ideologically strong 
in  the  refugee  community,  to  the  extent  that  they  are  the  dominant  discourse  producers 
proffering  certain  subject  positions  regarding  "Karen-ness".  This  serves  a  purpose  of 
sustaining sentiments of Karen nationalism. I will discuss this more thoroughly in the next 
section. 
2.4.2. Karen National Unity? Questioning KNU representations
In addition to drawing on historical claims to sovereignty, and on narratives of suffering, the 
rhetorics of the KNU have a number of other elements that serve as arguments justifying their 
dominance and the Karen struggle. The uprisings in the fall of 1988 led to around 10,000 
activists  fleeing  to  the  border  area  and  forming  alliances  with  Karen  resistance.  In  the 
following years and after the fall of Manerplaw, many of these activists have ended up in 
refugee camps along the border alongside ethnic minority groups. Claiming to be allies of the 
democracy movement in Burma, the KNU website promptly states that they have followed 
democratic  procedures  in  their  requests  for  an  independent  nation,  and  democratic 
government  is  one  of  their  demands  towards  the  Burmese  regime.  However,  the  KNU 
continues to be run among authoritarian lines (South 2007a). 
Expressions of the Karen struggle are mainly militarized. According to South (2007a), 
"the discourse is hegemonic in the sense that today’s supporters of the Karen struggle see this 
‘militarized nation-building project [as] the only legitimate expression of Karen nationalism in 
Burma" (South 2007b:4). 
Dating their own arrival in Burma to 739 BC, and also claiming that the areas they 
seek  to  regain  and  achieve  independence  for  are  predominantly  Karen,  the  KNU evokes 
primordial  ethnic  arguments  to  justify  their  claims  for  Karen  State.  However,  their 
representation of history is hardly supported by any other historical source (Lintner 1994). 
Also, as Eshce (2004) points out; the Karen population in today's Karen state constitute the 
narrowest majority possible, of 51%, while the remaining 49% of the people carry various 
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other  ethnicities.  Also,  as  many  as  75%  of  all  Karens  live  elsewhere  in  Burma  (Esche 
2004:89). This makes the claims of the KNU of Karen State as the main and predominantly 
Karen area seem less justifiable from a demographic point of view.
Though the Karen ethno-history put forward by the KNU intends (according to South 
(2007b)) "to ensure a unity that presupposes a political and cultural consensus. [...]  such a 
unity does not exist among the Karen with its variety of religions, languages and traditions" (in 
Berg 2009:15) (my emphasis). As already pointed out, a Christian S'gaw elite has created and 
maintains  the  dominant  discourse,  and  there  is  an  ongoing  "struggle  between  the  ethno-
nationalistic discourse of the KNU and those of alternative Karen discourses related to which 
version is going to represent all Karens, regardless of faith, language and political ambitions" 
(Berg 2009:15). Alternative Karen voices are seldom heard by outsiders, one important reason 
being that the areas in which they live are difficult  for outsiders to access. It  is indicated 
however, that even though little is known by outsiders on their political views and how they 
feel about ethnicity, far from all sympathize with the KNU or even identify with other Karens 
more than with Burmese in general (Berg 2009:14). This thesis does not attempt to give voice 
to these other views.
The important point for the purposes of this thesis, is that neither calls for democracy 
or geographic belonging, nor arguments regarding Karen unity necessarily hold if contradicted 
by other accounts. The proclaimed unity of Karens, and the degree to which the KNU can 
justly claim to represent the majority of Karens through a pan-Karen nationalistic ideology, 
can definitely be questioned. Nevertheless, these notions constitute a dominating discourse in 
the  refugee  community.  It  is  a  fundamental  factor  shaping  available  subject  positions  for 
Karen people in the border area. 
To  sum  up  the  chapter  so  far,  I  have  pointed  to  the  prevalence  of  contrasting 
representations of Karen State, both as a Perfect Place and as representing terror and suffering. 
I have argued that notions of victimhood and resistance have become embodied notions for 
Karen refugees. A state of refugee is given shape as a "pure" category (cf. Malkki 1995), 
necessary  for  claiming  that  Karen  ethnicity  qualifies  as  a  national  one.  Perspectives  on 
ethnicity and nationalism has helped me illuminate how the Karen National Union emphasizes 
a selective historical representation, romanticizing images of Karen State and Karen people, 
and  one-sided  stories  of  suffering  at  the  hands  of  the  Burmans.  Thus,  the  contrasting 
representations serve the purpose of maintaining sentiments of nationalism. I will now move 
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on to the refugee camp, showing how nationalism, as produced and sustained by the KNU, is a 
being reproduced there. However, this claim will be met with observations suggesting that this 
is not the only side to the story. 
2.5. The refugee camp: Consolidation of ideology or multi-discourse 
arena? 
So far I have discussed conceptualizations of refugeeness, and I have drawn a picture of the 
KNU as ideologically dominant  in  the refugee community.  Both issues provide important 
elements to the discussion of identity formation. I will now take a more concrete look at the 
situation  in  the  camp.  How  did  staying  in  these  particular  camps  under  these  particular 
circumstances affect peoples' thoughts about themselves in the world? I present two slightly 
contrasting  interpretations  of  how  existence  in  camp  can  be  said  to  affect  identification 
processes, both of which can be said to be supported by my findings. 
2.5.1. The camps as arenas for consolidation of nationalism and certain notions 
of ethnicity
From the within-perspective Karen culture appears reified and the explanations of  the 
difference between Karen and Burmese seem ethnocentric.  Stereotyping is abundant, 
and the discourse has a primordial and deterministic character (Berg 2009:53). 
Berg (2009:56)  points  to the education and ceremonies  in  the camps as important  arenas 
where  the  dominant  discourse is  reproduced "through the  recursive narrations  of  national 
identities". The result is, according to Berg (2009) "hegemonization of a specific knowledge" 
about Karen-ness, and "[t]he recursive use of narratives is  part  of a deliberate process of 
turning  an  ethnic  discourse  into  the  dominant  national  discourse"  (Berg  2009:56).  When 
looking at students' representations of the circumstances surrounding the war, it seems that 
certain understandings of causality and morality are being reproduced: 
My village is  very  interesting  for  me.  It  is  very  satisfying  for  me but  I  am very sad.  
Because before,  Karen people were pressed by SPDC reign so the Karen revolution  
began in 1949.(NKJC student 9)
Karen people do not wish to fight with the Burmese government. They wanted peace but  
the Burmese government did not want peace and use violence against the Karen people.  
Therefore the Karen people started to defend ourselves. (Saw Soe Win)
The Burmese government started to abuse Karen people – burn houses, kill people and 
rape women. So the KNU officially declared the beginning of the revolution at Insein in  
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1949. Therefore the civil war in Burma began. (Saw Soe Win)
I want to encourage my people in Karen State like this: Never surrender when you stay  
anywhere and when you do anything. (Saw Kaw)
Karen people do not want community strife and civil war, they want national unity and 
peace. (Saw Soe Win)
Karen State needs peace and democracy too. It needs the help of the future generation  
to erect. I hope everyone who passes the NKJC and goes on to become a leader, goes  
back to our mother homeland. We have to try hard to help it  be free forever. (NKJC  
student 6)
The Karen Education Department  (KED) is  a  strong organization  in  the  border  area  that 
enjoys  a  considerable  degree  of  influence  especially  in  the  camps  because  it  coordinates 
education initiatives in the entire refugee community.
Typically for organizations institutionalizing nationalism (Anderson 1991), the KNU 
have close ties to the KED, and exert considerable influence over the curriculum taught at 
most  of  the  schools  both  in  Karen  State  and  the  camps  (Berg  2009).  The  KNU  have 
themselves  published  a  number  of  books  on  Karen  history  and  culture.  The  first  one, 
published in the early 1970's, lists what a Karen heritage consists of: "the knowledge that there 
is  a  God,  the Divine Being;  high moral  and ethical  standards; honesty;  simple,  quiet  and 
peaceful  living;  hospitality;  language;  national  costumes;  and  aptitude  for  music"  (Rajah 
2002:530). These books, along with the Karen history from 1931 was and is taught at schools, 
and, along with the national anthem, the flag and celebration of Revolution day on January 
31st serves to reproduce Karen ethno-history and nationalism (Rajah 2002:529). 
In the library of the school where I worked, books on Karen history produced by the 
KNU were available, and subjects like Karen history (which was a subject set  apart from 
“regular”  history)  seemed  to  be  taught  using  a  mixture  of  those  books  and the  teacher's 
memory of stories and myths.  Berg (2009) goes as far as pointing to the schools in and in 
connection to the camps  as s for continued “S'gawization”. Indeed, the impression one got 
from  staying  in  the  camp  was  that  stories  of  people's  home  villages  were  similar, 
representations  of  Karen-ness  were homogenous,  and  the  variation  suggested in  academic 
literature  on  Karens  in  terms  of  language,  religion  and  way  of  life  was  thoroughly 
downplayed. I hold that this unifying identification is used as a tool for arousing patriotism, 
mobilizing military participation and encouraging Karens to die for their nation.
While acknowledging the camps as central arenas – and not wishing to underestimate 
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the potential for discursive domination inherent in the production and control of knowledge 
(cf.  Foucault  1980)  –  I  want  to  point  out  that  there  are  other  arenas  in  camp,  possibly 
providing alternative interpretations of reality and thereby alternative subject positions. I will 
discuss this in the next section.
2.5.2. The camps as multi-discourse providers
The difference between here [Mae La Oon] and Karen State is that here they [the women]  
get in touch with workshops and education. Many people change their thoughts. But still  
many are still in the old ways. (Naw April)
When I was a child and some leader, elder or teacher asked me, what would you do of  
you grow up, I mostly replied them I will become the military leader. Because since I was 
a child I have never seen peace. I always see fighting and war. When I was nine years  
old my parents sent me to school. In my village there is only primary school, so I [thought]  
when I finish primary school I will become a soldier and go to war. My father also meant  
for me like this. [But when i was in primary school the SPDC attacked my village] so in 
2006 I came to Mae La Oon camp. [There I continued my education] and now I am proud  
because I can speak a little bit English. Now [I want to be an interpreter]. I don't want to 
go back to my village to become a military leader (Saw Ku Nay). 
In the majority of the interviews I did, and in essays written by the students, a very common 
statement was that the education opportunities were a lot better in the refugee camp than in 
Karen State. Primary education is scarce, and secondary and higher education practically non-
existent in Karen State. Also, by law all education has to be in Burman, which people in Karen 
State usually don't learn at home. I was told that this order was handled by most schools by 
keeping materials in both Karen and Burman, usually only using the Karen one, and whenever 
they suspected that they were being spied upon, or whenever inspections took place,  they 
switched both the materials and the language to Burman. However, the fact remains that the 
school situation in Karen State generally is very poor. It might be natural here to include a 
discussion on the liberating potential of education versus the potential of exercising symbolic 
power  over  those  subjected  to  the  education  system,  along the  lines  of  Foucault's  (1980) 
theory of power and knowledge. However interesting, I consider that beyond the scope of this 
thesis. For now I will settle with claiming that Karens in the refugee camp are exposed to 
different kinds of knowledge than they were inside Karen State, and that this might well have 
a liberating potential. 
Most of my informants who spoke about the education situation in camp and in Karen 
State, referred to people inside Karen State as being less knowledgeable. "They are behind in 
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education"; "they don't know their rights" and "they have less knowledge" were phrases that 
many used. What they actually considered as knowledge was not clear, but it  seemed that 
many used the phrase to denote "the information and experience you get from going to school 
and attending workshops". Knowing about and sustaining traditional ways of doing things was 
not referred to as knowledge. On the other hand, several training programs in the camp were 
directed at teaching women how to weave traditional Karen clothes. However, this was more 
commonly referred to as an income generation effort, and though definitely seen as culturally 
important, it did not seem to pass as education or knowledge. 
The "access to knowledge" argument was by my informants often used in relation to 
women's  situation.  Many  women,  through  getting  in  touch  with  women's  organizations 
(notably the KWO), attended workshops and income generation projects and realized that they 
"didn't have to be dependent on men", as one woman phrased it. 
My husband is educated but I am uneducated. I always had to obey him. But after I came  
to the camp I started working with the KWO. And now I know more about my rights. I went  
back and discussed with my husband and told him "Now I understand, I know more about  
the war and the situation. I don’t want to be in the house and do the housework anymore,  
I want to try more." In the end he gave up and said "I give up! You can try more."(KWO  
representative 2)
I will discuss more thoroughly how the refugee experience leads to changes in gender relation 
in Chapter 3. 
In the refugee camps the access to the outside world, or more perhaps a better way of 
putting it, the access the outside world has to the refugee camps, was better than in Karen 
State (a fact I will elaborate in Chapter 3). Community Based Organizations that did enter 
Karen State consisted mainly of Karen refugees operating from the Thai border area,  and 
going inside was considered risky, although it depended on which part you were going to and 
the state of the war at the time. 
To sum up, the KNU exerts considerable ideological influence in the refugee camp 
serving to consolidate notions of Karen identity. However, there is simultaneously a certain 
potential  for  the  camps  to  serve  as  providers  of  alternative  knowledges;  as  representing 
alternative discourses 'embodying' different subject positions.
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2.6. Chapter Conclusion
Through my informants' descriptions of Karen State I have discussed the contrasting ways in 
which it  is  imagined and remembered – on the one hand it  is  imagined as a  perfect  and 
harmonious  place,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  is  remembered  in  terms  of  suffering  and 
suppression. I argued that the refugees conceptualized their own refugeeness as being utterly 
marginalized and  "statusless", while simultaneously using these very categories to claim a 
status,  a  place  within  the  conceptual  order  of  nation  states  (cf.  Malkki  1995).  This 
understanding is supported by Malkki (1995) who explored identification processes among 
Hutu refugees in Tanzania, arguing that they conceptualized the state of refugeeness as a state 
of purity.
The prevalence of KNU is strong in many of the camps, and it can be claimed that the 
camps serve as arenas for consolidation of nationalism, homogenizing and "S'gawifying" its 
population (cf. Berg 2009).  Exile became related to ethnicity,  and nationalism, within this 
dominant discourse, became part of what was to be Karen – a certain range of acceptable 
subject positions was provided (cf. Moore 1994). Moreover, I have questioned the legitimacy 
with which the KNU can claim to represent Karens as a group. 
The refugees linked their current suffering to a historical suppression at the hands of 
the Burmans, simultaneously projected it into the future by stating that the struggle would last 
until they were granted autonomy for Karen State. This act of linking the  past, present and 
future, constituted a powerful link between place and identity. Karen State was in a sense the 
center of their imagination because it was not free, and thus, Karens were not free. 
Remembering that the refugee situation on the border has lasted for 25 years, it is safe 
to  say  that  the  contrasting,  bu  simultaneously  closely  linked,  notions  of  victimhood  and 
resistance have become embodied (cf. Bourdieu 1993). I will indeed claim that it is this twist 
that allows the discourse of the KNU to remain dominant. The only way, I believe, that Karen 
nationalism in its current shape – and the understanding of the world that it both results in and 
is a result  of –  can have any appeal, is that the romanticizing imaginaries of place, society, 
past,  present  and  future  continues,  while  at  the  same time the  narratives  of  suffering  are 
reproduced. 
On the other hand, I have argued, there is a large variety of organizations present, both 
Non-Governmental  Organizations,  Community-based  Organizations  and  International 
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Organizations. The access to impulses from the outside, so to speak, is far higher than inside 
Karen State. This environment inhibits a potential for providing contrasting, or competing, 
discourses to the KNU nationalist one. Any actual prevalence of multiple discourses in camp 
is however, not clearly evident. 
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Chapter 3 - Changing gender relations in the Karen refugee 
context
Recalling Chapter 1 I see gender as involved in all human activities, as a central axis for the 
discursive  definition  of  difference  (cf.  Moore  1994  and  Fagertun  2009).  Negotiations  of 
gender  identity are  constant,  and social  changes  will  lead  to  changes  in  gender  relations. 
Discourses which employ specific gender categories provide and reproduce notions of identity 
and agency.  Inherent in  the notion of gender as fundamentally defined by difference,  is  a 
possibility for structural imbalance of power. Gendered types of agency can render persons, or 
be  perceived  as  rendering  persons,  in  stronger  or  weaker  social  positions.  Therein  lies  a 
potential for domination. 
When I have chosen to focus more on women than on men under the name of "gender" 
it  is  not  because I  am unaware that  this  approach is  inflammable.  Not  only women have 
gender, and we are passed the time when scholars could focus on women only to "catch up" 
because social science research up until then had had a tacit masculine focus. The two main 
reasons why I still think that I should get away with it are: 1: Notions of power and ethnic 
narratives in the Karen refugee community are, as I will illustrate, notoriously (and mainly not 
outspokenly) masculine, and women thus have a submissive position in that sense. 2: Notions 
of female emancipation is a hot issue in organizational circles in the refugee camp, whereas 
male  emancipation  is  not.  This  alone  does  admittedly  not  justify  a  solely  female  focus, 
because the lack of questioning of masculine roles is also interesting. Not taking a closer look 
at men's roles just because they are not obviously discussed in the community itself (other than 
as a function of discussing women's roles) is quite a banal trap to walk into. However, the 
scope of the thesis had to be limited somewhere. This time the limit was drawn by selection of 
sex. 
In this  chapter I will  give a brief  introduction to what has been said about gender 
relations in Southeast Asia, before moving on to discussing gender relations among refugees. I 
discuss my own findings regarding gender relations among Karen refugees, and how these are 
perceived to be changing in the transition from Karen State to the refugee camp. Changes that 
are  perceived  to  be  affecting  gender  relations  include  division  of  labor;  better  access  to 
education; and meeting the Karen Women's' Organization (KWO). New types of knowledge 
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are  provided,  and  these also lead to  an emergence of  new views on female activism and 
leadership. 
My central argument in this chapter is that in a situation of transition gender relations 
are changing, as new elements are brought into gendered identity constructions. Notions of 
"what is up for discussion", are changing (cf. Bourdieu 1993). I point to the Karen Women's 
Organization  (KWO)  as  a  powerful  organization  which  provides  new  gendered  subject 
positions (cf. Moore 1994), thus representing a node of resistance towards the masculinized 
notions of power salient in the dominant KNU discourse. At the same time however, I argue 
that they remain rooted in this discourse, trying to include the new subject positions proffered 
(especially for women) in overall notions of Karen-ness. 
3.1. Gender in Southeast Asia
A common  opinion  in  the  social  sciences  was  for  a  long  time  that  men  and  women  in 
Southeast Asia enjoy a relationship of complementarity. It has been said that though their traits 
and roles are distinct, they are considered relatively equal in terms of power (see for example 
Winzeler  1996:167).  According  to  Geertz  and  Geertz  (1975),  in  Bali  there  is  "no  sharp 
conceptual opposition between masculinity and femininity, and the division of social roles or 
spheres of activity according to sex is blurred and weak" (in Winzeler 1996:166). Atkinson 
and  Errington  (1990)  points  to  how  the  alleged  equality,  or  complementarity,  of  gender 
relations have commonly been generalized to Southeast Asia (Atkinson and Errington 1990:6). 
There are several reasons why this has been a gatekeeper. One is, according to Devasahayam 
(2009) that there is a high instance of matrilineal and bilateral kinship systems in Southeast 
Asian  societies25.  Moreover,  the  relatively  autonomous  role  many  women  play  regarding 
household economics and work outside of the home, have also been taken as signs of women's 
strong  position.  As  in  Fagertun's  (2009)  case  study  from  Bali,  women  and  men  were 
commonly conceived by anthropologists as "different but equal" (Fagertun 2009:5). 
However, this approach takes for granted a Western notion of the emancipatory power 
of wage work (Fagertun 2009:5). As Atkinson and Errington (1990) point out: "In many parts 
of  island  Southeast  Asia,  executive  power  is  associated  with  a  lack  of  spiritual  power" 
25 Notably Devasahayam et. al. do not account for what they call "tribal" societies in their book. 
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(Atkinson and Errington 1990:5), and 
[...] Women in many of these societies are assumed to be more calculating, instrumental, 
and direct  than men, and their  control  of  practical  matters  and money,  their  economic 
"power", may be the opposition of the kind of "power", or spiritual potency that brings the 
greatest prestige; it may assure them of lower rather than higher prestige (Atkinson and 
Errington 1990:6-7). 
Devasahayam (2009) does admit  that  many Southeast  Asian women suffer from structural 
inequalities rendering them low-wage workers and their work often second-class, but goes far 
in blaming colonialism, neoliberalism and the spread of global capitalism for having forced 
these structures on Southeast Asia. This is too simple. Scholars have noted both structural and 
symbolic subordination of women in Southeast Asia, among them Wikan (1990): "[...] my own 
evidence, corroborated by observations [from both North and South Bali], points to extreme 
gender  differentiation both in  ritual  and symbolic  activity and in  the  more  mundane life" 
(Wikan 1990:67). In the words of Errington: 
Although the social and economic equality of women in island Southeast Asia is certainly 
impressive,  terms  like  "equality"  and  "power"  barely  begin  to  tell  the  story  of  how 
differences between men and women, and the powers to which each has access and may 
exercise, are understood and constituted here (Atkinson and Errington 1990:7-8).
Similarly, Mills (1999) in her exploration of women's roles and modernity in Thai society, 
argued that "[a]lthough gender distinctions may appear muted in the context of day-to-day 
social interaction, gender meanings and identity have an important place in northeastern Thai 
cultural beliefs and practices" (Mills 1999:18). 
The conclusion that women and men have been viewed as having complementary roles 
and  functions,  underscores  the  fact  that  complementarity,  as  well  as  hierarchy,  implies 
difference,  and  difference  inhabits  the  potential  for  dominance.  Even  though  subjects 
themselves may carry a notion of complementarity, difference inhabits a potential of equipping 
men and women with different types of agency (see Chapter 1). Thus, gendered structures of 
difference might well manifest themselves in structures of unequal power. Indeed, I hold in 
line with Fagertun (2009) that the notion of complementarity "illustrates that gender is present  
and given social force as a structuring principle for many activities, as many practices are 
formed by this very notion" (Fagertun 2009:5). 
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3.2. Gender relations among Karen refugees – changing balance of 
power?
In Chapter 2 I discussed the notion of refugeeness, arguing that it was both conceptualized as a 
marginalized status, and simultaneously "used" in an attempt at claiming a status and making 
meaning. In other words (and most important here), I argue against a notion of refugees as 
complete non-agents. 
One of the key traits affecting gender relations in the Karen refugee community was 
the substantial  changes people experienced when moving from Karen State  to the refugee 
camps. Even though the KNU have effectively been at war with the SPDC since 1949 and 
refugees from Karen areas have been crossing the border for more than 25 years, making it 
one of the most prolonged refugee situations in the world  (UNHCR 2010), for individuals 
effected  by this  warfare  and forced  to  flee,  the  changes  are  no  less  severe  and probably 
impossible to prepare oneself for. Karen State is by no means a place in total isolation, and the 
organization of everyday life in Karen State varies along lines such as rural-urban, highland-
lowland, distance to the river and not least, the ascribed "color" of the area (see Chapter 1). I 
nevertheless make the assumption that life in camp is qualitatively different from life in Karen 
State not only in material and geographical terms but also in terms of connectedness to  "the 
outside world". The thriving organizational environment in the camps (also accounted for in 
Chapter 1) illustrates this. Furthermore, I do not believe that gender relations in Karen State 
are static and original, untouched or essential in any way. However, the degree of change, and 
possibly the nature of change as well, differs from more predictable situations.
I will use my data to illustrate, in line with Camino and Krulfeld (1994) that  "in the 
face of altered access to resource allocations and new differential employment opportunities, 
changes in gender roles and statuses, and ultimately, often, in gender models themselves are 
fostered  in  refugee  communities" (Camino and Krulfeld  1994:xii).  The  range  of  available 
subject positions is likely to change (cf. Moore 1994). 
In sub-chapter 3.1. I argued that an alleged complementary organization of gendered 
division of labor might nevertheless entail structures of dominance. In the refugee camp, there 
seemed to be a prevalent notion of power as masculine and militarized. Traditionally, women 
were not supposed to take up leading positions, but remain passive and home-bound. 
This was not however, an uncontested notion. A question can be posed as to whether 
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the  changes  that  occurred,  and  still  are  occurring,  when moving from Karen  State  to  the 
refugee camp, have the potential of shifting the balance of power in favor of women. I will 
explore this through looking at some of the factors that my informants commonly claimed 
were changing when moving from Karen State to the camps. Among these were a change in 
the division of labor; better access to education for girls; workshops, leadership training and 
income generation projects for women; and the prominent position of the Karen Women's 
Organization (KWO). I argue that the KWO played a significant part in the production of an 
important discourse regarding gender and ethnicity,  alternative to the one proffered by the 
male-dominated Karen National Union (KNU). I will then turn to show that this resistance, 
nevertheless, was ultimately rooted within the KNU discourse – it did not, I believe, represent 
a rebellion against it. But let me first show how gender relations did change in the camp, and 
how the KWO played a central role in these changes. 
3.2.1. Change in the division of labor
There is a problem for the men in the camp because there is less for them to do. For 
example there are many income generating projects for women but less for the men. In  
Karen State they would for example cut down the trees but in camp they cannot do that  
(KWO representative 1).
Traditionally, I was told, the husband was the head of the household. In general, the wife's 
chores were related to taking care of the family and the things that had to do with the house, 
while farming and procuring food and money was the husband's responsibility. This took the 
husband out of the house more whereas the wife was more bound to the house, cooking and 
taking  care  of  children.  This  was  generally  however,  not  considered  a  hierarchical 
organization, but more of a convenient and complementary division of labor. "The men can do 
the  things  that  they  can do,  and the  women can do  the  things  that  they  can do"  (KWO  
representative 1). This notion fits well with views presented in sub-chapter 3.1., that gender 
roles  were  commonly  represented  as  complementary,  not  hierarchical,  in  many Southeast 
Asian societies. 
In the camps however, people were not allowed to grow rice, and a limited amount of 
other  crops  or  animal  breeding  was  possible.  Men  lost  substantial  tasks  in  their  area  of 
responsibility, whereas women's tasks were still more or less unchanged. This, some of my 
informants claimed, led to many men feeling frustrated. 
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[...] Some men don’t want to face [problems], because when the problem is really hard so  
you don’t want to face, you're just having alcohol to forget everything. Why? The reason 
that she wants to explain is that especially in the camp, most of the women try to get more  
income for the house, for the children, like weaving and sewing, knitting. But for thing like  
that, the weaving, knitting, the men are not doing like that but they can do like cut down the  
trees […] But in the camp they cannot do  that. She wants to compare like this: When 
woman are try to get something like the small income like the weaving, knitting, sewing,  
the men also have to do something to for income but in the camp it’s disappear. They are  
try to make a hat and try to make bamboo basket (KWO representative 1). 
Similar observations were made by Camino and Krulfeld (1994) in their studies of changing 
gender relations among Cambodian refugees in the United States. In their cases, it seemed that 
a  wider  range  of  opportunities  was  being  created  for  the  women.  The  studies  referred  to 
reported  that  Cambodian  men  felt  threatened  by  women's  increased  opportunities  and 
changing identities. Krulfeld (1994b) shows how marriage had functioned as an important way 
of controlling female sexuality, and through behavior such as going to school or work, getting 
in touch with other men, driving a car and using contraceptives, Cambodian men were robbed 
of some of that control. Moreover, the fact that women to a greater degree started working 
outside the home constituted a change in the division of labor in the household. Women's role 
was held to be as the head of the domestic sphere, where she was in charge, also financially 
(Krulfeld 1994b). 
However, it is not clear whether this change in the division of labor led to women's 
emancipation  or  empowerment  by their  own definitions.  Wage  labor  is  not  necessarily  a 
universal  criteria  for  female  empowerment.  Benson's  study  (1994)  suggests  that  many 
Cambodian women in fact, in contrast to their American neighbors, did not justify working 
with individual assertions, but through a "needs of the family" approach (Benson 1994:76). 
She therefore concludes that "[there is no] neat correspondence between work outside the 
home (however important that factor may seem to American feminists) and social esteem and 
authority in other aspects of life" (Benson 1994:93). What lies within concepts of liberty and 
equality, is not universally given. 
As the above quote suggest, not only did the change in division of labor potentially 
lead to women having more work to do than before. It also led to men having a lot less to do 
than before. Many informants talked about the fact that men often turned to drinking, which in 
turn composed its own problems for the women. Increased domestic violence was a problem 
in the camp communities (Lambert and Pickering 2003). Similar developments were reported 
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among Cambodians in the United States by Krulfeld (1994b). 
On the other hand, a development where women were more active on new arenas 
could also be seen as an opening for more women to take charge – perhaps filling a gap left 
open by men with alcohol problems:
When you face the biggest problem, like the real problem, when the two people try to solve  
a problem that is really difficult to face. At that time the women try to solve the problem but  
for the men they just having alcohol or something to forget or to solve the problem, so it  
becomes a problem after having too much alcohol, something like that. So for her opinion,  
at that time women can be power more than men (KWO representative 1). 
The shift in the gendered division of labor then, might - but does not necessarily -  lead to a 
shift in the balance of power in favor of women. 
3.2.2. Access to education
Education access was better for girls in the camp than in Karen State. It was better for the boys 
as well, but my impression from informants was that the gap to be filled was larger for the 
girls to start with, because it was less common for girls to go to school in Karen State. The 
notions of difference between boys and girls (evident in for example the division of labor) in 
Karen State, even though not widely regarded as inhibiting an unequal balance of power, often 
meant  that  parent's  would  not  see the  point  of  sending  their  daughters  to  school  because 
eventually their job was going to be in the house anyway.  In some cases schools in camp 
made a point of promoting their openness to both boys and girls.  Though it was a common 
opinion that women also in camp were lagging behind in education and general participation 
in  civil  society,  and  the  husband was  still  the  head  of  the  household  in  many cases,  the 
common perception was that more possibilities were open to the girls in the camps.
In 2004 we moved to Mae La Oon camp. Here we have a chance to go to school. Both  
boys and girls can go, they don't discriminate like they did in the past. (NKJC student 9)
Access to schools meant access to new types of knowledge, and perhaps it meant a better 
insight into the logic of state and administration26. The effect of the Karen educational regime 
on gender relations is, however interesting, not explored there. Suffice to say that girls got 
26  For an excellent exploration on the reproduction of notions of Karen nationalism through the Karen 
education system, see Berg (2009).
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better access to a new sphere of life that had to a greater extent (though not totally) been boys' 
domain  inside  Karen  State.  Notably  there  was  still  an  over-representation  of  boys  in  the 
schools in camp.
3.2.3. The Karen Women's Organization (KWO)
The Karen Women's Organization was, as already mentioned, a powerful organization in the 
Karen refugee community with an influential institutional position both in the camps and in 
villages  along  the  border.  They  organized  a  broad  range  of  activities  for  women,  from 
education and training, via income generation to documentation of abuses towards women. 
The stated objectives of the KWO are as follows (KWO 2008 [online]):  
To assist women in the endeavour to be free from all forms of oppression. 
To promote and empower women in all spheres of life, including education and general  
living standards. 
To encourage women to participate in the struggle for freedom, democracy and equality. 
To develop women's knowledge, ability and skills, including political and organisational  
skills.
To achieve the rights of women and equal status with men. 
To promote and maintain Karen culture and traditions. 
To care for the well-being of girls and children. 
KWO aims to empower women through offering various capacity building trainings to teach 
skills, build confidence and create new opportunities so that women will be better able to 
solve problems. We are working hard to educate ourselves and our  communities so that 
we can work more effectively and advocate for our struggle on the international stage. 
We believe that women’s contribution is an essential factor in the peace-building and 
national reconciliation processes of Burma. 
Upon discussing the objectives of the KWO with a representative from the KWO in Mae La 
Oon, I got the following explanation: 
Like empowerment means […] to educate people, to get more knowledge. So the woman 
that are educate they should train them to be like weaving or sewing, knitting, something,  
to earn the money for them to survive. And also for the young women they have to like be  
active and to learn more. And like, to be a leader. Because most of the Karen women they  
are afraid to be a leader, afraid to have the high role. So we [should] empower them to  
have more. To be active and like more educate, especially the women. Not to look back on  
the past, to be active and to be strong (KWO representative 1).
To this representative then, empowerment was deeply linked to knowledge, to earning money, 
and to be able to be a leader, but yet:
Equality does not mean that you have to do the same job, you are weaving so the men 
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have to weaving, when the men cut down the tree you have to cut down, not like that, you  
have to share. You have to share each other. Like, the thing that you can do you have to  
help. And the men can do, we have to work together, that’s equality. Equality is not doing  
the same thing. (KWO representative 1)
According  to  this  utterance  the  KWO,  or  at  least  this  representative,  held  a  notion  of 
empowerment and equality not as "women and men doing the same things", but of "female 
traits" becoming more valued, and of women being able to sustain themselves through "female 
activities". In other words, her aim was to raise the value of female modes of action to the 
level of male modes of action. The fundamental notion of gender difference was not contested. 
Many women  in  camp got  in  touch with  the  KWO through  attending  workshops, 
leadership  training  courses  and  income generation  projects,  and  many  "realized  that  they 
didn't have to be dependent on men" (KWO representative 1). This seems very similar to the 
Cambodian case referred to earlier. I argue that through the KWO Karen girls and women 
staying in the camps gained new possibilities and were exposed to new types of knowledge. In 
other words, many women experienced that new gendered subject positions became available 
as a result of the strong ideological position of the KWO. 
[...] now situation is change. Karen women cannot stay in the house and take care of the  
children. Not more today.[...]  today woman power is better then men. Because we have  
activity more than men today. We have strong [organization] at KWO so they have many 
community to work, some in Karen State and some in Mae Sariang and some in the camp. 
(Naw Say Paw)
My general impression however, was that there was a significant gap between stated views by 
women activists and lived realities for people in camp who were less engaged in politics or 
organizational life. As I will show below, even though young Karens learned at school that 
"men and women should have equal power" this did not always or immediately result in a 
change in thought.
Activism and leadership
Women being leaders does not collide with Karen culture (KWO representative 1).
In the past the men were always thinking that the woman can’t do anything. They are shy,  
they cannot be a leader (KWO representative 2).
When it came to taking formal leading positions in the community, there were altogether more 
men than women doing so both in Karen State and in the camp. This corresponds with the idea 
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of women's responsibilities being tied to the household. I came across a number of ways of 
reasoning about this, though they could be broadly put into one out of two categories: One was 
the opinion that Karen women can be leaders if they want to, but they are still stuck in the old  
ways of  thinking,  so we have to encourage them.  The other can be summarized as  Karen 
women cannot be leaders, because that is a masculine trait. This difference can be interpreted 
as reflecting different views on women’s abilities to act upon the world; that is, female modes 
of  action  The first  view reflects  a  view of  female  modes  of  action  as  potentially equally 
powerful as male modes of action whereas the latter does not. 
Traditionally,  I  was  told,  women were supposed to  be  "shy".  The  Karen word for 
which they gave the English translation "shy" - "meshah" - also meant "to want to cry". Being 
shy entailed being quiet, polite, stay in the background or maybe even hiding, not try to solve 
problems or do anything actively unless asked to, and avoiding attention from, and maybe 
even being afraid of, strangers. 
It’s like, traditional and, how to say, it’s long from the older, when the girls grow up they  
have to be respect and they have to be very shy and not be active. If they are active so the  
older, like the grandma and the mother always tell her to be very polite, to be very quiet,  
not to be very active as men. Because of the, I don’t know how to say, because of the  
past. But right now it’s getting less (KWO representative 1).
One of  my  informants  explained  women's  lacking  ability  to  be  leaders  in  terms  of  their 
shyness and their physical weakness:
Saw Htoo Minh:  Tharamu27,  what do you think about gender? Men and women should have 
equal power or not? I think men should have more power. 
Me: Why?
Saw Htoo Minh:  Because women are weaker than men, they cannot do the same things. They  
give  up  easily  and  they  are  shy.  They  say  ”I  can’t”  without  trying  hard.  
Especially in the Karen culture. What do you think? You think they should be 
equal, right? 
Me: Yes.
Saw Htoo Minh:  Why?
Me: Because I think that they can be equally strong and achieve equally if they  
believe it themselves. I believe ”shy” is possible to change. 
Saw Htoo Minh:  We are learning about gender at school now, that’s why I ask. 
Me: What are you learning? 
Saw Htoo Minh:  That they should be equal.
27 The S'gaw Karen word for female teacher. 
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Me: And you disagree?
Saw Htoo Minh:  No, I agree. But not for Karen, especially Karen women, they cannot do things,  
be strong, climb the tree… 
Me: So you have to climb the tree to be a leader? 
Saw Htoo Minh:  No, that’s not what I mean. [...] Women cannot be leaders because they have  
not been soldiers. 
Me: So you have to be a solider to become a leader? 
Saw Htoo Minh:  Yes. 
(Conversation with male student in the refugee camp)
In the above conversation we see that this boy saw female physical weakness as a hinder for 
female  leadership.  Being  a  soldier  and  being  physically  strong  was  seen  as  important 
qualifications. This quote illustrates the centrality of a militarized, masculine, leadership ideal. 
It reveals the prominent position of soldiers (KNU) as rightful and suitable leaders in Karen 
society, a leadership ideal which has, as I have shown in previous chapters, historical roots and 
is continuously being reproduced. Interestingly, when confronting a girl working as a secretary 
for the camp committee with Saw Htoo Minh's statement, what she resented was not the fact 
that he regarded physical strength as important for leadership, but the accusation that Karen 
women didn't have it: 
Me: So I was talking to some of the students at the KNFEP, and they said they had  
just been learning about gender now. And then some of the boys asked me “do 
you think that men and women should be equal?” and I said “yeah, what do  
you think?”  and they said  “no,  women cannot  be leader because they are  
useless and they cannot climb the tree, they have never been soldiers, so they 
can not be leaders”, something like that.
Naw Say Paw: But Karen women can climb the tree! Especially me! (laughing)
Me: Do you think that many Karen boys and men think that Karen women cannot  
be leaders?
Naw Say Paw: Can be leader!
Me: But what about the opinion of the men? Do you think that they agree that you  
can be a leader?
Naw Say Paw: But especially the girl. Because they a little bit be shy. So the men let them to 
become a leader, but they don’t want to be a leader so they a little bit shy to 
become a leader. We have the right to become the leader. 
Me: So it’s up to [the girls]?
Naw Say Paw: Up to them. 
This  girl  was  of  the  opinion  that  Karen  girls  themselves  had  to  take  responsibility  for 
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becoming leaders.  Others stressed the complementarity of  "male"  and "female"  traits  as a 
qualification for female leadership, and though arguing that physical differences gave men and 
women  different  roles,  rejected  the  argument  of  masculine  traits  being  better  "leadership 
qualities": 
Yes, some men have the view like that [women are too physically weak to be leaders], the  
same as before. Her opinion, she said for the men and women evenly. Women can do 
more than men, even the woman cannot be soldiers, cannot do the hard thing, but they 
can do many things. Like when you have the organization or something to do there is  
many part to do so the women can do the other part, not to cut down the tree, to be a  
soldier. So you can do the thing that you can do and the men can do the thing that they  
can do. Some things women can do but men can’t do. Some things that men can do,  
women can’t  do because  of  the  energy  of  the  people,  the  human. Because  we are 
women so we are a little bit weak so we cannot be soldiers or do the hard thing but we  
can do other things (KWO representative1). 
Thus,  even  though  this  informant  did  not  reason  that  complementarity  in  gender  roles 
potentially inhabited unbalanced power relations, she nevertheless saw a clear divide between 
male modes of action and female modes of action.  This line of reasoning is supported by 
observations made by Krulfeld (1994b) in her study of Lao refugees in the United States. 
Caring and nurturing was traditionally the power base of Laotian women, implying a notion of 
gender complementarity.   However,  Krulfeld argues, as do I,  that  "women's  power is  also 
limited by the [Lao] concepts of appropriate gender roles and behavior" (Krulfeld 1994b:102). 
The difference between the two lines of reasoning, then, lay in whether one mode of 
action was perceived as stronger than the other. There were different opinions regarding what 
qualified  to  be  a  leader,  whether  it  was  the  ability  to  adopt  what  was  generally  seen  as 
masculine,  or  whether  a  strong  person  was  fit,  regardless  of  whether  their  strength  was 
"masculine" or "feminine". To put it another way: Some (illustrated by the two first quotes) 
seemed  to  hold  that  "masculine",  physically  strong,  militarized  traits  reflected  a  stronger 
ability to act than the "feminine" counterpart which was shy and weak. Others (illustrated by 
the last quote) argued that feminine and masculine capabilities were of equal worth reflecting 
a  view which  juxtaposes  female  and  male  agency.  However,  both  stances  imply  a  clear 
definition  of  difference between  feminine  and  masculine  traits,  and  women  and  men's 
capacities, (cf. Moore (1994), Fagertun (2009)).The aim of the KWO seemed to be to increase 
the value of female capacities in women's own eyes and in the eyes of men. 
What most people seemed to agree upon however, was that even though it might have 
happened in the past, men no longer denied women access to leadership,  if they were able. 
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What kept some women from taking leading positions was their lingering shyness: 
If they have the ability they can (KWO representative 1).
In the camp situation is changing so it’s depend on your case. […] If you are right then  
more people will follow you. Even like two ideas, even the women idea and the men idea,  
It depend on the idea, if it’s a good idea so if the women has good idea then many often  
follow, agree with her idea. If her idea is a little bit like strange to the men so they follow  
the other. (Camp committee representative 1).
But who defines what ideas are "good" and what ideas are "strange"? This was not a question 
that was asked, at least not out loud. The discursive power to define what "proper" knowledge 
is,  is  the  basis  for  dominance  (cf.  Foucault  1980),  and  that  definition  was  not  up  for 
discussion. 
One of  the  KWO activists  I  interviewed stressed  the  importance  of  urging  young 
Karen women to become leaders. This was part of their notion of empowerment, and girls' 
shyness was seen by the KWO as a hinder for female leadership. But encouraging girls to not 
be shy,  was not, I  believe,  seen as destructive to the girls'  Karen-ness. As much as Karen 
women might be supposed to be "shy", they were also supposed to be strong, and encouraging 
strength on the girls' own premises seemed to be the approach of the KWO. In other words, 
through their activities they provided new gendered subject positions for women, making them 
more prone to  take leadership positions,  while  remaining the sense of  Karen-ness.  To the 
KWO, the "shy" could and should be lost without having the effect of rendering girls less 
Karen. 
[...] in the camp women are get equal right to do with the men. But as you know for the 
past the women are […] they don’t want to be a leader they don’t want to be […] and talk  
to the men so they always go back to the bad. But they try to solve the problem but she  
hopes that more and more will be like the leader, more and more later. We have to try, to  
encourage them, like that. (KWO representative 1)
I have shown that in the camp community there was a discursive obstacle against girls and 
women becoming leaders. Notions of how proper Karen women were supposed to act were not 
easily united with them standing out and speaking out. Nevertheless, KWO members I spoke 
to insisted that it was not "against Karen culture" for women to be leaders (as in the first quote 
in this sub-chapter). I believe that in order to achieve and maintain an influential position in 
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the refugee community, the KWO had to try to unite these two notions of Karen femininity as 
smoothly as possible.  Outright rebellion against  the dominant,  masculine ideal would – in 
addition to being contrary to the principle of ah na deh – probably not have given them the 
broad support  they enjoy today.  I  thus  argue  that  even though the  KWO was a  powerful 
organization with a lot to say regarding notions of gender, they still operated within the doxic 
notions laid down by the dominant discourse of the Karen National Union (KNU). However, 
in  the  light  of  reflections  made  by  Parker  (2005),  agency  should  not  be  conflated  with 
resistance, neither is it always the same as activity: 
Women's agency may take a range of forms […]. Anthropology has been at the forefront 
of social science research which has represented women's “activity” or “active agency”. 
[…] it is […] necessary to note that the emphasis on women's activity as the principal 
index  of  agency  might  be  a  particularly  Western  way  of  perceiving  agency  (Parker 
2005:11-12). 
I  am also reminded of Foucault's  reflection that  resistance is  never  completely exterior  to 
power (Foucault 1978:95 in Parker 2005:6). Moreover, the fact that issues related to female 
leadership were discussed at all, might suggest a shift in what was possible to put into question 
(cf. Bourdieu 1993). I suggest this with great care, since I know very little about what was 
discussed and not regarding gender relations inside Karen State.
3.3. Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the social transition resulting from leaving Karen State for 
the refugee camp led to a number of changes which affected gender relations. Contrary to the 
early claims about gender relations in Southeast Asia, and in line with more recent argument 
(cf.  Fagertun  2009),  I  have  shown  that  gender  relations  in  the  Karen  context  were 
fundamentally defined by difference, and entailed an unequal relation of power. The discursive 
power executed by the Karen National Union (KNU) was fundamental in defining acceptable 
subject positions, and this included notions of femininity and masculinity. 
I have illustrated how changes related to life as a refugee might be contributing to a shift 
in gendered power relations. A change in the gendered division of labor; increased access to 
education and new types of knowledge; and the existence of a broad range of activities offered 
to women on basis of their sex (coupled with a lack of corresponding possibilities for men), all 
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served to bring new elements into gendered identity negotiation. 
However, the actual emancipatory power of increased access to what were previously 
men's domains in a society, is not a universal given. This argument was supported by Camino 
and Benson's (1994) observations that L;ao women did not install the same individual prestige 
in for instance having a job as many American women did. 
Moreover I argued that the Karen Women's Organization (KWO) was a powerful actor 
in the refugee community,  with the aim of proffering new knowledge and skills  to  Karen 
women and girls. Though this can be interpreted as exhibiting a mode of resistance, I believe 
they represent a sub-discourse remaining within the dominant discourse of Karen-ness. "New" 
subject  positions  (cf.  Moore  1994)  made available  to  women  were  still  embedded in  the 
dominating  overall  notion  of  Karen  ethnicity.  I  argued  that  the  aim of  the  KWO was  to 
increase the value of what was seen as female modes of action, in the common opinion in the 
refugee community, enabling girls to take up leadership positions without risking loosing their 
Karen-ness.  Thus  I  argued  that  they  can  be  said  to  reproduce  a  notion  of  fundamental 
difference between feminine and masculine modes, as they through their work enhanced the 
idea of complementary gender relations.  All in all I have argued that they operated within 
doxic notions of gender differences (cf. Bourdieu 1998).
I have not concluded as to whether power was actually shifting in favor of women in the 
refugee camp. I have pointed to alcoholism among men and an alleged increase in domestic 
violence  in  camp as  factors  that  continued  to  render  women  powerless  (cf.  Lambert  and 
Pickering 2003). Moreover, though the KWO was a powerful organization there was not a 
univocal accept for a stance that female types of agency should be regarded as equally strong 
as male types of agency. 
The  discussion  about  changing gender  relations  can  be  related  to  more  overarching 
questions posed in this thesis concerning how to conceptualize, and deal with, life in a refugee 
camp on the Thai-Burmese border. Significant elements are changing in the transition from 
Karen State to the camp, resulting in constant renegotiation of identities, of what is seen as 
true and acceptable; of ethnicity, and also gender relations. One significant change that has 
happened during the past few years, is the possibility, for some, of being resettled to a third 
country. I believe that the great unpredictability of the situation for Karen refugees leads to 
ambiguity when thinking and talking about the future. It is towards this ambiguity I turn in the 
last chapter. 
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Chapter 4 - Ambiguous Thoughts about the Future
In  Chapter  2  I  argued  that  the  dominant  ethnic  and  nationalist  discourse  produced  and 
sustained  by  the  KNU  played  a  central  role  in  shaping  processes  of  identification  and 
meaning-making for refugees in  the camps.  I  have also showed that the transition to the 
camps induced changes in gender relations and ideas of gender (Chapter 3), even though this 
was a multifaceted process. 
In this chapter I will show how feelings of marginalization and insecurity were often 
met with an act of mixing dreams and wishes with "realistically" oriented thoughts and plans. 
I believe that similarly to the paradoxical use of narratives about Karen State discussed in 
Chapter 2, thoughts about the future were often conveyed in a contrasting fashion. I argue that 
the refugees used paradoxical representations as a resource in their relation to reality. I believe 
it was a way of coping with the situation of utter unpredictability and lack of influence on 
their own destiny, within the dominant discourse of what was seen as acceptable and true. 
I start off this chapter with reminding the reader of the point made in Chapter 2: How 
Karen State was simultaneously imagined as a Perfect Place and remembered as a place of 
terror and suffering. Then I move on to new territory, showing how this imagery could also be 
projected towards a Third Country. I argue that ambiguity and doubts related to the nature of 
the link between identity and place in a situation of utter unpredictability, led to paradoxical 
representations  of  thoughts  about  and  plans  for  the  future.  In  the  last  sub-chapter  I  will 
illustrate the apparent inconsistency between thought and actions through a discussion of how 
young Karen refugees dealt with pre-marital romantic relationships. 
4.1. Imagining a Perfect Place
4.1.1. Karen State - belonging to a place, and a community of solidarity
Karen State is a beautiful state. Even though I have to be away I never forget it. I always 
miss it. It is much better than other countries. All Karen people want to go back to it. It will  
always be in my life (Saw Michael). 
Recapturing this quote28 from a student at the School serves as a reminder of the point already 
28 All of the quotes in this sub-chapter are drawn from the essays written by students at the school which I 
referred to in Chapter 2. While seven out of 27 students wrote about their homeland, another seven wrote 
essays named "My future plan" or something similar. Also, I have drawn quotes from an essay named "Karen 
traditional ceremonies". 
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made about how Karen State was imagined as a Perfect Place (Chapter 2). At the same time, 
the hardships from which they had escaped formed fundamental elements in the narrations of 
their life as well as being tied up with ethnicity and ethnic virtues. I have framed  this as the 
difference  between  remembering and  imagining  Karen State.  Karen State  was  the  central 
focal point for Karen nationalism, tightly linked both to the political and military mobilization 
and to a sense of ethnic identification. I have argued (Chapter 2) that even though, or maybe 
because, the romanticized images might be far from the "actual" state of Karen State, it was 
possible  to  create  such  imaginaries  of  a  Perfect  Place.  Strong  emotions  of  territorialized 
belonging and identity were evoked, as is the core of nationalism. 
Another central element in the images of Karen State was the notion of a community 
where people had close ties to each other,  helped each other and remained true to Karen 
values. Going back to Karen State after having finished school and Helping The Community 
through sharing their knowledge, setting up schools, hospitals, orphanages etc. was quite a 
common plan among the students at the school. 
When I finishing KNFEP school I think I will [continue to] study at KWO, finishing, I will  
work in KWO because KWO work is very advantage for me. More over many people live  
in the Karen state they need to help for us they are very pity, so will help them (Naw Moo 
Dah).
My plan is is I finish KNFEP I will be a teacher in Karen state. Because my family live in  
Karen state. Moreover my people need education and need many people to works in  
Karen community. I strongly know our Karen people have many problems from SPDC. So  
I should try to save them (Naw Bae Paw).
After finish my study I want to become a good person for my community. I will try to help 
them as much as I  can.  Because my people  really  need me.  My people have many 
problem to face (Naw Julia).
After finishing KNFEP school, I will help some thing in my community about doctor, or  
teacher ( Naw Jade).
This sense of community was far from absent in the refugee camp. Efforts to maintain it were 
constant.  Through  schools,  churches,  community  based  organizations  and  organizations 
related to the camp administration there were open activities and ceremonies going on in 
different parts of the camp almost constantly the times I was there29. At the School, students 
29 I once came across a term schedule lying around at the Center, from the CCSDPT (the major umbrella 
organization coordinating all organized activities for refugees in the camps and along the border), with an 
overview of activities under their coordination. There were several «special days» listed such as the World 
Refugee Day and the International AIDS Day. The CCSDPT had found it necessary to stress that these were 
not mainly days for ceremony and celebration, and urged the organizations under their flag to organize 
activities related to the day in question, not «only» «traditional Karen celebrations».
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had to wear Karen clothes every Wednesday (every Friday they wore a western-style school 
uniform). One student essay pointed to the importance of ceremonies for the Karen people in 
terms of remembering their origins, in order to maintain the Karen culture, and to remind 
people how important it was to remain united in these difficult times: 
I would like to tell you about Karen traditional ceremonies that I attended in refugee camp.  
I had many thoughts about it that I would like to share with you. 
The wrist-tying ceremony is as old as the Karen people. It was started by Tawmeipa. He 
wanted to unite his family once a year because they lived far away from each other. The  
family met and became more united when they were celebrating the ceremony together. I  
think this is very important for our people. 
Another part of the celebration is Karen traditional clothes. When we go somewhere we  
use Karen clothes because we are Karen so we should use Karen clothes. We shouldn't  
forget Karen clothes in our life. When we have the Karen new year we wore the Karen  
traditional clothes, bracelet and necklace. We saw that they had to work well together to  
be successful. If we have unity, we will always win. We should remember the proverb  
“united we stand, divided we fall”. 
In the past, only individual families performed the ceremony but now it's important that 
our entire Karen community comes together as a family for this very special event (Naw 
Say Paw).
The idea of a perfect  community then,  was a community organized along lines of Karen 
tradition  and  based  on  unity,  solidarity  and  cooperation,  where  peace  ruled  and  people 
respected each other. The image of a proper Karen person not only contained an element of 
helping the community – of being  "useful". Another fundamental point was the wish  to go 
back  to  Karen  State  –  that  was  how the  link  between place  and identity was  "properly" 
constituted. 
Karen State needs peace and democracy too. It needs the help of the future generation  
to erect. I hope everyone who passes the [school] and goes on to become a leader, goes  
back to our mother homeland. We have to try hard to help it  be free forever. (NKJC  
student 6)
As I am a Karen lady, the Karen blood speaks to me. I must be useful to my people. I will  
return to Karen State and help my people as much as I can. (female student)
We are Karen and we shouldn't let ourselves be discouraged, instead we should try hard  
to improve our lives. If we live in another country we should not forget who we are, and  
we  should  maintain  our  culture.  We  have  a  responsibility  to  help  our  people  and 
nationality.  We  should  […]  cooperate  for  peace.  We  shouldn't  be  shy  to  speak  our  
language and wear our traditional clothes. We shouldn't be afraid to speak for justice.  
Hopefully one day we will get [freedom] in our own country. (Saw Soe Win)
Karen-ness  was  fundamentally  tied  to  having  a  strong  relation  to  Karen  State,  a  strong 
longing  for  it.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  ideals  of  Karen-ness  and  solidarity  colouring 
images of Karen State as the perfect community can be tied to the dominant discourse on 
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ethnicity and nationalism. The dominant discourse proffered certain subject positions related 
to Karen-ness which were more acceptable than others (cf. Moore 1994). 
I argue, then, that the act of creating an image of Karen State as a Perfect Place was 
simultaneously  a  result  of  three  elements:  1)  A conceptualization  of  refugeeness  as  both 
marginalized, ultimately liminal and temporary (Malkki 1995), 2) an outcome of normative 
images of Karen ethnicity, with the dominant nationalist discourse pushing in the direction of 
national  romanticism;  and  3)  These  imaginaries  of  Karen  State  provided  consolation  for 
people who had fled from it, and offered a way of imagining the homeland that gave room for 
dreaming about going back. This dream could only exist if one thought about Karen State not 
only in terms of its "real state", but also in terms of what it ought to be, its connection with 
Karen identity, and as the ultimate (almost unavoidable) result of the Karen struggle.
The  role  expectations  related  to  ethnicity,  I  believe,  were  powerful  in  shaping 
identification processes in times where new opportunities were emerging. The possibility of 
resettlement,  a  reality from 2005 when the UNHCR launched their  resettlement  program, 
brought new possibilities for forming images of a Perfect Place, bringing new elements into 
the linkages between place and identity.
4.1.2. A Third Country 
In spite of the limitations on who could go to a third country (see Chapter 1),  many people 
spoke of going as if it were realistic option for them when in fact in the current situation it 
was not. Similar ways of expression among Karen refugees in camps on the Thai border is 
also reported by Berg (2009). Some of my informants would express a desire to go and speak 
as if it was a possibility for the future, even though they did not in fact have refugee status. 
On the other hand, some people told me on one occasion that they planned to go back 
to Karen State to help their community, while I later found out that they were in fact applying 
for resettlement.  A wish to go to a third country,  even though many carried it,  was often 
associated with guilt,  with a feeling of leaving your people behind, of failing your fellow 
Karens in a time of utter need (Berg 2009:94-95). 
During my time in the field I got many questions about life in "The Third Country". 
Resettlement was a hot conversation topic, and something "everyone" related to in one way or 
another, whether because they were pondering whether to go or not; knew someone who had 
left or were planning to leave; were struggling to accept the fact that they couldn't go because 
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they didn't have the right legal status; or were actually in the process of applying themselves. 
Questions were many and varied from everyday details via practical issues such as food and 
temperature, to speculations about whether people in third countries were happy all the time 
or not. Some were, naturally, quite acknowledgeable about conditions outside the sphere of 
Karen  State  and  the  border  area.  Others  had  gathered  information  from  foreigners  and 
relatives who had already gone, and were thinking in a more critical manner about how life 
would be in another country. Many of the younger students especially seemed to associate it 
with complete happiness and a conspicuous absence of problems. In other words, the act of 
creating an image of a Perfect and harmonic Place could be directed both towards Karen 
State, and towards a rich  and peaceful Third Country.  The same person could carry both 
images.
However, as already mentioned and as explored by Berg (2009), an urge to go was 
tempered with a sense of guilt, of not being a proper Karen, of letting one's people down. A 
proper Karen should, if going to a third country,  return to help their community: 
Now we live in here but we have the opportunity to apply for a third country. So some 
people leave and go to a third country to get skills, improve their English and have a  
better standard of living. They want to live in a free country. They don't like fighting as  
their village. They want their child to have better quality of life. One day, if the country is  
free they will go back to their country and share their skills to people and help their nation.  
They  don't  forget  their  nation.  I  think  they  always  remember  their  village  who faced  
problems in the past. Even though they left to another country I think they will help their  
people as much as they can to get a free country, a free life and luxury. (NKJC student 9)
I  see  that  most  of  the  people  with  high  education  they  don't  want  to  work  for  their  
community. Mostly they find benefits for themselves [...] I want to tell you this my beloved  
brother  and  sister:  Don't  forget  everything  that  your  grandparents  have  done for  the  
community. [...] If you work for your community in some way, work until the people tell you  
oh, teacher, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, you do so much for your community, that is ok,  
you have fulfilled your duty for your nation, right now you can leave and take a rest in  
[an]other country. You can choose any place that you want and stay well for your whole  
life. (Saw Wah Eh)
These utterances reflects a negotiation concerning whether a desire to go could be fitted into 
the notion of "Karen-ness". 
However, many people saw difficulties related to going to a third country. Some of my 
informants uttered concern that young people didn't understand that they would face problems 
in a strange place where their knowledge was less worth than in the refugee community. 
Being in the third country is like being in the neighbor house, you are not free because  
[…] it’s far from your culture, far from your native. So its just like being to someone’s  
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house.  […]  But  if  you try  very  hard  you can  get  something.  But  it’s  different.  (KWO  
representative 1)
One of my informants in particular, expressed concern about what she saw as people thinking 
they could run away from the problems they experienced in camp, not seeing the new set of 
problems they would face: 
Naw April:  [...] there is a problem for the refugee moving to the western country. That they are  
uneducate people. The cannot read and write so they have to start and learn from the  
beginning so it will be very boring for them. Even they don’t want to study, they don’t  
want to learn because they are uneducate and they are very old. So it will be difficult  
for them.
Me: Yeah, I think it can be difficult.
Naw April:  She says that many people want to go but the real problem is lack of education, so if  
they go there they have to start  education so it’s  really hard for them. As for her  
opinion it  is hard to start  in the beginning. As you said like when the husband is  
getting drunk and beating the wife they [in a third country they cannot do it]. She said  
that many women in the camp they want to escape that kind of behave because of  
the husband drinking alcohol and beating him and something like that. Just want to  
escape and they want to go to third country. They just think that it’s easy, like if they  
go to the third country they will escape for that, escape for the husband beating them.  
But they don’t think that they, some, because they are uneducate so they don’t know 
and they don’t think about the other because they have to face a big problem like  
they have to strive in the beginning. So it’s difficult for them. But even they live here, if  
they know their right, if they know how to protect themselves so it’s ok but they are  
not try to follow the solution but they just want to go to the third country to escape. 
Me: Yes, I think many of the people I have been talking to think that they can go to a third  
country and then they can be happy all the time.
Naw April:  Yes, but for her, her opinion is not like that. You have to solve the problem here. If the 
wife and the husband don’t understand each other you will escape for that kind of  
behave. So if you are not try to solve the problem so when you be there, f something  
happen, you will be take care of by the police, the family will separate, something like  
that. So her idea, she doesn’t think like that. 
(From interview with KWO member in Mae La Oon refugee camp)
Thus, the act of imagining a Perfect Place in a Third Country was not unproblematic. These 
"new" projections of dreams of a perfect and harmonious Karen community onto a place that 
was not Karen State were full of insecurity, doubt, moral conflict and ambiguity. The question 
of whether dreaming about going or deciding to go to a third country implied a violation of 
Karen-ness, brought new and disturbing elements into identity negotiations – am I less Karen 
if I decide to go? Was it possible to create a space where a decision to go could fit into a 
notion of Karen-ness? 
A chance to go to a third country implies a drastic change in circumstances. In the 
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next section I will discuss how such changes affected identification processes for people in 
the refugee community, in terms of negotiations between images and "reality". 
4.2. Negotiating between Imaginaries and Reality
When you cannot do anything, that’s the biggest problem in life.(Naw Eh Paw)
I  see the suffering of  my people but  I  cannot help and set  them free.  (female NJKC  
student)
My other ambition is to go to Canada but they didn't allow me. (Saw November Htoo)
When I finish this school I will teach in my village or I will help my community. But not  
really. If I go to a third country I will study there to improve my English. But this is my first  
year out of four in this school. Maybe I will  teach in the camp, if  I don't  go to a third  
country. Maybe if I don't teach in camp I  go to my village. If I don't teach in the camp I will  
find a job in Thailand. Sometimes I think if I pass this school I won't work at all. I have an  
aim to go to a third country. But my future plan is not real. I stay in this camp. (Saw Lah  
Htoo)
I believe the Karen concept of  ah na deh is central for understanding why such statements 
where informants openly conveyed feelings  of  hopelessness were very rare.  The norm of 
proper behavior was to always be in control of one's feelings, not exposing any lack of control 
and not stirring up bad emotions in others. This led to a general avoidance of talking about 
issues of insecurity, sadness, loss, disappointment etc.  
This  description  of  norms  regarding  the  expression  of  feelings  has  some striking 
similarities to points made by Wikan in Managing Turbulent Hearts (1990), which is based on 
fieldwork in northern Bali. According to Wikan, everyday life was characterized by
an experienced ubiquitous endeavour of "making one's face look bright and clear" in a 
world  where  there  is,  as  they say,  "so  much  to  care  about".  What  Westerners  have 
perceived  as  an  innate  aesthetic  mood,  an  ingrained  disposition  to  be  graceful  and 
poised, I found instead to reflect a deliberate attitude, a willed response of "not caring", 
"forgetting" the bad that has come to pass, and "letting bygones be bygones" if one is to 
thrive, or even to survive (Wikan 1990:xvi). 
Within the framework of the concept of ah na deh, hoping can be a risky project. Hoping 
implies  a  possibility  of  being  disappointed,  and  thus  risking  breaking  with  the  norms  of 
remaining in control of one's expression. Nevertheless, some of my informants did express a 
spirit of "it is possible": 
I’m just talking to her about moving to third country. She says that some parents they  
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[send for the children to] become teacher even the children are going to third country, if  
they are not try hard they ill not get nothing, they will just finish high school and if they are  
not try hard, it is the same here. Even people here and even people in Karen State if they  
try very hard and they are very clever they can go to university, they have chance, but not  
everyone. One of my cousin he is now in Bangkok to study but the parents are inside  
Karen State because he is smart than the other but he also try very hard and he also  
holding a Burmese passport, but he have to try very hard. I want to say even the refugee,  
even if  he is a refugee from Karen State he try to get the opportunity. I  think he will  
graduate on March, something like that (Naw April). 
This story could be interpreted as a protest against conceptualizations that render the Karen 
refugees  "outside of  everything",  robbed of  their  humanity,  completely marginalized – in 
other words, as resistance. This voice seems to say "there is a place for us, and we can claim 
it, even though we are refugees". Is seems to contradict perspectives that leave no room for 
people with no nation, that render their identities "damaged" and their agency against all odds. 
I  want  to  stress  the  diverging  views  I  observed  during  my field  work  regarding 
conceptualizations  of  the  future,  as  illustrated  in  the  two  above  clusters  of  quotes  from 
informants. This indicates an intense ongoing negotiation not only internally for individuals, 
but between different currents within the Karen refugee community about linkages between 
ethnicity, place and identity. 
I will now substantiate this argument by pointing to one manifestation of ambiguity in 
identity negotiations. I use some observations regarding young Karens' romantic relationships, 
showing  how  unpredictability,  insecurity  and  doubts  led  to  contrasting  thoughts  and 
representations. I argue that this way of relating to insecurity can indeed be seen as a form of 
agency. 
4.2.1. Courtship and romantic relationships
Pre-marital  romantic  relationships  were  quite  common  in  the  Karen  refugee  community, 
although  sexual relations before marriage were not accepted, and were sometimes sanctioned 
by community leaders or elders. Although I did not investigate the prevalence of arranged 
marriages, Naw April put it like this in a conversation30: Divorce was not accepted, except in 
extreme cases, and even then you had to prove for a community committee that you had a 
good reason and they would decide. Therefore it would be a good idea to let your parents help 
decide  who you  should  marry.  Because  parents  were  wiser,  and  they probably knew the 
family of the boy and could tell you if that boy was a good worker or if he was lazy and 
30 I have rephrased this conversation on basis of my field notes. 
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would leave all the work to you. Most of the time the parents would not force you, but it was 
wise to listen to their advice. 
Avoiding marriage was a possibility, but since that meant staying at your parent's farm 
(back in Karen State), you would face difficulties when your parents got too old to work, 
because taking care of a farm was too much work for just one person. The situation in the 
camp was quite different, since farming was not the way of life anymore (see Chapter 2). 
According to Naw April, this, in addition to the increased access to higher levels of education 
for both boys and girls, resulted in a lot of women getting married at a later age than before. 
In Karen State, she said, girls would often get married between 14 and 18, whereas in the 
camp they were often older than 20. Pre-marital romantic relations were fairly common, and 
high school sweethearts frequently ended up getting married when they finished school. 
Many of my informants were students in the age 19-21. Romantic relationships was 
an unavoidable issue when staying together in a boarding situation. From what I gathered 
through observation and tentative inquiry, the process of courtship should follow just about a 
pattern such as this: If you liked someone you would write them a letter stating that you loved 
them and asking if they wanted to be your boyfriend/girlfriend. Both boys and girls could 
apparently do this. If the recipient of the letter "liked you back", he or she would answer 
either  by  letter  or  face  to  face,  and  you  would  be  considered  a  couple.  You  were  then 
"allowed" to stay in a room alone together during daytime, and people would generally be 
aware of the fact that you were a couple. The bold ones would after a while hold hands in 
public sometimes, and maybe even touch each other discretely, like laying an arm around the 
waist  when standing in a crowd. However,  kissing was regarded as a sexual act  and was 
reserved for engaged and married couples, and even then people did generally not kiss in 
public. In general, in public situations it was hard for an outsider to spot who were together 
and who weren't,  since they would very rarely act  in an obviously different way towards 
boyfriends/girlfriends and other friends of the opposite sex.
This norm can perhaps be related to the concept of ah na deh, the norm of constraining 
the expression and keeping strong feelings hidden on the inside, to keep things "smooth". The 
concept as I understand it does not only relate to negative feelings. Uncontrolled expressions 
of joy or excitement were typically met with an allegation of being "crazy". For example, one 
of the Karen teachers at the school frequently used "crazy" of students who were disorderly, 
joking and laughing in class. "Crazy" could also be used of a person in order to turn down a 
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love request. When an informant told me she had gotten a love letter by a boy she didn't want, 
she had turned him down by smilingly exclaiming "you crazy boy", acting as if the request 
was a laughable non-matter. The term "crazy" seems to have been used in resembling ways in 
Wikan's (1990) field, where a crazy person seemed to denote someone incapable of hiding or 
constraining their feelings (Wikan 1990:7). 
4.2.2. The ambiguity of pre-marital relationships
Talking about romantic issues was considered intimate, and was mostly done either in the 
girls'  room (I  don't  know about  the boys'  room since I  couldn't  go there),  or  in a joking 
manner in the common areas. Hesitancy to "admit" being in a romantic relationship with 
someone seemed ever-present. There was a clear threshold between the outsider (me) and 
"everyone else". This was an area where language problems were clearly prevalent. Every 
comment in English seemed to have a double meaning, and was often followed by a stream of 
talk and laughter in Karen. Methodological issues aside, what seemed to repeat itself was that 
when being asked for the first time if they were in a relationship, people would deny it, even 
though other people's statements sometimes hinted otherwise. Again, the concept of  ah na 
deh is usefully remembered here, as these were probably emotionally loaded issues. Telling 
me that someone else was in a relationship was a popular way of teasing each other, and the 
person subject to the teasing would then deny it and there would be laughter and fighting over 
who was lying to me. This could perhaps be described as straight-forward pubertal behavior 
and not very surprising (an explanation not taking into account that coming of age can be very 
different experiences in different cultural contexts). However, when going into the refugee 
camp for the first time after having stayed at the Center for around a month, the incongruity 
between claims made at the Center in Mae Sariang and in the School in the refugee camp 
became obvious. In fact, all of the girls at the Center had claimed to be single and many of the 
boys too, whereas in camp I would be introduced to their alleged boyfriends and girlfriends. 
This difference between representations was such a reoccurring phenomenon that I caught 
myself thinking that there was a pattern to this secrecy surrounding romantic relationships. I 
pondered whether it was because they were not sure that their partner would admit it and 
wanted to play safe to avoid getting hurt or loosing face, or if it might be because they wanted 
to  keep  their  options  open  since  one  of  them had  left  the  camp.  I  continuously  got  the 
impression that what was being said could not be taken literally, and sometimes the "truth" as 
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I experienced it would be a complete opposition from what I had deduced from what people 
said. In the field this developed into a kind of mystery to me, which I wanted to solve.
Then, one evening when I was in camp, I met a Canadian volunteer teacher at the 
neighboring school.  She happened to  be an anthropologist,  and we started discussing my 
project. The thought that I need to credit this Canadian anthropologist (whose name I have 
unfortunately forgotten) for,  is  that  the general  insecurity of the situation for these young 
people made so many of them hesitate to admitting, in a consistent way, to having any "real" 
dreams or plans. When speaking about the future you had, crudely put, two options. Either 
you could throw all your stakes in there and dream about peace in your home country or 
resettling and building your life and future somewhere distant and wonderful, or you had to 
fully realize, or admit, your own marginalized situation with its utter lack of possibilities for 
choice and self-determination. So when asking if someone had a boyfriend or a girlfriend, I 
might  unknowingly  have  pushed  them  into  a  corner  so  to  speak,  and  asked  them  to 
spontaneously choose between dreaming without conditions - acting as if they had options, 
acting as if they had a choice, and realizing the hard facts of physically being stuck, subject to 
forces beyond their control, and not having a clue whatsoever of what future years would 
hold. 
Thus  I  came  to  see  this  ambiguous  mode  of  expression  regarding  romantic 
relationships, as illustrating something more general. I came to see it as an expression of a 
negotiation  between  dreams  and  reality,  of  which  I  have  pointed  to  various  examples 
throughout this thesis. This, I  argue, was one of the ways the Karen refugees acted upon 
insecurity; it was a way of making meaning. It can, indeed, be seen as a kind of agency. 
The way Karen refugees seemed to insist that there was hope, that there was sense to 
their struggle, can be viewed in light of the same trail of thought. Without falling into the trap 
of suggesting that there is anything "natural", "given" or "functional" about the traits I have 
pointed to, I do believe that the ambiguity in people's representations of place, past, present 
and  future,  was  a  reaction  to  the  circumstances  they found themselves  in  as  refugees.  It 
became central to identity construction. Although a sense of liminality and historically  based 
marginalization might be constructed by a dominant discourse-producer operating within a 
nationalist  framework,  it  was  simultaneously  fundamentally  engrained  in  processes  if 
identification. For the Karen refugees the sense of insecurity was very real, and something 
they dealt with as persons. 
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4.3. Chapter Conclusion
This chapter has been devoted to discussions of how refugeeness affects identity construction, 
with special attention to how people think about the future. In light of these discussions, how 
do we conceptualize an existence as a refugee?
First  of all,  a part  of the answer is that  conflating the whole population of Karen 
refugees (regardless of their legal status), will not capture the situation adequately. As I have 
shown in this thesis,  power differences among Karens – in terms of connectedness to the 
military;  in  terms  of  relation  to  the  Christian  S'gaw elite;  and  in  terms  of  gender  –  are 
significant axis of difference in the Karen refugee community. Moreover, individual stories 
are different, as are their "real", as well as perceived, opportunities. 
In this chapter I have argued that presented with constraints of crippling dimensions, 
many turned to a romanticized image of Karen State as a place for dreams, a Perfect Place, 
and a powerful nationalistic discourse was sustained. I have showed how images of a perfect 
place  could  also  be  directed  towards  a  Third  Country  where  dreams  could  come  true, 
especially among young people. This turn, I have argued, constituted a new element in terms 
of identity negotiation, especially ethnic identity. In other words, significant changes in the 
social field affected habituses (cf. Bourdieu 1993), as notions of the links between place and 
identity  were  renegotiated.  An  attempt  at  including  "wanting  to  go"  into  Karen-ness 
necessarily included a redefinition of Karen-ness, and of the link between Karen-ness and 
Karen State. This process was characterized by friction. 
I have showed how contrasting, yet closely linked, processes of relating to place and 
identity manifested themselves in an apparent blurring of the line between dreams and reality, 
possible and impossible. I substantiated this argument through a discussion of how young 
people talked and acted in relation to the future, and how they dealt with pre-marital romantic 
relationships. I also applied the concept of ah na deh as a partial explanation for ambiguous 
representations. Comparing with Wikan's (1990) case from Bali, I argued that the two cases 
were  similar  in  that  there  were  strong  behavioral  norms  demanding  that  people  show 
constraint and control over their emotions, and that this had a direct effect on how problems 
were dealt with. 
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Without claiming that these acts somehow solved the refugees' problems or gave them 
the sense of humanity or voice which they struggled to achieve (cf. Tangseefa 2003), I have 
argued that these two features – the imagining of a Perfect Place, and seemingly contradictory 
ideas about the future – were defining features of identification processes among Karens in 
the refugee context. I believe that they did sense the marginalization inherent in not having a 
country within a global system of nation-states; in having lost their place; in having been 
uprooted.  At  the  same  time  however,  the  fact  that  these  very  notions  were  so  clearly 
articulated, the fact that they were central in the common Karen narratives, gives them an air 
of resistance. 
I will end this chapter with a conversation from the very beginning of my field work. 
It illustrates the deeply felt hopelessness that I believe must, at least occasionally, take hold of 
people in the Karen refugee community. This boy longed for something else, despaired at his 
current situation and – being faced with me, representing some perfect life he knew he would 
never have but nevertheless dreamed of – almost took to his tears. 
Teacher, sorry..." August Htoo starts every sentence by excusing himself, even though we 
are  just  sitting  at  the  porch  staring  at  the  passing  cars.  "How  long  will  you  stay  in  
Thailand?" I tell him I will stay until the end of December. He nods and gives a small,  
careful laugh. He stares straight ahead with a wrinkle on his forehead. He's sweating, its  
hot, and his hands are shivering slightly. "Teacher, sorry... How many brothers and sisters  
do you have?" I tell him I have one older sister and one younger brother. He nods and  
grunts confirmatively. Another pause while I am wondering whether he is talking to me 
just to be polite or if he actually wants to but just can't find the words. "Teacher, sorry... I  
want to practice my English, but... my English is very weak," he stutters. It's true. I have  
problems understanding him even though I have gotten used to the Karen accent. "Don't  
be shy," I say "you should speak, you should practice." The conversation goes on like this 
for an hour, we take turns asking and answering questions. Suddenly he looks straight at  
me, somehow firmly and hesitantly at the same time. "Teacher, I think... You are lucky.  
Because...you have a country." Pause. "And..." Long pause, his eyes wander. "Peace."  
-"Yes." I answer. "I am lucky." -"We have to stay in Thailand," he proclaims. -"You are not  
happy in Thailand," It is more a statement than a question. -"No. I want to go back to my  
country" .
Illustrative to my central point in this chapter though, Saw August had already at this time 
decided to apply for resettlement to the United States. 
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Chapter 5 - Concluding Remarks: Ambiguity and Agency
In this thesis, I have argued that Karen refugees in Thailand are in a state of ambiguity. This is 
important for how they make meaning and for how identity is  constructed,  how they see 
themselves in the world and how they think about the future. Throughout the thesis I have 
discussed several elements that I hold to be central to identity construction. 
On the one hand marginalization, liminality and unpredictability render the refugees 
with a sense of powerlessness, hopelessness and insecurity.  On the other hand, these traits 
become  key  to  identity  construction,  and  enable  them  to  claim  rights  to  a  category  as 
"deserving" refugees  (cf.  Malkki  1995).  While  marginalization  is  individually  "real"  and 
central  to  identification  processes,  I  have  argued  that  the  dominant  discourse  on  ethnic 
identity and Karen nationalism (cf. Berg 2009) proffers certain subject positions that can be 
seen as instrumental in this representation project. This can be conceptualized as an act of 
resistance (cf. Moore 1994) towards the dominant system of nation states (cf. Malkki 1995), 
and towards the ruling Burmans. Further I argued that this dominant discourse is potentially 
challenged by the range of NGOs the refugees meet when entering the camps.  I  noted a 
certain  potential  for  the  refugee camps to  serve as  multi-discourse arenas,  paying  special 
attention to the Karen Women's Organization (KWO), which aims at the empowerment of 
women. I showed that gender relations do change as a result of life in the camp, and I argued 
that the KWO is an active organization proffering alternative subject positions (cf. Moore 
1994) for women in the camp. In the end however, I believe that the Karen National Union 
(KNU) remains fundamentally unchallenged and power remains masculinized and militarized.
In  Chapter  2  I  discussed  the  conceptualization  of  refugeeness  among  the  Karens, 
which I labeled as somewhat paradoxical. Drawing on Malkki (1992; 1995), Tangseefa (2003) 
and Lubkeman (2008) I created a conceptual space for discussing the refugees' representations 
of their situation. While Tangseefa (2003) focuses on the victimhood and "statuslessness" of 
Karen IDPs, Lubkeman (2008) argues that a state of war does not automatically render actors 
complete "non-agents". I have argued that both perspectives have their valid points in this 
case:  On the  one  hand  the  state  of  refugee  was  conceptualized  as  complete  victimhood, 
marginalized, temporary and liminal. Life in the refugee camp, away from Karen State, as 
someone who has been forced to move away from their home and who has been bereft of their 
nation, was narrated in terms of suffering and misery. On the other hand, the very articulation 
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of this notion victimhood, and the way it becomes instrumental in the nationalistic struggle, I 
have argued, are signs of agency. 
This view is supported by Malkki (1992; 1995), who discusses the conceptualization 
of refugeeness among Hutu refugees in Tanzania. I have noted similarities between my case 
and hers: In both cases the refugees seemed to conceptualize refugeeness as a "pure" category, 
rendering  them  rightful  natives  and  deserving  of  a  nation.  National  identity  was  used 
instrumentally to claim political rights. At the same time, however, I have argued that the 
paradoxical,  but  simultaneously  closely  linked,  pair  of  victimhood  and  resistance  have 
become engrained in identification processes and are central in attempts at making meaning 
for the refugees. 
Another side to the linkages between place and identity, was the noted paradoxical 
representations of Karen State. On the one hand it was conceptualized as a place of suffering 
and terror. On the other hand it was represented as a Perfect Place, and narrated in terms of an 
imagined Karen community where peace, solidarity, prosperity and happiness prevailed. This 
paradox of representation, I argue, was fundamental to the workings of Karen nationalism. I 
have showed how the narratives placed the lives of the Karen into a historical trajectory where 
myth and reality were mixed. It had a clear beginning, a story-line, a plot and a moral, and the 
Karens were portrayed as the innocent  victims of never-ending terror at  the hands of the 
Burman rulers. These reflections are supported by Malkki (1995), who saw the construction 
of a "mythico-history" (cf Malkki 1995) as central to Hutu camp refugees' understanding of 
themselves as "a people" with the rights to "a nation". 
Central to this struggle – it can indeed be argued, the origins of it – was the Karen 
National  Union  (KNU).  I  have  argued,  in  line  with  Berg  (2009)  that  this  organization 
represented  a  dominant  discourse  in  the  Karen  refugee  community,  proffering  certain 
acceptable subject positions (cf. Moore 1994) related to Karen ethnicity. Utilizing Anderson's 
(1991) and Eriksen's (1993) perspectives on ethnicity and nationalism, I have showed how 
they produced and sustained notions of Karen-ness and Karen history, and stressed the unity 
of the Karen People, thereby justifying their continued dominance. The production of history 
justifying the right to define themselves as a nation was a central tool in the production of 
nationalism  (cf.  Anderson  1990),  and  can  be  conceptualized  as  establishing  doxa  (cf. 
Bourdieu 1998). In line with Berg (2009) I have pointed out that the KNU underplayed the 
heterogeneity  that  actually  characterizes  Karens  as  a  people,  for  instance  the  significant 
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linguistic divides. 
While I argued in Chapter 2 that the refugee camps were social arenas ideal for the 
consolidation of nationalism and continued – if not enhanced – dominance of the KNU (cf. 
Berg  2009),  I  have  also  pointed  out  their  potential  as  multi-discourse  arenas.  The 
organizational environment in particular, and the relatively high accessibility to and from the 
"outside world" compared to Karen State, were main reasons for this. A central way in which 
life in the refugee camp represented change, was the social transformation that seemed to 
occur in terms of gender relations. In Chapter 3 I argued that some of the marked differences 
in everyday life have especially affected women's roles and identification processes. Changes 
in the division of labor within the household, better access to schools, and being faced with a 
number of organizations especially directed towards women, providing new modes of action, 
were among the central elements. I have argued that the range of available subject positions 
for women have increased (cf. Moore 1994). Moreover, I have pointed to the Karen Women's 
Organization (KWO) as a central actor. Their aim was the empowerment of women through 
providing them leadership training, income generation projects and various workshops. Many 
informants reported that they had started thinking differently after getting in touch with the 
KWO, that they had started thinking that they "didn't have to be dependent on the men". This 
development was further facilitated by the combination of the facts that in camp, agriculture 
no longer demanded the labor of women (or men), and that more girls went to school in camp 
than in Karen State. 
Female leadership was a central issue for the KWO, and I have argued that their work 
has indeed taken female leadership a long way towards a more general acceptance. In other 
words,  development was moving towards a larger range of available subject positions for 
women (cf. Moore 1994). At the same time however, the situation in camp led to its own 
problems related to changing gender roles, and overall it is hard to estimate whether there has 
been an actual shift in power in favor of women. Moreover, I have also argued that the KWO 
conceptualized  Karen  gender  roles  as  complementary,  not  hierarchical,  and  thus  install 
women and men with different capacities for action. This notion remains unquestioned, and 
can perhaps be labeled a doxic notion (cf Bourdieu 1977). Moreover it is in line with what 
was  commonly  asserted  by  scholars  and  activists  alike  up  until  a  few  decades  ago  (cf. 
Atkinson and Errington 1990 and Fagertun 2009), that  gender roles in Southeast Asia are 
"equal but different". In line with Moore (1994) and Fagertun (2009), I hold that this notion 
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nevertheless implies a notion of fundamental difference, and as such inhibits the potential for 
dominance. 
While the KWO was a central actor which could arguably be seen as resisting the 
dominant  KNU  discourse  in  certain  ways,  I  argued  that  they  did  not  challenge  the 
fundamental  sense  of  Karen-ness  proffered  by  this  discourse.  While  this  approach  could 
perhaps be interpreted as the KWO being unable, or unwilling, to challenge the dominant 
discourse, I have argued, in line with Parker (2005), that this form of resistance can indeed be 
seen as agency. Moreover the concept of ah na deh (crudely interpreted as a tendency to avoid 
direct confrontation) possibly favors working "behind the scenes" over rebellion. 
In the face of resettlement options, ideas about identity, ethnicity and aspirations were 
renegotiated. In Chapter 4 I discussed how the linkages between place and identity (cf. Malkki 
1995)  proffered  within  the  discourse  of  Karen  nationalism,  where  Karen  State  was 
fundamental  to  Karen  ethnicity,  were  challenged  in  the  face  of  change.  The  friction  that 
occurred included doubt, ambiguity and guilt related to a desire to go to a third country (cf. 
Berg 2009), and there was an intense ongoing negotiation within the refugee community as to 
how or whether this could fit into fundamental notions about ethnic identity. Was it possible to 
be  a  proper  Karen  and  actually  choose  to  resettle  to  a  third  country?  Given  that  the 
resettlement program has only been going on for a little over five years, outcomes are hard to 
predict. 
Moreover, in Chapter 4 I showed how the unpredictability and uncertainty related to 
life in the refugee camp – on the one hand getting in touch with something "other", while on 
the other hand sensing one's own low status and lack of options within this system, led to 
young Karen refugees talking about their  future in markedly paradoxical ways. While the 
narratives discussed in Chapter 2 were fundamental to most peoples' representations of their 
ethnic identity, their individual histories and their values - "everyone" presented plans to go 
back to Karen State and Help Their Community - many simultaneously made more or less 
firm plans to get resettled. Similar contrasting ways of thinking and talking about the future 
were manifest in the ways young people dealt with pre-marital romantic relationships. I noted 
how people talked about romantic relationships in seemingly inconsistent ways, apparently 
hesitant to "admit" to being in one. I drew lines to the concept of ah na deh, arguing that 
norms of behavior inducing people to show constraint, to be in control of their emotions and 
not stir up bad feelings, might lead to a certain care when dealing with emotionally loaded 
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issues. Similar norms of behavior have been noted by Wikan (1990) in her monograph from 
Northern Bali. Constraining emotional expressions was fundamentally important in Wikan's 
(1990) case, and it had a direct and severe influence on how people dealt with problems. In 
the Karen case I have argued that remaining ambiguous was a turn that allowed people to 
hope while "staying Karen", and without the great risk of loosing face if and when their plans 
changed. 
Several of the traits discussed above can be said to be characterized by a paradox of  
representation. Conceptualizations of refugeeness; representations of Karen State; Changes in 
gender roles; and peoples' thoughts about the future, were all characterized by a degree of 
ambiguity. These  ambiguities,  I  argue,  led  to  representational  paradoxes,  and  were 
fundamental  to  identity  construction.  They  were  a  way  of  making meaning for  Karen 
refugees,  constantly faced  as  they were  with  unpredictability  and non-fulfillment  of  their 
ambitions.  I  see  this  turn  as  an  exhibition  of  agency.  Thus,  the  conceptualization  of 
refugeeness  pointed  to  and  criticized  by  Malkki  (1995)  and  Lubkeman  (2008)  as  'bare 
humans' with no agency, driven by an almost biological urge to survive, generally does not 
apply here. 
Let it be noted however, that I do not wish to underplay the suffering many Karen 
people have experienced as a result of the more than 60 year long war. Even though I point to 
the active use of Karen history, and to attempts at making meaning; and even though I suggest 
that factors in the refugee camp improve certain aspects of life for women – I do by no means 
suggest  that  the  suffering  they  talk  about  isn't  "real",  that  they  don't  "actually"  feel 
marginalized, powerless and insecure. The fact that it is now being debated whether to define 
the atrocities committed against Karens in Eastern Burma as crimes against humanity (see for 
instance Amnesty International 2008), should more than suffice to stress this. The title of this 
thesis, as well as the last quote in Chapter 4, were included as a reminder, to myself and to the 
reader:  For  the  past  six  months  I  have  struggled  to  obtain  an  analytical  distance  to  my 
empirical material, and can thus (hopefully) point to some abstract processes going on among 
Karen refugees. However I have tried to tie my analysis to informants' voices throughout the 
thesis, reminding myself and the reader who this is all about. I hope I have managed to pay 
respect to their experiences. 
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List of expressions and abbreviations
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Border, the: Refers to the national border between Thailand and Burma. 
Burma/Myanmar.  The official  name of the country is  Union of Myanmar.  The opposition 
prefers the name Burma.
Burman/Burmese: "Burman" refers to the largest ethnic group in Burma, which dominates the 
central and urban areas of Burma. “Burmese” refers to all nationalities which consider 
themselves to belong in Burma, and as such also includes, in addition to Burmans, the 
ethnic  minorities  of  Shan,  Karen,  Kachin,  Mon,  Rohingya,  Kayah  and  Chin. 
Indigenously however, Burmese usually refers to Burmans.
CCSDPT: Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced People in Thailand. 
CPB: Communist Party of Burma
DKBA: Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. Fractioned out of the KNU in 1995 and are now in 
alliance with the SPDC. 
KED: Karen Education Committee. The educational wing of the KNU
KNLA: Karen National Liberation Army. The military wing of the KNU. 
KNU: Karen National Union. The larges Karen insurgency group/opposition party
KRC: Karen Refugee Committee. The overall representatives of Karen refugees in Thailand.
KWO: Karen Women's Organization
MOI: Thai Ministry of Interior
Naw: Used before girls' and women's names in polite or formal settings. The prefix is used 
regardless of age or marital status.
PAB: Provincial Admission Boards: Administrative units that register refugees in the camps 
on an ad hoc basis. Also used to denote a person that has been registered as a legitimate 
dweller in the camp but which does not have refugee status. 
RTA: Royal Thai Army
RTG: Royal Thai Government
92
Saw: Used before boys'  and men's  names in  polite  or formal  settings.  The prefix  is  used 
regardless of age or marital status.
SLORC. State Law and Order Restoration Council. The previous name of the SPDC. 
SPDC: The State Peace and Development Council. The military junta of the Burman central 
authorities. Refers to both government and military, as the head of state also is the head 
of the military (Senior General Than Shwe). Commonly used by the Karens to denote 
the Burmese Army. 
Tatmadaw: The Burmese Army. Commonly referred to as the SPDC, even though the SPDC 
also includes the Government. 
TBBC: Thailand Burma Border Consortium. Handles deliveries of rice, cooking oil, yellow 
beans,  vegetable  mix,  charcoal  and  building  materials  to  all  the  camps  along  the  
border. Member organization of the CCSDPT.
ZOA:  Zud  Ost  Asien.  Provides  primary  and  secondary  education  in  most  of  the  camps. 
Member organization of the CCSDPT.
MI: Malteser International. Provides health and sanitation services to the camps
PPAT:  Planned  Parenthood  Association  of  Thailand.  Organizing  activities  related  to 
Reproductive health in the camps
WE: World Education. Provides special education in the camps. 
HI: Handicap International. Provides mine risk education and rehabilitation in the camps. 
COERR: Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees 
TOPS: Taipei Overseas Peace Service
SVA: Shanti Volunteer Association. In charge of libraries in the camps
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
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